Timothy Speed

The present volume brings together four contributions that examine the structural relationship between neurodivergence, welfare-state institutions, and legal evaluative practices. The point of departure is the observation that modern welfare and legal systems operate on implicit assumptions of normality that presuppose neurotypical forms of communication, employment trajectories, conflict regulation, and social adaptation. For individuals whose modes of living and working diverge from these assumptions, systematic misinterpretations, institutional conflicts, and forms of structural vulnerability frequently arise. The contributions analyze these dynamics from several complementary perspectives. A first focus concerns the interaction between neurodivergent persons and welfare-state institutions. The analyses show that administrative and legal procedures often interpret behaviors as deficits that are in fact expressions of neurodivergent perceptual and communicative styles. The resulting escalation dynamics therefore do not primarily stem from individual incapacity but from structural incompatibilities between neurodivergent ways of living and institutional expectation structures. A second line of inquiry addresses the question of epistemic authority within legal contexts. The contributions investigate how statements made by neurodivergent individuals about their own life situations are frequently relativized or reinterpreted in administrative and judicial proceedings. This dynamic produces forms of epistemic disenfranchisement in which affected persons are no longer treated as reliable sources regarding their own needs and experiences. A third analytical perspective focuses on the institutional organization of social security. Using central instruments of German social law—particularly the concept of the Bedarfsgemeinschaft—the contributions demonstrate how welfare systems organize subsistence security relationally and thereby generate dependency structures and conflict dynamics that are particularly burdensome for neurodivergent individuals as well as for non-standardized forms of work. Taken together, the contributions argue that many conflicts between neurodivergent individuals and state institutions do not primarily arise from personal deficits but from structural mismatches between institutional systems and neurodivergent modes of existence. Under conditions of existential dependency, these mismatches can produce predictable forms of institutional harm. The volume therefore contributes to a critical analysis of welfare-state institutions from the perspective of neurodivergent experience and asks under which structural conditions systems of law, administration, and social security provide protection—and under which conditions they generate predictable forms of institutional harm.

This volume brings together three contributions that address a shared theoretical and legal question: under what conditions do forms of structural violence toward neurodivergent people arise, and why do these forms of violence frequently remain invisible within modern institutional systems. The point of departure is the observation that contemporary social, legal, and administrative orders implicitly rely on assumptions about a uniform, neurotypical form of human existence. Perception, communication, work capacity, self-regulation, and social interaction are treated as general standards. Forms of existence that structurally diverge from these assumptions tend to appear within this framework either as illness, as individual deficit, or as insufficient adaptation. The contributions develop an ontological and legal-theoretical perspective for analyzing this problem. At the center lies the thesis that many conflicts between neurodivergent persons and institutional systems do not primarily arise from individual difficulties, but from a structural incompatibility between different forms of human existence and the normative architecture of modern societies. This incompatibility produces predictable forms of harm which, within legal and administrative procedures, are often individualized, pathologized, or interpreted as communicative disturbance. The volume unfolds this diagnosis in three interconnected steps. The first contribution introduces the concept of representational violence as an ontological critique of modern knowledge and administrative systems. It argues that, within many institutional contexts, reality is recognized only insofar as it can be translated into symbolic, administrative, or diagnostic formats. Forms of experience, perception, or existence that resist such translation do not merely remain unnoticed; they are structurally excluded from the sphere of what can appear as real. The second contribution develops, on this basis, the concept of a right to ontological coexistence. Neurodivergent forms of human existence are understood not as deviations from a general norm, but as autonomous variants of human world- and meaning-relation. Equality, therefore, cannot be conceived primarily as integration into a single social order. Instead, it must be understood as the legally protected coexistence of different forms of existence without coercion toward normalization, pathologization, or economic functionalization. The third contribution applies this perspective to the analysis of modern state institutions. Drawing on examples from social law, administrative procedures, and criminal-law attribution, it demonstrates how structural incompatibilities between neurodivergent forms of existence and work- and performance-centered systems generate foreseeable harms. Where existential dependency, known incompatibility, and predictable harm converge, state action can no longer be understood as neutral governance but must be recognized as a form of structural violence. Taken together, the volume develops a theoretical framework for analyzing modern societies under conditions of real ontological diversity. By connecting ontological critique, human rights reasoning, and legal system analysis, it aims to make visible forms of institutional violence that remain largely unrecognized in contemporary legal and social orders and to contribute to a reconsideration of equality, responsibility, and protective duties in plural societies.

This volume concludes Section V of the series by synthesizing the theoretical implications of the Emergence Economy developed in the preceding contributions. The section has shown that modern economies systematically misrecognize forms of work whose effects unfold over long temporal horizons, through relationships, or through the stabilization of complex social and epistemic fields. By introducing the concepts of the Value Threshold, Diversity Threshold, Unfolding Gap, and Eigenzeit, it outlines a framework for understanding the growing disjunction between real world-forming work and its economic recognition. From this perspective, poverty appears not merely as a lack of resources, but as a structural loss of world-binding capacity. The volume therefore situates the concept of Universal Care Income within a broader theoretical context: not primarily as a redistributive policy, but as an infrastructural condition that protects the possibility of world-forming work in complex societies.

This paper develops the theoretical foundations of Radical Worker (first published 2019, new edition 2025), arguing that self-determined work is not merely a political right but a structural requirement for preventing societies from collapsing into simulation. Autonomous labour is defined here as work that arises from internal resonance rather than external command, organised around long-term responsibility to reality rather than short-term deliverables. Building on the books Speeds Arbeit / Speed's Work and Radical Worker, the paper distinguishes three dimensions of labour: output-production, reality-maintenance, and simulation. It argues that only self-determined work can perform reality-maintaining labour in complex societies, because only autonomous workers have the structural freedom to correct institutions, preserve diversity, and generate new forms of meaning that are not pre-formatted by market or algorithmic expectations. By contrast, wage labour under contemporary capitalism is increasingly organised as simulation-management: the production and maintenance of appearances that satisfy metrics, dashboards and bureaucratic expectations without necessarily improving social or ecological reality. Automation and AI intensify this tendency by rewarding behaviours that imitate machine logic and punishing forms of work that cannot be simulated. Through a combination of theoretical analysis and long-term field research, the paper shows that self-determined workers are structurally targeted by labour markets, welfare bureaucracies and algorithmic governance precisely when their work increases reality-contact. The conclusion is that autonomous labour is not a luxury, hobby, or exception, but civilizational infrastructure. Societies that suppress self-determined work will progressively lose the capacity for correction, democratic reflexivity and ecological survival.

