Christoph Luetge

In many countries around the world, the mechanisms of civil society have become very commonplace. Large companies are under constant pressure from civil society organizations to change their policies, strategies and approaches. The tobacco industry in particular is under heavy pressure in many parts of the world. Smoking has been prohibited in many public as well as private or semi-private areas in a large number of countries. However, while smoking as an addiction seems to be declining in some countries, in others it is not. This paper presents an example of a country (Indonesia) in which smoking is still on the rise. We discuss how mechanisms of civil society are a chance to at least improve the situation and effectively combat a grave social problem.

During the current financial crisis, the need for an alternative to a laissez-faire ethics of capitalism (the Milton Friedman view) becomes clear. I argue that we need an order ethics which employs economics as a key theoretical resource and which focuses on institutions for implementing moral norms. I will point to some aspects of order ethics which highlight the importance of rules, e.g. global rules for the financial markets. In this regard, order ethics (“Ordnungsethik”) is the complement of the German conception of “Ordnungspolitik” which also stresses the importance of a regulatory framework. This framework is needed not to tame the market, but to make it more profitable in the long run. The conception of order ethics relies heavily on contractarianism, especially on James Buchanan’s work. Unlike many other conceptions of ethics, it does not start with an aim to achieve, but rather with an account of what the social world – in which ethical norms have to be implemented – is like. Our social world is different from the pre-modern one. Pre-modern societies played zero-sum games in which people could only gain significantly at the expense of others. And the types of ethics that we are still used to today have been developed within these pre-modern societies. Modern societies, by contrast, can be characterised – by economists and other social theorists alike – as societies with continuous growth. This growth has only been made possible by the modern competitive market economy which enables everyone to pursue his own interests within a carefully devised institutional system. In this system, positive sum games are played, which makes it in principle possible to improve the position of every individual at the same time. Most kinds of ethics, however, resulting from the conditions of pre-modern societies, ignore the possibility of win-win-situations and instead require us to be moderate, to share, to sacrifice, as this would have been functional in zero-sum games. These conceptions distinguish – in more or less strict ways – between self-interest and altruistic motivation. Self-interest, more often than not, is ultimately seen as something evil. Such an ethics cannot be functional in modern societies. Ethical concepts lag behind. Within zero-sum games, it was necessary to call for temperance, for moderate profits, or for a condemnation of lending money at interest. Within positive-sum games, however, the morally desired result of a social process cannot be brought about by changes in motivation, by switching from ‘egoistic’ to ‘altruistic’ motivation. The second theoretical element introduced by order ethics is the distinction between actions and rules, which was already mentioned. Traditional ethics concerns actions: It calls directly for changes in behaviour. This is a consequence of pre-modern conditions as reconstructed before: People in the pre-modern world were only able to control their actions, not so much however the conditions of their actions. In particular, rules like laws, constitutions, social structures, the market order, and also ethical norms have remained stable for centuries. In modern societies, this situation has changed entirely. The rules governing our actions have increasingly come under our control. In this situation, ethics has to focus on rules. Morality must be incorporated in incentive-compatible rules. Direct calls for changes in behaviour without changes in the rules lead only to an erosion of compliance with moral norms. Individuals that continue to behave ‘morally’ will be singled out, because the incentives have not been changed. Moral norms which are to be justified cannot require people to abstain from pursuing their own advantage. People abstain from taking ‘immoral’ advantages only if adherence to ethical norms yields greater benefits over the planned sequence of actions than defection in the single case. Thus ‘abstaining’ is not abstaining in the long run, it is rather an investment in expectations of long-term benefits. By adhering to ethical norms, I become a reliable partner for interactions. The norms do indeed constrain my actions, but they simultaneously expand my options in interactions. And people consent to rules only if these rules hold greater advantages for them, at least in the long run. In general, ethics cannot require people to abandon their individual calculation of advantages. However, it may suggest improving one’s calculation, by calculating in the long run rather than in the short run, and by taking into account the interests of our fellows, as we depend on their acceptance for reaching an optimal level of well-being, especially in a globalized world full of interdependence. The problem of implementation can now be placed at the beginning of a conception of order ethics, justified with reference to the conditions of modern societies I have sketched. Under the conditions of pre-modern societies, an ethics of temperance had evolved that posed simultaneously the problems of implementation and justification. The implementation of well-justified norms or standards could then be regarded as unproblematic, because the social structures allowed for a direct face-to-face enforcement of norms. Pre-modern societies not only favored an ethics of temperance, they also had the instrument of face-to-face-sanctions within their smaller and non-anonymous communities. This instrument is no longer functional in modern anonymous societies, and so we have to face up to the problem of implementation right at the start of our ethical conception. Simultaneously, an order ethics relies on the implementation of sanctions for enforcing incentive-compatible rules. In modern societies, rules and institutions, to a large extent, must fulfil the tasks that were, in pre-modern times, fulfilled by moral norms, which in turn were sanctioned by face-to-face sanctions. Norm implementation in modern societies thus works by setting adequate incentives in order to prevent the erosion of moral norms, which would happen if ‘moral’ actors were systematically threatened with exploitation by other, less ‘moral’ actors. This conception of order ethics is then elaborated further in the area of business ethics.

