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33Skepticism and foundationsIn Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Press. pp. 1--11. 2003.
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30How do people reason about the what follows from certain assumptions? How do they think about implications between statements. According to one theory, people try to use a small number of mental rules of inference to construct an argument for or proof of a relevant conclusion from the assumptions (e.g., Rips 1994). According to a competing theory, people construct one or more mental models of the situation described in the assumptions and try to determine what conclusion fits with the model or mo…Read more
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30Epistemic Analysis: A Coherence Theory of Knowledge (review)Philosophical Review 97 (1): 122-123. 1988.
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29Glüer, Kathrin., Donald Davidson: A Short IntroductionReview of Metaphysics 67 (1): 162-164. 2013.
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29Two quibbles about analyticity and psychological realityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 21-22. 1980.
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28This is indeed a fallacy, if the relevant sort of consistency is logical consistency. However, the expression “is consistent with” is often used by scientists to mean something much stronger, something like confirms or even strongly confirms.
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26Précis of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning TheoryAbstracta 5 (S3): 5-9. 2009.
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2612. knowledge, inference, and explanationIn Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 106. 2003.
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25General Foundations versus Rational InsightPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3): 657-663. 2001.BonJour offers two main reasons for supposing that there is such a thing as rational insight into necessity. First, he says there are many examples in which it clearly seems that one has such insight. Second, he argues that any epistemology denying the existence of rational insight into necessity is committed to a narrow skepticism. After commenting about possible frameworks for epistemological justification, I argue against these two claims in reverse order.
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23Book Review:Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition: A Theory of Judgment. Howard Margolis (review)Ethics 100 (1): 200-. 1989.
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22Moral Relativism and Moral ObjectivityPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 161-169. 1998.
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21Review of W. V. Quine. Philosophy of logic. Englewood cliffs (review)Metaphilosophy 2 (2). 1971.
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21Meaning and semanticsIn Milton Karl Munitz & Peter K. Unger (eds.), Semantics and philosophy: [essays], New York University Press. 1974.
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21New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (review)Journal of Philosophy 98 (5): 265-269. 2001.
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21Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theoryBehavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3): 365-365. 1983.
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21William P. Alston. The quest for meanings. Mind, n.s. vol. 72 , pp. 79–87. - William P. Alston. Meaning and use. The philosophical quarterly , vol. 13 , pp. 107–124 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (3): 456-457. 1970.
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20Response to Shaffer, Thagard, Strevens and HansonAbstracta 5 (S3): 47-56. 2009.Like Glenn Shafer, we are nostalgic for the time when “philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists interested in probability, induction, and scientific methodology talked with each other more than they do now”, [p.10]. 1 Shafer goes on to mention other relevant contemporary communities. He himself has been at the interface of many of these communities while at the same time making major contributions to them and this very symposium represents something of that desired discussion. We begin with …Read more
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