Research on autism and neurodivergence has produced a wide range of partial models over recent decades, including monotropism, hyper-systemizing, intense-world hypotheses, variants of predictive processing, theories of veridical mapping, and empirical descriptions of savant phenomena. Each of these approaches captures real aspects of neurodivergent cognition, yet they remain fragmented and fail to explain why these phenomena systematically co-occur. The present paper proposes an ontological re-framing. Building on the Rosetta Operator (10.5281/ZENODO.17857039), it argues that neurodivergent cognition should not primarily be understood as a variation of cognitive properties within an already stabilized world, but as a specific position within the process of world-stabilization itself. Veridical mapping is thus conceptualized not as a special ability, but as an epistemic access to pre-ontological structures that are early symbolically smoothed and integrated in neurotypical cognition. In this context, the Rosetta Operator does not function as an additional theory, but as a translational framework that allows existing models to be read as docking points of the same underlying dynamic: delayed or partial stabilization of world, increased openness to non-integrated structure, and a liminal observer position between pre-ontological openness and ontologically closed world. On this basis, monotropism, intense-world approaches, predictive-processing models, hyper-systemizing, veridical mapping, savant phenomena, and the double-empathy problem are integrated as different projections of a shared ontological process. The paper positions itself as a foundational contribution. It does not aim to introduce a new clinical typology, but to clarify the epistemic position of neurodivergent cognition and its significance for epistemology, scientific practice, and the understanding of different modes of world-access. This paper functions as an interface text within a larger operator-based research corpus. Core concepts are applied here, not re-derived. The underlying research operates in a non-linear, rhythmically recursive epistemic mode grounded in an autistic form of structural perception; the present text provides an interface translation for academic contexts.

Savant phenomena are still regarded in cognitive science and neurological research as anomalies: as isolated island abilities, as exceptions within otherwise deficit-oriented cognitive profiles, or as curiosities that cannot be adequately integrated into established models of intelligence, learning, or representation. Despite extensive empirical documentation, there is a lack of a theory that explains how savant performances are epistemically possible without either mystifying or pathologizing them. This paper proposes a fundamentally different approach. It argues that savant phenomena do not constitute special talents in the classical sense, but rather local manifestations of operatoric cognition: a non-representational mode of knowing in which structure is not modeled, simulated, or abstracted, but directly recognized and held as invariance (embodied). Savant performances are therefore based neither on increased computational capacity nor on exceptional memory or accelerated information processing, but on a specific operatoric coupling to world-structure that operates without symbolic mediation. On the basis of an operatoric model (Rosetta Operator DOI: 10.5281/ZENODO.17857039), which has been consistently developed over three decades across different fields of research—consciousness research, autism epistemology, value and labor ontology, and social analysis—it is shown that savant phenomena function as epistemic boundary cases. They make visible that knowledge does not necessarily have to be mediated through representation, generalization, or simulation, but can also arise from a non-closing relation to the ontological gap. From this perspective, savant performances do not appear as isolated islands within a deficit-oriented system, but as empirical evidence for a second knowledge architecture, whose systematic invisibility can be explained by processes of ontological smoothing—understood as a shift from pre-ontological structural relation toward representational distortion. The paper makes three contributions to savant research: (1) It provides a non-deficit-oriented ontological classification of savant phenomena at the operatoric level. (2) It explains the theoretical underdetermination of the field as a consequence of epistemic incompatibility between representational models and operatoric cognition. (3) It positions savant performances as empirical markers of non-representational cognition, with consequences for cognitive science, AI theory, and epistemology. This paper functions as an interface text within a larger operator-based research corpus. Core concepts are applied here, not re-derived. The underlying research operates in a non-linear, rhythmically recursive epistemic mode grounded in an autistic form of structural perception; the present text provides an interface translation for academic contexts.

Operatoric Research Corpus Studies in World-Formation Section I Ontology and Physics Volume 2 The Ontological Limits of Physical Explanation Measurement, Collapse and Boundary Phenomena in Quantum Physics This volume brings together a series of contributions on the ontology of fundamental problems in physics, in particular the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, the collapse of the wave function, the relationship between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, as well as boundary phenomena such as black holes, renormalization, and vacuum energy. The point of departure of these investigations is the thesis that numerous paradoxes of modern physics do not primarily result from insufficient physical theories, but from a categorical misaddressing. Transitions that concern the very conditions of world stability—especially the transition from possibility to facticity—are often interpreted as dynamical processes within an already stabilized world. This gives rise to explanatory programs that attempt to bridge this boundary by means of additional mechanisms, ontologies, or informational structures. The texts collected in this volume pursue an alternative strategy. They understand the so-called collapse of the wave function not as a physical process, but as an irreversible constriction of a space of possibility through which objectivity and the direction of time first emerge at all. The concept of indimergence designates the boundary act in which possibility passes into facticity without itself being describable as an event within the world. On the basis of this determination, central approaches in the foundations of quantum mechanics—particularly dynamical collapse models, Many-Worlds interpretations, and information-theoretic ontologies—are comparatively analyzed. It becomes evident that, despite their differences, they share a common presupposition: the assumption that the transition from possibility to facticity must itself be explicable within physical description. The contributions in this volume instead propose to read the measurement problem and related paradoxes as indications of structural limits of physical description. From this perspective, other fundamental problems—such as the tension between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, the information paradoxes of black holes, or divergences in field theory—no longer appear primarily as unsolved technical puzzles, but as boundary phenomena of world formation itself. The volume therefore does not present itself as an alternative physical theory, but as an ontological clarification of the conditions under which physical theories are able to describe a world at all.

