•  127
    Moral reasoning
    with Kelby Mason and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
    In John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    What is moral reasoning? For that matter, what is any sort of reasoning? Let me begin by making a few distinctions. First, there is a distinction between reasoning as something that that people do and the abstract structures of proof or “argument” that are the subject matter of formal logic. I will be mainly concerned with reasoning in the first sense, reasoning that people do. Second, there is a distinction between moral reasoning with other people and moral reasoning by and for yourself . Mora…Read more
  •  8
    The relation between Quine and Davidson
    In Glock, Hans Johann (2014). The relation between Quine and Davidson. In: Harman, Gilbert; Lepore, Ernest. A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 526-551, . pp. 526-551. 2014.
  •  63
    Love isn't all you need (review)
    Times Literary Supplement 26 (5104): 26. 2001.
    Virtue ethics is a type of ethical theory in which the notion of virtue or good character plays a central role. This splendid new book describes a “program” for the development of a particular (“Aristotelian”) form of virtue ethics. The book is intended to be used as a textbook, but should be read by anyone interested in moral philosophy. Hursthouse has been a major contributor to the development of virtue ethics and the program she describes, while making use of the many contributions of others…Read more
  •  3
    Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology (edited book)
    with William P. Alston, Roderick M. Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, and John R. Searle
    Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1997.
    This landmark collection of essays by six renowned philosophers explores the implications of the contentious realism/antirealism debate for epistemology. The essays examine issues such as whether epistemology needs to be realist, the bearing of a realist conception of truth on epistemology, and realism and antirealism in terms of a pragmatist conception of epistemic justification. Richard Rorty's essay provides a critical commentary on the other five.
  •  81
    Logical form
    Foundations of Language 9 (1): 38-65. 1972.
    Theories of adverbial modification can be roughly distinguished into two sorts. One kind of theory takes logical form to follow surface grammatical form. Adverbs are treated as unanalyzable logical operators that turn a predicate or sentence into a different predicate or sentence respectively. And new rules of logic are stated for these operators. A different kind of theory does not suppose that logical form must parallel surface grammatical form. It allows that logical form may have more to do …Read more
  •  1562
  •  881
    The inference to the best explanation
    Philosophical Review 74 (1): 88-95. 1965.
  •  220
    Enumerative induction as inference to the best explanation
    Journal of Philosophy 65 (18): 529-533. 1968.
  •  28
    A Companion to W. V. O. Quine (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2013.
    This Companion brings together a team of leading figures in contemporary philosophy to provide an in-depth exposition and analysis of Quine’s extensive influence across philosophy’s many sub-fields, highlighting the breadth of his work, and revealing his continued significance today.
  •  4
    Indeterminacy, Relativity, and Behaviorism
    In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley. 2013.
    Gilbert Harman, Indeterminacy, Relativity, and Behaviorism: The indeterminacy of radical translation is comparable to the various ways of representing number theory in set theory. Transcendent notions of reference and meaning, which are subject to indeterminacy, can be distinguished from immanent notions that are trivially not subject to indeterminacy. Although Quine's discussions of these issues emphasize behavioral dispositions, he appeals to dispositions as place‐holders for currently unknown…Read more
  •  197
    Moral Explanation and Moral ObjectivityMoral Relativism and Moral Objectivity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 175. 1998.
    What is the real issue at stake in discussions of "moral explanation"? There isn't one; there are many. The standing of purported moral properties and problems about our epistemic or semantic access to them are of concern both from within and without moral practice. An account of their potential contribution to explaining our values, beliefs, conduct, practices, etc. can help in these respects. By examining some claims made about moral explanation in Judith Thompson's and Gilbert Harman's Moral …Read more
  •  11
    W. V. Quine. Philosophy of logic. Englewood Cliffs (review)
    Metaphilosophy 2 (2): 184-190. 2007.
  •  55
    Stringency of Rights and "Ought"The Realm of Rights.Fundamental Legal Conceptions
    with Judith Jarvis Thomson, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, and Walter Wheeler Cook
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 181. 1993.
  •  6
    Responses to CriticsMoral Relativism and Moral Objectivity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 207. 1998.
  •  30
    Language learning
    Noûs 4 (1): 33-43. 1970.
  •  99
    How belief is based on inference
    Journal of Philosophy 61 (12): 353-359. 1964.
  •  101
  •  271
    Sellars' semantics
    Philosophical Review 79 (3): 404-419. 1970.
  •  49
    On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays.Noam Chomsky, Linguistics and Philosophy
    with Finngeir Hiorth
    Philosophical Quarterly 26 (103): 187-189. 1976.
  •  94
    Is modal logic logic?
    Philosophia 2 (1-2): 75-84. 1972.
    (1) modal logic is not needed, Since there are alternative accounts of modality. (2) modal logic does not function as logic even in the thinking of its advocates, As is revealed, E.G., When the semantics of modal logic is presented in an extensional metalanguage. Furthermore, (3) when a wider view is taken, One sees that modal logic treats as logical constants expressions that belong to a large and open syntactic class, Unlike other logical constants. Finally, (4) modal logic treats as sententia…Read more