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30Glüer, Kathrin., Donald Davidson: A Short IntroductionReview of Metaphysics 67 (1): 162-164. 2013.
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29Two quibbles about analyticity and psychological realityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 21-22. 1980.
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746According to moral relativism, there is not a single true morality. There are a variety of possible moralities or moral frames of reference, and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc. is a relative matter—relative to one or another morality or moral frame of reference. Something can be morally right relative to one moral frame of reference and morally wrong relative to another. It is useful to compare moral relativism to other relativisms. One possible com…Read more
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143Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning 1 (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1): 173-179. 2007.Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests is a brilliant book, combining insights about knowledge with a careful examination of how recent views in epistemology fit with the best of recent linguistic semantics. Although I am largely convinced by Stanley’s objections to epistemic contextualism, I will try in what follows to formulate a version that might have some prospect of escaping his powerful critique.
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3'The Internal CritiqueIn Dov M. Gabbay (ed.), Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: The Turn Towards the Practical, Elsevier. pp. 171--186. 2002.
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44In (Harman 2007) I argued “that a purely objective account of conscious experience cannot always by itself give an understanding of what it is like to have that experience.” Following Nagel (1974), I suggested that such a gap “has no obvious metaphysical implications. It [merely] reflects the distinction between two kinds of understanding,” objective and subjective, where subjective understanding or “Das Verstehen” (Dilthey 1883/1989) of another creature’s experience involves knowing what it is …Read more
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64Statistical Learning Theory (e.g., Hastie et al., 2001; Vapnik, 1998, 2000, 2006) is the basic theory behind contemporary machine learning and data-mining. We suggest that the theory provides an excellent framework for philosophical thinking about inductive inference.
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24Book Review:Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition: A Theory of Judgment. Howard Margolis (review)Ethics 100 (1): 200-. 1989.
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366Practical reasoningIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. pp. 431--63. 1997.
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51Hawthorne discusses (without endorsing) the following instance of our (T1) , “One knows that one is seeing a desk by taking for granted, but without knowing, that one is not a brain in a vat” (510). We believe that this is a commonsensical way of describing an ordinary situation. Intuitively, one knows one is seeing a desk. Intuitively one is normally justified in taking it for granted that one is not a brain in a vat, but one does not know one isn’t a brain in a vat.
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8039What is moral relativism?In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals, D. Reidel. pp. 143--161. 1978.
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9Is There a Single True Morality?In Paul K. Moser & Thomas L. Carson (eds.), Moral Relativism: A Reader, Oxford University Press. pp. 165. 2001.
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1Pragmatism and reasons for beliefIn C. B. Kulp (ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield. 1997.
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112Reflections on knowledge and its limitsPhilosophical Review 111 (3): 417-428. 2002.Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits is the most important philosophical discussion of knowledge in many years. It sets the agenda for epistemology for the next decade and beyond.
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7IntentionalityIn William Bechtel & George Graham (eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science, Blackwell. 1998.A proper understanding of intentionality is crucial to the study of a number of topics in cognitive science, including perception, imagery, and consciousness. The term itself, intentionality, can be misleading, in suggesting intentional action, doing something intentionally, with a certain aim or purpose. In cognitive science, the term is used in a different, more technical sense. Intentionality involves reference or aboutness or some similar relation to something having what the scholastics of …Read more
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3The toxin puzzleIn Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, Cambridge University Press. pp. 84--89. 1998.
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21New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (review)Journal of Philosophy 98 (5): 265-269. 2001.
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64Rationality in AgreementSocial Philosophy and Policy 5 (2): 1. 1988.Gauthier's title is potentially misleading. The phrase “morals by agreement” suggests a social contract theory of morality according to which basic moral principles arise out of an actual or hypothetical agreement. John Rawls defends a hypothetical agreement version, arguing that the basic principles of justice are those that would be agreed to in an initial position of fair equality. I myself defend an actual agreement version, arguing that the moral principles that apply to a person derive fro…Read more
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281Field on the Normative Role of LogicProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3). 2009.I begin by summarizing the first two chapters of (Harman 1986). The first chapter stresses the importance of not confusing inference with implication and of not confusing reasoning with the sort of argument studied in deductive logic. Inference and reasoning are psychological events or processes that can be done more or less well. The sort of implication and argument studied in deductive logic have to do with relations among propositions and with structures of propositions distinguished into pre…Read more
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81The Nonexistence of Character TraitsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2): 223-226. 2000.
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