The present volume brings together three contributions that pursue a shared theoretical question: what is work under conditions in which technical systems are increasingly able to simulate human performance, and what constitutes the specifically human form of work that structurally resists such simulation. The starting point is the observation that modern societies predominantly define work through output, employment status, or market value. This definition, however, enters into crisis once artificial intelligence becomes capable of formally reproducing ever larger portions of this output. Against this background, the contributions in this volume develop an ontological redefinition of work. Work is not understood primarily as the production of goods or services, but as a form of embodied, self-determined interaction with the world through which social and ecological reality is stabilized. Central to this perspective is the concept of relational agency: work appears as a practice in which action, responsibility, and world-reference are inseparably intertwined, enabling the emergence of new forms of meaning, knowledge, and social order. From this standpoint, artificial intelligence is not interpreted as a competitor to human labour in the conventional labour-market sense, but as a structural test case. AI makes visible which aspects of human activity are functionally reproducible and which are not. While many forms of output, decision-making, or innovation can be algorithmically simulated, the form of work that arises from situational responsibility, irreversible temporality, and concrete world-binding remains in principle non-delegable. In this context, particular attention is given to the concept of Eigenzeit, which designates the non-externalizable temporal dimension of human action in which decisions, responsibility, and consequences become irreversibly effective. The volume connects this ontological analysis with an examination of the social conflicts that arise from it. If work is not primarily output production but reality-maintenance and world-binding, those forms of labour that frequently remain invisible within contemporary labour regimes come into focus: artistic practice, care work, activism, critical research, and other forms of self-determined, relational activity. At the same time, these forms of work often encounter institutional resistance, delegitimization, or economic pressure, since they can only partially be integrated into market-based or algorithmically governed models of labour. The contributions therefore argue that the current transformation of work cannot be understood solely as an economic or technological issue. It concerns the more fundamental question of how societies organize their relationship to reality. If work is defined primarily through simulation, metrics, and interchangeable functions, there is a growing risk that social systems lose their capacity to recognize and correct real problems. In this sense, self-determined relational work appears not as a marginal phenomenon, but as a central condition for societal learning, democratic reflexivity, and the long-term stability of complex systems.

This volume forms the starting point of Section V – Work and Emergence Economy, which examines work not primarily as an economic category, but as a structural condition of world-formation. The contributions assembled here investigate the relation between the emergence of new realities and the conditions under which these realities become socially stabilised as value. In doing so, they shift the analytical focus from questions of distribution and productivity toward the deeper mechanisms that determine which forms of work are able to appear, persist, and shape the world. The present volume brings together five contributions that pursue a shared theoretical question: under what conditions do new forms of reality emerge, and under what conditions can these forms become stabilised as socially recognised value. The point of departure is the observation that modern societies, despite high levels of productivity, innovation, and complexity, increasingly confront phenomena of structural invisibility. Forms of work, knowledge, care, ecological regeneration, and social stabilisation exert real and system-sustaining effects, yet often fail to appear as economic value. To analyse this problem, the contributions develop a threshold model of social reality. At the centre of this model stand two interrelated concepts: the Diversity Threshold (D) as the threshold of forced emergence and the Value Threshold (T) as the threshold of societal stabilisation and visibility. While the Diversity Threshold designates the point at which systems must generate new forms due to increasing incommensurability, the Value Threshold describes the conditions under which these emergent forms can appear as durable and socially stabilised realities. The difference between these two thresholds leads to a structural diagnosis of contemporary societies. Many forms of real and effective work—such as care work, ecological regeneration, cultural practice, artistic research, or neurodivergent modes of problem-processing—frequently operate above the threshold of emergence, yet remain below the threshold of societal stabilisation. The result is a condition in which reality is continuously produced without becoming durably recognised as value. On this basis, the contributions develop an alternative perspective on economy and social value formation. Economy appears not primarily as a system of resource allocation, but as a threshold regime that determines which forms of emergent reality are stabilised and which remain invisible. The distinction between primary economy (world-sustaining work) and secondary economy (value-extractive organisation), together with the concept of the Unfolding Gap, describes concrete mechanisms through which this structural asymmetry manifests itself in everyday social life. The volume therefore does not present a programme of economic reform, but contributes to an ontologically grounded theory of work, value, and social reality. It proposes a research programme in which emergence, stabilisation, and visibility are not treated as separate phenomena, but as interrelated transitions within complex social systems.