The Handbook of Business Ethics: Philosophical Foundations is a standard interdisciplinary reference handbook in the field of business ethics. Articles by notable philosophers and economists examine fundamental concepts, theories and questions of business ethics: Are morality and self-interest compatible? What is meant by a just price? What did the Scholastic philosophers think about business? The handbook will cover the entire philosophical basis of business ethics. Articles range from historical positions such as Aristotelianism, Kantianism and Marxism to systematic issues like justice, religious issues, rights and globalisation or gender. The book is intended as a reference work for academics, students (esp. graduate), and professionals.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is a wide consensus in society and science that a modern society cannot do without a market economy. The current political and academic debate revolves primarily around the question of what kind of social system a modern society needs. This question includes important normative as well as instrumental aspects. In this essay, we want to pursue the question of how modern societies can best achieve progress in both dimensions. The standard response — both politically and academically — is that we can improve our social system best through piecemeal engineering. According to the standard view, the improvements of our social system should be both democratically legitimizced and put into effect nationwide. In this essay, we want to oppose this consensus and raise the question whether a competition between decentralized social systems would not be a more apt means to reach shared goals. The motivating idea behind this essay is not to pesent a fully-fledged theory, but to question some of the standard presumptions for piecemeal engineering that is often directed against institutional compctition in the realm of social systems.

This volume explores various aspects of risk taking. It offers an analysis of financial, entrepreneurial and social risks, as well as a discussion of the ethical implications of empirical findings. The main issues examined in the book are the financial crisis and its implications for business ethics. The book discusses unethical behaviour as a reputational risk (e.g., in the case of Goldman Sachs) and the question is raised as to what extent the financial crisis has changed the banks’ entrepreneurial strategy. The book presents an analysis of the reasons leading to the crisis and identifies them as ethical dilemma structures. In addition, it looks at general questions regarding ethical behaviour and risk taking, such as: To what extent does the social embeddedness or abstraction play a role in guaranteeing ethical behaviour? What conclusions can be drawn from institutional or evolutionary perspectives on risk management? Finally, the book discusses further issues that become factors of risk within and between societies, such as work insecurity, corruption or the problem of facilitation payments as a risk in international transactions.

Contract-based approaches have been a focus of attention in business ethics. As one of the grand traditions in political philosophy, contractarianism is founded on the notion that we will never resolve deep moral disagreement. Classical philosophers like Hobbes and Locke, or recent ones like Rawls and Gaus, seek to solve ethical conflicts on the level of social rules and procedures. Recent authors in business ethics have sought to utilize contract-based approaches for their field and to apply it to concrete business dilemmas. However, the application of contractarianism to management contexts can cause difficulties. Our article discusses this conceptual problem of contractarian business ethics and presents the idea of order ethics as an alternative. Order ethics, as we argue, can make a difference by conceptually bridging the gap between contractarianism and business ethics.

This study provides a representation of the broad spectrum of theoretical work on topics related to business ethics, with a particular focus on corporate citizenship. It considers relations of business and society alongside social responsibility and moves on to examine the historical and systemic foundations of business ethics, focusing on the concepts of social and ethical responsibilities. The contributors explore established theories and concepts and their impact on moral behaviour. Together, the contributions offer varied philosophical theories in approaches to business ethics. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers with an interest in the theoretical development of business ethics. Reviews: 'The rapidly expanding business ethics field is often populated by thinly theorised work. This book is a welcome exception. It is also distinctive in that it embraces a clear macro perspective whereas much of the debate is rather stuck at the level of the individual or the organisation. As such the book has a distinctively European flavour and should be considered as an intellectually stimulating collection offering original perspectives on business ethics.' Laura J. Spence, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK 'This book makes an important contribution to our knowledge and understanding of corporations especially in the areas of corporate citizenship and responsibility as well as ethics and economic ethics. In addition the relationship of these areas with the social contract is well argued.' Australian Journal of Corporate Law

This paper draws a connection between recent developments in naturalized philosophy of science and the Buchanan research program in economics. Economic approaches in naturalized philosophy of science can be combined to form an economic philosophy of science. After giving an overview of some of these approaches, I lay out the fundamentals of the Buchanan research program. I argue that its main elements are a theory of interactions and a normative foundation in consensus which help to answer some important criticisms of economic philosophy of science.

