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Nick Zangwill

University College London
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    157
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    12
  •  News and Updates
    32
  •  Philosophical Views

 More details
  • University College London
    Department of Philosophy
    Other (Part-time)
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Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
Aesthetics
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics
Aesthetics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Normative Ethics
1 more
  • All publications (157)
  •  482
    Direction of fit and normative functionalism
    Philosophical Studies 91 (2): 173-203. 1998.
    What is the difference between belief and desire? In order to explain the difference, recent philosophers have appealed to the metaphor of
    Thought and ThinkingFunctionalism
  •  136
    Negative Properties, Determination and Conditionals
    Topoi 22 (2): 127-134. 2003.
    Properties, MiscValue Theory
  •  164
    Hume, taste, and teleology
    Philosophical Papers 23 (1): 1-18. 1994.
    Hume: AestheticsTeleology and Function, Misc
  •  213
    Variable realization: Not proven
    Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167): 214-19. 1992.
    Functionalism, MiscMultiple RealizabilityFunctional Realization
  •  276
    Constitution and Causation
    Metaphysica 13 (1): 1-6. 2012.
    I argue that the constitution relation transmits causal efficacy and thus is a suitable relation to deploy in many troubled areas of philosophy, such as the mind–body problem. We need not demand identity
    Material ConstitutionTheories of CausationVarieties of Causation
  •  270
    Moral mind-independence
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2): 205-219. 1994.
    Moral ExpressivismMoral Projectivism
  •  272
    The indifference argument
    Philosophical Studies 138 (1). 2008.
    I argue against motivational internalism. First I recharacterise the issue over moral motivation. Second I describe the indifference argument against motivation internalism. Third I consider appeals to irrationality that are often made in the face of this argument, and I show that they are ineffective. Lastly, I draw the motivational externalist conclusion and reflect on the nature of the issue.
    Internalism and Externalism about Moral Judgment
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