The following paper is one of the most extensive documented analyses to date of state violence against neurodivergent people and the poor in Germany. It examines, with an unusual density of data, a series of social court and administrative law proceedings in which a neurodivergent applicant attempted to make fundamental rights – in particular access to autism diagnostics, disability-related accommodations, subsistence-securing benefits, and health protection – practically effective. What becomes visible is how the German state harms the health of neurodivergent people through unsuitable or failing administrative structures (Bürgergeld system / social courts / medical care), while protective mechanisms structurally fail. In the context of the WCA scandal in England, this study reveals a repetition of the same situation of endangerment that there led to numerous deaths and suicides. What emerges is a dramatic picture of the state’s inability to prevent foreseeable health damage and deaths among neurodivergent people that are caused by state action, which raises the most serious concern. Parallels to the Contergan/Thalidomide scandal also become apparent, particularly regarding the authorities’ treatment of the victims, but also with respect to the scale of health damage. This paper stands in the context of the ten-year investigation already published in the book Speed’s Work, which documents massive violence against the poor, neurodivergent people, and other marginalized groups – violence of which state authorities, public prosecutors, and ministers knew that it caused health damage, yet continued nevertheless. Judges, politicians, public prosecutors, and other employees of the state were and remain involved in this violence to this day. The starting point of this new investigation is the massive diagnostic emergency in the field of autism, which exists internationally and is enormous in Germany as well. In the course of this investigation, 1,667 affected individuals competed in one quarter, through a lottery procedure, for 25 diagnostic places at Humboldt University in Berlin, effectively making access to medically necessary autism diagnostics dependent on chance. Because the diagnosis is a prerequisite for almost all further social law claims, a systemic effect arises: without diagnosis no rights – without rights no stabilization – without stabilization no possibility of enforcing the diagnosis. Since only few studies to date have examined the consequences of this emergency in detail, this paper provides an important empirical basis beyond Germany. On the basis of eight court proceedings, several urgent proceedings before Social Courts and Higher Social Courts, internal administrative statements, reactions by court presidents, as well as the refusal of intervention by the Office of the General Public Prosecutor despite risk to life, the study examines how shifts of jurisdiction, fragmentation of legal domains, formal narrowing of claims, and delay condense into a de facto suspension of effective legal protection. The central thesis is that what appears here is not primarily an individual wrong decision, but a systemic constellation in which access to justice is formally opened while materially being structurally blocked. The data reveal a simulation of legality in which state action loses any connection to social reality and individuals are sacrificed in order to stabilize the system. Fundamental structural flaws become visible in social law, as well as in the criminal liability of institutions and their accountability (corporate crime and organizational liability / corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide). It becomes clearly visible how the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is disregarded at crucial points in Germany, or simply cannot be enforced. The data of the long-term investigation show that a General Public Prosecutor in Germany can watch, without consequence, as an autistic person is gradually forced into mortal danger through the withdrawal of fundamental rights by authorities. As the practical test carried out here reveals, no real functioning protection exists against indirect killing through state measures. Germany also collects no data at all on deaths caused by the state, meaning that what occurred in England (600 suicides) remains statistically invisible in Germany. The question of what state violence against the poor and people with disabilities actually means for those affected has so far been insufficiently investigated. Why autistic people internationally have an estimated life expectancy reduced by up to 16 years can partly be better understood on the basis of the data presented in this study. This study places the frequently occurring, foreseeable health damage among neurodivergent people into the space of the highest urgency, as well as the failure of authorities to react to threats to health and even threats to life, and it likely provides for the first time a scientific basis for assessing the enforceability of the fundamental rights of neurodivergent people in a European country such as Germany. Methodologically, the work (qualitative research) combines legal analysis with documented lived impact. The author acts not only as an external observer but also as part of the experimental arrangement (“provoked empiricism”): applications, complaints, and danger notifications function as empirical measuring instruments in order to make visible how institutions react under conditions of known vulnerability. The emotional dimension – in particular the medically described risk posed by continuous administrative stress in autism – is treated not as rhetorical exaggeration but as part of the evidentiary basis. In the light of international human rights concepts, the events are classified as forms of Structural Violence, Procedural Violence, Epistemic Violence, and Safeguarding Failure. Particular attention is given to the question of whether and why foreseeable health damage is knowingly accepted despite awareness of the situation. This work serves as a human-rights basis aimed at preventing further suffering as far as possible, and as a submission for examination by the responsible EU and UN institutions in Brussels and Geneva, as well as by the German Federal Constitutional Court. This paper has also been submitted to the General Public Prosecutor of Brandenburg together with a criminal complaint, as well as to the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Berlin. Through this documentation, testimony is intended to be given to the fatal situation of neurodivergent people. At the same time, the present investigation functions within the author’s overall body of work as a methodological bridge between theoretical work, documentation, and institutional experience. It reconstructs not only concrete legal conflicts but also makes visible how structural blockages themselves become an epistemic environment that shapes the form, tone, and persistence of neurodivergent research. In this way, the paper contributes to clarifying the conditions under which self-determined neurodivergent knowledge production emerges and shows why its forms of expression are often misunderstood or delegitimized when this contextual structure is not taken into account.

The present volume brings together three contributions that address a fundamental question of neurodivergent existence: under which ontological conditions do the conflicts arise between neurodivergent forms of life and the institutional, diagnostic, and temporal structures of modern societies? The point of departure is the observation that central phenomena in autism and neurodivergence research—such as masking, autistic burnout, or the frequent biographical breakdowns occurring under administrative and labour-market conditions—are predominantly interpreted as problems of individual adaptation. The contributions collected in this volume systematically challenge this perspective. Instead, they develop an ontological analysis in which the conflicts between neurodivergent and neurotypical forms of existence are understood as expressions of different structures of world-relation and world-binding. The first contribution develops a theory of masking that understands it not primarily as a psychological strategy of adaptation, but as an ontological boundary process. Masking emerges where neurodivergent modes of world-relation—characterised by open, relational, and not fully objectified experiential fields—must enter social orders organised through simplification, representation, and stable role structures. In this context, masking appears both as a creative form of world mediation and as a potentially exhausting performance when such mediation becomes the permanent condition of social existence. The second contribution analyses the diagnostic consequences of this constellation. It shows that psychiatric and clinical models frequently interpret masking as a symptom of over-adaptation or exhaustion and thereby produce a structural misreading. Autistic competence, stability, or situational adaptability are often diagnostically interpreted as deception or compensation, whereas autism becomes recognisable as “authentic” only in moments of overload, breakdown, or burnout. In this way, an iatrogenic dynamic emerges in which diagnostic recognition is effectively bound to visible failure. The third contribution extends this analysis through a temporal and institutional perspective. With the concept of Eigenzeit, it shows that many conflicts in neurodivergent biographies arise not primarily from individual deficits, but from a structural incompatibility between forms of intensive world-binding and the time-administrative regimes of modern institutions. Procedures, deadlines, and organisational routines replace real world-binding with simulations of responsibility, thereby creating conditions under which highly bound forms of existence struggle to sustain stable life trajectories. Taken together, the contributions develop a perspective in which neurodivergent existence does not appear as a deviation from a normative model of human subjectivity, but as an epistemic and ontological boundary case of modern societies. The conflicts analysed in this volume reveal that many institutional, diagnostic, and temporal orders rely on simplifications that systematically overstrain or render invisible more complex modes of world-relation. Neurodivergence thus emerges not only as an object of clinical description, but as an analytical entry point into fundamental questions concerning reality, responsibility, and the conditions of viable social orders.