Ziel dieses Papiers ist es die Ordnungsethik – einen bereichsethischen Ansatz, der derzeit vor allem für wirtschaftsethische Fragestellungen benutzt wird – als eine universelle Methode zur Analyse von bereichsethischen Fragestellungen vorzustellen. Um das Vorhaben handhabbar zu machen, muss es in zweierlei Hinsicht eingeschränkt werden. Zum einen kann es sich hier natürlich nicht um eine voll ausgearbeitete Methodologie für die Analyse von bereichsethischen Fragestellungen handeln, sondern nur um eine methodische Skizze. Zum anderen soll es in diesem Papier im Wesentlichen um solche bereichsethischen Fragestellungen gehen, deren Lösung die Implementierung von formellen wie informellen Regeln erfordert.

Many social philosophers and ethicists contend that a modern society cannot remain stable merely by its citizens obeying all of its rules. Such prominent theoreticians as J. Habermas, J. Rawls, D. Gauthier or R. Rorty hold the view that the citizens of a modern society must exhibit additional anthropological qualities which are termed moral surpluses here. Christoph Lütge argues, however, that no moral surplus is immune to erosion by systematic counter-incentives and that anthropological qualities in general cannot serve as a basis for ethics in the globalized world. An order ethics, which is based on weaker prerequisites, namely the characteristics of situations and their basic conditions (orders), is more likely to count on cross-cultural approval in the era of globalization.

Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der Darstellung des systematischen Zusammenhangs des mit dem Aufkommen der Experimentellen Philosophie neu entstandenen Teilbereichs der Experimentellen Ethik mit der spätestens seit den 1980er Jahren wieder populär gewordenen Evolutionären Ethik, einer Teildisziplin des philosophischen Naturalismus. Nach einer kurzen Charakterisierung beider ethischer Teilbereiche wird am Beispiel der metaethischen Frage nach der Objektivität moralischer Urteile dafür argumentiert, dass die partikulären Ergebnisse experimenteller Methoden in der Moralphilosophie erst in einer umfassenderen Perspektive auf menschliches Handeln vollständig interpretierbar werden: Ohne eine rahmenbildende Hintergrundtheorie moralischen Urteilens, wie z.B. die Evolutionäre Ethik, liefert die Experimentelle Ethik nicht mehr als proximate Erklärungen moralischer Urteilsmechanismen. Zweifelsohne sind dies wertvolle Erkenntnisse über die Funktionsweise moralischer Urteilsfindung – ohne Ordnungsrahmen drohen sie jedoch unverbunden nebeneinander stehen zu bleiben. Andererseits beinhaltet gerade die Evolutionäre Ethik empirische Hintergrundannahmen über menschliches moralisches Urteilen, die erst mit den Methoden der Experimentellen Ethik ihre unabdingbare empirische Überprüfung finden können. Diese zwei Teilbereiche der Moralphilosophie stehen daher in enger systematischer Beziehung.

In March 2008, the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) has passed an important, even though preliminary, decision concerning data retention. The GFCC’s decision accepts the storage of data, but greatly restricts their use to serious offenses like murder and organized crime. From an ethical point of view, it is particularly interesting to look at the justification given by the GFCC, which relies heavily on the argument that the “impartiality” (Unbefangenheit) of communication will be thoroughly damaged if feelings of being watched spread in a society. This argument is examined in view of two contrasting theoretical approaches: Discourse ethics and evolutionary contractarian theory.

This article discusses the question whether modern societies require some kind of a social glue in order to remain stable. This social glue (termed the ‘moral surplus’) is regarded as a moral capacity or capability which goes beyond the individual quest for advantages and benefits. Four positions in contemporary social philosophy which postulate a moral surplus are discussed and criticized: J. Habermas, J. Rawls, D. Gauthier and K. Binmore. The conception of order ethics is outlined as an alternative view which abandons the idea of a moral surplus.

