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21Meaning and semanticsIn Milton Karl Munitz & Peter K. Unger (eds.), Semantics and philosophy: [essays], New York University Press. 1974.
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37The Fragmentation of Reason: Precis of Two ChaptersPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1): 179-183. 1991.
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264Discussions of the mind-body problem often refer to an
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172Block is concerned with the question whether there are cases of phenomenology in the absence of cognitive access. I assume that, more precisely, the question is whether there are cases in which a subject S has a phenomenological experience E to which S does not have direct cognitive access?
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385Moral relativism is moral realismPhilosophical Studies 172 (4): 855-863. 2015.I begin by describing my relation with Nicholas Sturgeon and his objections to things I have said about moral explanations. Then I turn to issues about moral relativism. One of these is whether a plausible version of moral relativism can be formulated as a claim about the logical form of certain moral judgments. I agree that is not a good way to think of moral relativism. Instead, I think of moral relativism as a version of moral realism. I compare moral relativism with the relativity of motion …Read more
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2027. Reflections on Language, by Noam Chomsky; On Noam Chomsky: Critical EssaysIn Bernard Williams (ed.), Essays and Reviews: 1959-2002, Princeton University Press. pp. 133-140. 2014.
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241Guilt-free moralityOxford Studies in Metaethics 4 203-14. 2009.Here are some of the ways in which some philosophers and psychologists have taken the emotion of guilt to be essential to morality. One relatively central idea is that guilt feelings are warranted if an agent knows that he or she has acted morally wrongly. It might be said that in such a case the agent has a strong reason to feel guilt, that the agent ought to have guilt feelings, that the agent is justified in having guilt feelings and unjustified in not having guilt feelings. It might be said …Read more
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21Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theoryBehavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3): 365-365. 1983.
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136Moral particularism and transductionPhilosophical Issues 15 (1). 2005.Can someone be reasonable or justified in accepting a specific moral judgment not based on the prior acceptance of a general exceptioness moral principle, where acceptance of a general principle might be tacit or implicit and might not be expressible in language? This issue is an instance of a wider issue about direct or transductive inference. Developments in statistical learning theory show that such an inference can be more effective than alternative methods using inductive generalization and…Read more
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59Scott Sehon argues for a complex view about the relation between commonsense psychology and the physical sciences.1 He rejects any sort of Cartesian dualism and believes that the common-sense psychological facts supervene on the physical facts. Nevertheless he asserts that there is an important respect in which common-sense psychology is independent of the physical sciences. Despite supervenience, we are not to expect any sort of reduction of common-sense psychology to physical science, nor are …Read more
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47Doubts about conceptual analysisIn John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Michaelis Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 43--48. 1994.
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69Some philosophical issues in cognitive scienceIn Michael I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science, Mit Press. 1989.
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139Intending, intention, intent, intentional action, and acting intentionally: Comments on Knobe and BurraJournal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2): 269-276. 2006.There has been considerable controversy about whether this last entailment always holds. Ordinary subjects may judge that (4) and (5) are appropriate in cases in which none of (1)-(3) are—cases in which Jack’s breaking the base is a foreseen but undesired consequence of Jack’s intentionally doing something else. It is currently debated what the best explanation of such ordinary reactions might be. It is also debated what to make of the fact that ordinary judgments using the adjective intentional…Read more
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16"Logical Form in Natural Language" by William G. Lycan (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2): 340. 1986.
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61Critical review: Richard B. Brandt, a theory of the good and the right (review)Philosophical Studies 42 (1). 1982.
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