This volume brings together four contributions that address a shared question: under which ontological and epistemic conditions do different forms of human world-constitution arise, and what role does neurodivergent cognition play within this process. The point of departure is the observation that contemporary autism research largely operates under an implicit assumption: that all humans inhabit the same ontological ground and that differences appear primarily at the level of cognitive traits, information processing, or social abilities. The contributions collected here systematically question this assumption. They develop the thesis that autistic and neurotypical modes of world-constitution are grounded in different operator logics. From this perspective, autistic cognition does not appear as a variation within a shared ontology but as a distinct epistemic position characterized by increased access to non-integrated structural relations of reality. On this basis, several theoretical steps are developed. First, the concept of autistic ontology shows that differences between autistic and neurotypical subjects are not primarily communicative or cognitive deviations but arise from divergent modes of world-stabilization. Second, the Rosetta Operator formulates an invariant operator system describing processes of difference, tension, indimergence, and emergence as fundamental structures of reality formation. This framework connects multiple domains—including consciousness research, economic theory, and neurodivergence—within a common structural model. Third, the concept of operatoric cognition introduces a non-representational form of intelligent world-relation that operates not primarily through symbols or meanings but through dynamic transitions, topological tensions, and emergent processes of form generation. Finally, the concept of veridical mapping is interpreted as an epistemic consequence of this architecture: an access to pre-symbolic structural relations that remains more directly available in certain neurodivergent cognitive configurations than in neurotypical forms of perception stabilized early through symbolic integration. The volume thus proposes a shift in the theoretical framing of neurodivergent cognition. Instead of describing autism through deficit-oriented accounts of individual traits, it interprets autistic cognition as an epistemic boundary position within the open process of world-stabilization. In this perspective, autism becomes relevant not only for cognitive science but also for epistemology and the philosophy of science, as it reveals alternative modes of world-access that challenge representational models of knowledge. The concepts developed in this volume are not presented as a final theory but as a structural framework intended to integrate previously fragmented models of autism research while opening a broader perspective on the conditions of knowledge, perception, and reality formation.

The present volume brings together three contributions that pursue a shared ontological question: under what conditions can world arise at all, and where do the structural limits of technical systems and theoretical models lie in relation to this capacity for world-formation. The point of departure is the observation that many contemporary debates in physics, artificial intelligence, and information theory implicitly assume that increasing complexity, computational power, or theoretical precision could in principle suffice to reconstruct, simulate, or fully explain world. The contributions collected in this volume systematically challenge this assumption. They argue that world does not arise from completeness or formal closure, but presupposes a structural openness that cannot be fully stabilized without undermining the very condition that makes world possible. The first contribution introduces the All–Nothing Paradox (ANP) as a minimal ontological condition of world-formation. According to this view, world appears only where reality does not fully coincide with itself and cannot collapse either into complete determinacy or into pure nothingness. Ontological openness is therefore not an epistemic incompleteness, but a structural prerequisite for perspective, emergence, and reality. The second contribution examines the implications of this condition for artificial systems. It argues that technical systems necessarily operate within formally closed spaces of possibility and can therefore simulate world states but cannot form world. World-formation presupposes structural vulnerability, non-optimisability, and the real risk of world loss—properties that stand in structural contradiction to the technical usability of artificial systems. The third contribution extends this consideration to scientific theory itself. It introduces a categorical distinction between theoretical correctness and world-founding capacity and shows that even fully correct, empirically successful, and formally consistent theories are not thereby ontologically world-capable. Scientific models operate within stabilized spaces of possibility and therefore presuppose the existence of a world without being able to generate it. Taken together, the contributions mark a precise ontological boundary: world cannot arise either from complete theoretical determinacy or from technical simulation. It emerges only under conditions of structural openness that cannot be fully formalized or stabilized. The volume therefore does not present a critique of scientific or technological practice, but a clarification of its ontological scope.

The present volume brings together six contributions that pursue a common question: under what conditions stable forms arise in natural, biological, social, and cognitive systems, and where the ontological limits of their reconstruction, control, or simulation lie. The point of departure is the observation that central contemporary debates—such as those in morphogenesis, complexity research, medicine, or artificial intelligence—are increasingly structured by concepts that treat form as in principle reconstructible: as a target state, attractor, setpoint, or as information within a state space. The volume systematically questions this implicit assumption. The contributions develop a morphological perspective in which form is not understood as a stored structure or a retrievable goal, but as a temporary stabilization within irreversible dynamic processes. Earlier theoretical concepts such as focal points (Fixpunkte), folding, and the Bran-Spiral are genealogically reconstructed and related to later operatorial concepts such as shift of being (Seinsverschiebung), negative topology, and indimergent stabilization. From this perspective, form appears neither as the product of a plan nor as the result of linear processes, but as an emergent configuration that can stabilize only under specific historical and temporal conditions. Against this background, central phenomena of biological morphogenesis are reread. Bioelectric regulation, regeneration, aging, cancer, or cloning no longer appear primarily as problems of genetic control or technical manipulation, but as boundary cases of emergent order. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of the Eigenzeit of living systems: the irreversible emergence-time in which form becomes genealogically stabilized. Interventions that attempt to bypass or neutralize this Eigenzeit therefore do not necessarily produce a return to earlier states, but rather temporarily stable yet ontologically displaced orders. At the same time, the contributions show that many contemporary hopes for technical reconstruction—such as those found in regenerative medicine, bioengineering, or AI-based simulations—rest on a categorical confusion. Simulation operates within given state spaces and can reproduce formal stabilizations without participating in the ontological conditions of world-formation. Morphology, simulation, and repair must therefore be understood as three fundamentally different modes. In the final step, this perspective is extended to a more general ontological level. If time itself is understood as the trace of irreversible loss of possibility, every stabilized world-form proves to be structurally finite. Indimergence appears here as a double boundary operation: it grounds world-time while simultaneously carrying the condition of its exhaustion. The volume therefore does not present itself as a complete theory of morphology, but as a precise boundary determination with respect to ontologies that assume the complete availability of form, information, and world.