It has recently been proposed that the evolution of human cooperativeness might, at least in part, have started as the cooptation of behavioral strategies evolved for solving problems of coordination to solve problems with higher incentives to defect, i.e. problems of cooperation. Following this line of thought, we systematically tested human subjects for spillover effects from simple coordination tasks (2x2 Stag Hunt games, SH) to problems of cooperation (2x2 Prisoner’s Dilemma games, PD) in a laboratory experiment with rigorous controls to rule out subject confusion or habituation. Supporting the hypothesis that decision mechanisms for cooperation problems are linked with decision mechanisms for coordination, our main finding is that cooperation levels in PD games embedded in a sequence of SH games were significantly increased compared to a baseline sequence consisting only of PDs when subjects played in fixed pairs. No such effects could be found when players were randomly rematched each round. Additional findings include that this spillover effect cannot prevent a decay of cooperation over time, that there is no indication of a reversed effect, i.e. no signs of negative spillovers from failed cooperation to miscoordination, and that subjects self-reported preferences in SH games are prosocial.

This paper draws a connection between recent developments in naturalized philosophy of science and the Buchanan research program in economics. Economic approaches in naturalized philosophy of science can be combined to form an economic philosophy of science. After giving an overview of some of these approaches, I lay out the fundamentals of the Buchanan research program. I argue that its main elements are a theory of interactions and a normative foundation in consensus which help to answer some important criticisms of economic philosophy of science.

'Ethik ist auf deskriptives Wissen angewiesen. Das ist nichts Neues: Bereits Aristoteles betont, die Ethik müsse berücksichtigen, dass der Mensch von Natur aus ein soziales Wesen sei. Wie viel Gewicht aber kann und sollte man dem deskriptiven Wissen in normativen Fragen zugestehen? Eine naturalistische Ethik hält es für möglich, dass deskriptives Wissen nicht nur Hilfsmittel für die Anwendung ethischer Normen sein, sondern einen großen Teil der bisher erforderlichen Normen ersetzen kann. Eine naturalistische Ethik fordert außerdem: Möglichst wenig metaphysische Annahmen! Statt Metaphysik möchten Naturalisten Ergebnisse und Methoden der Wissenschaften einsetzen, mit dem Ziel, den Bestand an Normen in der Ethik und damit den Begründungsbedarf zu verkleinern. Lassen sich also Normen durch Fakten ersetzen? Und wenn ja, wie weit? In diesem Band kommen zu dieser Frage Philosophie, Ökonomik, Soziologie, Psychologie, Soziobiologie, Rechtswissenschaft und Spieltheorie zu Wort. Es geht hierbei gerade nicht um eine ethisch-moralische Bewertung von Resultaten oder Methoden dieser Disziplinen, sondern - umgekehrt - um die Frage, welchen Beitrag diese Wissenschaften zur Ethik leisten können.' (Autorenreferat). Inhaltsverzeichnis: Gerhard Vollmer, Christoph Lütge: Fakten statt Normen? Einleitung und Überblick (VII-XIV); Dieter Birnbacher: Prognosen statt Normen? Das Zusammenspiel von Normen und Fakten in der Angewandten Ethik (3-13); Gerhard Schurz: Zur Rolle von Brückenprinzipien in einer faktenorientierten Ethik (14-27); Uwe Czaniera: Vernünftige Normen statt moralischer Fakten (28-42); Gerhard Engel: Von Fakten zu Normen: Zur Ableitbarkeit des Sollen aus dem Sein (43-59); Dagmar Borchers: Träume von Tatsachen und Tugenden: Stärken und Schwächen des tugendethischen Naturalismus (60-77); Wolfgang Buschlinger: Hinter verschlossene Türen: Ethik in die Hand von Experten? (78-87); Eric Hilgendorf: Fakten und Normen in der Rechtstheorie Tatsachenfragen und Wertungsfragen: Bausteine zu einer naturalistischen Jurisprudenz (91-102); Karl Homann: Fakten und Normen: Der Fall der Wirtschaftsethik (105-116); Christoph Lütge: Ordnungsethik - naturalistisch konzipiert (117-127); Ken Binmore: Natural Justice (128-150); Michael Baurmann: Mehrheit ohne Moral? Warum demokratische Entscheidungen ethische Prinzipien erfordern (153-176); Eckart Voland: Normentreue zwischen Reziprozität und Prestige-Ökonomie: Eine soziobiologische Interpretation kostspieliger sozialer Konformität (177-189); Günter Dux: Das Sein des Sollens (190-204); Heiko Breit, Lutz Eckensberger: Fakten und Normen in der Psychologie. Die Faktizität des Normenbewusstseins: Eine entwicklungspsychologische Perspektive (207-224).