The contributions assembled in this volume examine a fundamental question that is usually only implicitly presupposed in the natural sciences: under what conditions can world arise and persist at all. The point of departure is the observation that modern physical theories have achieved an extraordinary degree of formal precision, yet at the same time often presuppose what they cannot themselves explain—namely, the stabilization of world as a historically effective nexus. The volume therefore introduces a categorical distinction between theoretical correctness and world-founding capacity (World-Capability). Theories can be internally consistent, empirically confirmed, and technically successful without thereby explaining the conditions under which world can appear at all and unfold effects. This difference forms the starting point of the following analyses. On this basis, the question of the direction of time is reformulated. Time does not appear primarily as a parameter of physical processes, but as a trace of irreversible world-binding. World emerges through processes in which possibility is transferred into concrete existence and thereby irreversibly bound. The direction of time is an expression of this binding. Several contributions show how this perspective renders central physical concepts newly readable. Relativistic time differences no longer appear as mere numerical deviations, but as irreversible shifts in the conditions under which world has taken place. World-processes can therefore be conceived neither as linear nor as fully reversible; they follow a curved structure in which recurrence always occurs under altered conditions. Against this background, the limits of formal reconstruction become visible. Simulations, information models, and artificial intelligence operate within reconstructible state spaces and therefore cannot produce world-binding, but only process its traces. Even fundamental physical limits—such as the speed of light—no longer appear solely as dynamical constraints, but as structural conditions of world-connectedness itself. The volume does not present itself as a competitor to physical theories, but as an ontological clarification of their presuppositions. It does not ask how world functions within existing models, but under what conditions it can appear as world at all.

The present volume brings together four contributions that pursue a common ontological question: under what conditions can determinate reality arise from an open dynamics of possibilities, and when does this transition take the form of observation or experience. The point of departure is the diagnosis that central problems of modern physics and consciousness research—most notably the measurement problem of quantum mechanics and the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness—rest on a categorial confusion. Transitions between openness and facticity are typically interpreted as processes that must be mediated within a shared temporal framework. The contributions collected here argue, by contrast, that this expectation itself forms part of the difficulty. Where implicative boundary acts are involved, the question of a mediating “how” loses its validity. From this perspective, the measurement problem is reread. Measurement no longer appears primarily as an epistemic act performed by an observer, but as an ontological stabilization of determinacy under conditions of structural overload within open dynamics. Observation, in this sense, is not a special property of particular systems, but a space-internal operation through which world stabilizes events and perspectives. Against this background, the volume develops the concept of ontological recurrence within the MNO model (Submergence–Indimergence–Emergence), originally introduced in The Physics of the Poor. Recurrence designates a cyclical return of a system to the space of its own possibilities prior to the stabilization of an actual state. The central proposal is that the transition from possibility to actuality can occur in two structurally distinct forms: as ordinary measurement without recurrence, or as phenomenal actualization under conditions of recurrence. This distinction makes it possible to treat the measurement problem of quantum mechanics and the emergence of conscious experience within a shared structural framework. At the same time, it suggests a minimal dynamical condition under which physical collapse events—such as those discussed in Orch-OR models—can acquire phenomenal quality. The volume therefore does not present itself as a new interpretation of quantum mechanics in the narrow sense. Its aim is rather a categorial clarification of the conditions under which concepts such as measurement, observer, experience, and time can be meaningfully formulated and related to one another.

Operatoric Research Corpus Studies in World-Formation Section V Work and Emergence Economy Volume 12 Eigenzeit and the Ontology of Poverty The present volume brings together two contributions that pursue a common foundational question: under what conditions can world become binding at all, and what follows when this condition is structurally destroyed. The point of departure is the diagnosis that many contemporary crises of modern societies—political incapacity to act, the reproducibility crisis in science, the simulation of responsibility in administration and technology, and the expansion of structural poverty—share a common but rarely articulated cause: an inadequate ontology of time. The first contribution develops the concept of Eigenzeit as a categorical alternative to dominant models of time, particularly to the widespread assumption of a block-like continuum of world-time. Eigenzeit does not denote subjective duration or a physical measure, but an ontological operation: the non-delegable instantiation of world-time in human action. Time appears here not as a neutral container of events but as the effect of irreversible closures in structurally open worlds. Decisions do not merely produce changes within an already given temporal framework; they bind world irreversibly. From this perspective, far-reaching consequences emerge for science, politics, and human rights. Reproducibility proves to be a property of closed world-conditions; politics reveals itself as structurally incapable of deciding Eigenzeit collectively; and rights appear insufficient insofar as they implicitly address the human being without protected Eigenzeit as an administrable object. The second contribution examines the social consequences of this ontological structure. Building on the concept of Eigenzeit, poverty is interpreted not as a socio-economic condition of scarcity but as the ontological consequence of systematically withdrawn world-binding. Modern systems of work, markets, and social security increasingly organize action in procedural time while structurally preventing irreversible world-binding. Poverty thus appears as a permanent impossibility of living Eigenzeit. This condition is conceptualized as existential prohibition (Existenzverbot) : a structural constellation in which life remains formally permitted, yet the possibility of performing actions that bind and carry world is effectively withdrawn. Taken together, the contributions show that central societal conflicts arise not primarily from moral or organizational deficits but from a temporal-ontological blindness toward irreversible world-formation. The volume therefore does not propose Eigenzeit as another model of time, but as a necessary categorical complement wherever reality is not presupposed but brought into being through responsible decision. From this perspective, poverty, political paralysis, and the simulation of responsibility appear as symptoms of an order that administers time while failing to protect the conditions under which time—and thus world—can come into existence.

Operatoric Research Corpus Studies in World-Formation Section IV Neurodivergent Epistemology Volume 9 Autistic Epistemology & Structural Savantism The present volume brings together six contributions that pursue a common question: under which epistemic conditions forms of knowledge arise that do not primarily rely on representation, model construction, or symbolic abstraction, but instead emerge from a direct structural coupling between perception and world. The point of departure is the observation that central areas of contemporary cognitive science—particularly intelligence research, autism research, and savant studies—continue to operate with the implicit assumption of a single, representational architecture of cognition. Within this framework, neurodivergent modes of perception and thought appear either as deficit profiles, as unusual performance distributions, or as isolated anomalies within an otherwise homogeneous cognitive system. The contributions collected in this volume systematically question this presupposition. They develop the thesis that certain neurodivergent forms of perception and cognition—especially those associated with autistic modes of knowing—cannot be adequately described as variations within a unified cognitive architecture, but rather as expressions of an independent epistemic configuration. Autistic cognition is therefore not approached through deficits or performance measures, but through structural operators such as fidelity (high truth-resolution), hyperspecificity (context retention rather than generalization), pattern attunement (direct coupling to structural dynamics), and non-representational immediacy in world-relation. Against this background, several interconnected theoretical shifts are proposed. First, the concept of intelligence itself is reconsidered. Intelligence no longer appears as the primary source of knowledge, but as a secondary stabilizing performance that becomes effective only once emergence has already occurred within a relation to the world. Second, savant phenomena are reinterpreted not as isolated “islands of ability,” but as local manifestations of a non-representational mode of knowing in which structural invariants can be directly recognized and maintained without symbolic mediation. Third, the concept of structural savantism is introduced to describe an epistemic configuration that remains largely invisible within both classical savant research and intelligence-centered models of autism. A further focus of the volume concerns the methodological question of how such forms of knowledge can become scientifically accessible at all. In this context, the concept of synesthetic science is proposed as an epistemological extension in which embodied perception, affective resonance, and somatic feedback are not treated as disturbances but as epistemic instruments for detecting complex and non-linear relations in the world. From this perspective, neurodivergent perceptual configurations can function as measurement architectures capable of registering structural tensions and thresholds that remain invisible within strictly representational research paradigms. The volume concludes with an analysis of the feature film Transferprotokoll as a transmedial research configuration. The film is not interpreted as an artistic representation of a theoretical approach, but as an empirical stress test of a non-representational knowledge architecture under real social and institutional conditions. Its polarized reception is therefore read less as an aesthetic judgement than as an epistemic marker indicating different degrees of compatibility between representation-oriented expectations and forms of knowledge that systematically resist narrative condensation and symbolic translation. Taken together, the contributions aim to render visible the possibility of a plural architecture of human cognition. Instead of assuming a single universal model of knowledge, the volume advances a perspective of epistemic diversity in which different modes of world-relation coexist without being reducible to a shared representational logic. In this sense, the volume positions neurodivergent forms of perception and cognition not as marginal phenomena, but as constitutive expansions of the scientific horizon of knowledge.

Operatoric Research Corpus Studies in World-Formation Section I Ontology and Physics Volume 2 The Ontological Limits of Physical Explanation Measurement, Collapse and Boundary Phenomena in Quantum Physics This volume brings together a series of contributions on the ontology of fundamental problems in physics, in particular the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, the collapse of the wave function, the relationship between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, as well as boundary phenomena such as black holes, renormalization, and vacuum energy. The point of departure of these investigations is the thesis that numerous paradoxes of modern physics do not primarily result from insufficient physical theories, but from a categorical misaddressing. Transitions that concern the very conditions of world stability—especially the transition from possibility to facticity—are often interpreted as dynamical processes within an already stabilized world. This gives rise to explanatory programs that attempt to bridge this boundary by means of additional mechanisms, ontologies, or informational structures. The texts collected in this volume pursue an alternative strategy. They understand the so-called collapse of the wave function not as a physical process, but as an irreversible constriction of a space of possibility through which objectivity and the direction of time first emerge at all. The concept of indimergence designates the boundary act in which possibility passes into facticity without itself being describable as an event within the world. On the basis of this determination, central approaches in the foundations of quantum mechanics—particularly dynamical collapse models, Many-Worlds interpretations, and information-theoretic ontologies—are comparatively analyzed. It becomes evident that, despite their differences, they share a common presupposition: the assumption that the transition from possibility to facticity must itself be explicable within physical description. The contributions in this volume instead propose to read the measurement problem and related paradoxes as indications of structural limits of physical description. From this perspective, other fundamental problems—such as the tension between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, the information paradoxes of black holes, or divergences in field theory—no longer appear primarily as unsolved technical puzzles, but as boundary phenomena of world formation itself. The volume therefore does not present itself as an alternative physical theory, but as an ontological clarification of the conditions under which physical theories are able to describe a world at all.

This volume assembles four conceptual papers that articulate the foundations of an operator-based ontology of world-formation. The texts develop a framework in which reality is not primarily understood through objects, entities, or representational access, but through structural responses to conditions of non-integrability. The starting point is the concept of the gap as a primary condition of reality. Rather than representing a deficit of knowledge or an incomplete ontology, the gap denotes the structural impossibility of complete self-identity within reality itself. From this perspective, operators are not entities or causal agents but response structures through which reality stabilizes itself under conditions of non-closure. Building on this foundation, the second paper diagnoses a broader conceptual transition within contemporary physics. Phenomena such as dark energy, the measurement problem, and global cosmological structures increasingly resist explanation in object-centered ontologies. The proposed response-based framework interprets these phenomena as structural reactions to limits of integration rather than as missing entities. The third and fourth papers extend this framework to the ontological status of the observer. Instead of presupposing the observer as a subject, cognitive system, or measurement point, observation is analyzed as a structural achievement of world-formation. The observer emerges where reality stabilizes itself locally under conditions of openness. In this sense, perception does not represent a pre-given world but participates in the stabilization of world itself. The final text formulates this claim categorially by interpreting the observer as a topological inversion of world—a spatial operation through which perspective, coherence, and local intelligibility become possible. Taken together, the four papers outline a pre-ontological framework in which: reality is structured by gaps rather than substances, operators appear as responses to non-integrability, physical phenomena signal limits of object-centered ontology, and observers arise as structural foldings of world rather than as agents within it. The volume does not present a closed theory but establishes a conceptual position from which problems in physics, epistemology, and consciousness research can be reinterpreted without introducing additional ontological entities.

This introductory volume outlines the conceptual framework of the series Studies in World-Formation. The work begins from the observation that many contemporary systems—scientific, technological, economic, legal and administrative—operate with increasing efficiency and internal coherence, while simultaneously producing growing losses of relational world-capacity. The central distinction developed throughout the series is therefore not between progress and decline, but between world-binding and stabilization. Stabilization refers to the increasing tendency of modern systems to secure coherence, predictability and control through representation, simulation and formal procedures. While such mechanisms can maintain systemic order, they may also replace the relational processes through which worlds are actually formed, sustained and transformed. The volume introduces the concept of an operatoric ontology, in which the primary question is not what entities exist, but which structural differences bind or block the emergence of worlds. Rather than treating objects as the fundamental units of reality, the approach focuses on relational processes, irreversible transitions and forms of emergence that cannot be fully captured within closed representational systems. Within this perspective, phenomena such as measurement in physics, morphological formation, artificial intelligence, economic value, legal responsibility and neurodivergent cognition can be understood as different arenas in which the tension between world-binding and stabilization becomes visible. Methodologically, the work departs from additive models of knowledge production based primarily on cumulative citation. Instead, it develops a form of recursive, monotropic inquiry that investigates structural invariances across different domains. The operator functions here not as a formal rule applied to objects, but as a minimal difference structure through which world-binding becomes possible. This introductory volume therefore provides both a methodological orientation and an architectural overview of the series. The subsequent volumes explore the same ontological distinction under varying structural conditions: in physics and cosmology as questions of measurement, collapse and ontological limits; in morphology and temporal theory as problems of irreversible emergence and Eigenzeit; in artificial intelligence as the difference between functional correctness and world-capacity; in economics as the problem of value thresholds and the invisibility of world-sustaining work; in law and social institutions as the fragmentation of responsibility; and in neurodivergent epistemology as a heightened sensitivity to structural differences within highly stabilized systems. Rather than presenting a closed theoretical system, the series investigates how different domains reveal the same structural tension between the formation of worlds and the stabilization of representations. Each volume therefore functions as a test field for a single guiding question: Does a given system bind world—or does it merely simulate it?

Radical Worker occupies a central position within the author’s long-term research program on work, value, neurodivergent epistemology, and systemic violence in contemporary capitalism. While earlier works such as Society Without Trust focus on societal structure and system creativity, this volume constitutes the first comprehensive articulation of the author’s theory of self-determined work as a distinct socio-economic and epistemic category. The book integrates artistic research, autoethnographic fieldwork, and theoretical analysis to examine how dominant labor systems systematically exclude neurodivergent modes of perception, cognition, and contribution. Concepts that later become structurally formalized—such as the MNO model, value thresholds, diversity thresholds, submergence/indimergence/emergence cycles, and the notion of work as relational agency—are developed here in applied and experiential form. Radical Worker functions as a bridge between empirical intervention and theoretical consolidation. It documents long-term real-world experiments within corporations, welfare institutions, and media systems, treating these interventions not as illustrations but as epistemic instruments. In this sense, the work contributes simultaneously to Artistic Research, Critical Autism Studies, political economy, and labor theory. This Author Accepted Manuscript version is provided for scholarly and research purposes. It differs from the published book edition in layout and format and should be read as part of a larger, non-linear research corpus developed across subsequent books and papers, rather than as a standalone manifesto. About: Timothy Speed – neurodivergent artist, poverty theorist, and relentless disruptor – throws himself between assembly line, boardroom, and bureaucratic frontline. As a Radical Worker, he refuses the paycheck as measure of worth, working instead by moral coherence, ecological resonance, and existential sense. Whether infiltrating corporations undercover or applying to run Germany’s state TV, Speed exposes the deep protocols of a system that converts dignity into obedience and creativity into currency. For the Artistic Research movement, this book proves that art isn't commentary – it's infrastructure. Research happens in real-time, in real life. For Critical Autism Studies, it’s a rare inside-out account: autistic intensity, rule clarity and focused resistance sharpen into a tool that cuts through institutional myth. For anyone forced to work – or forced not to – this is a living roadmap: self-determined labour, basic income, and the politics of commoning are not just imagined here – they’re practiced, tested, lived. Speed flips the script: poverty is not a lack, but a refusal to play by a broken game. Forced labour is social exclusion. And the true metric of wealth? The time left untouched by the system’s noise. Radical Worker is manifesto, fieldwork, and survival guide – a call not to adapt, but to remake the world from the bottom up.

This paper advances the thesis that poverty is not a socio-economic condition but an ontological consequence: the result of systematically withdrawn Eigenzeit. Poverty emerges where the world can no longer be bound, where action is organized without bearing, responsibility without world, and time without irreversibility. The point of departure is the concept of Eigenzeit developed in earlier work as the non-delegable instantiation of world-time in action. Eigenzeit names the condition under which life becomes structurally viable at all, because decision irreversibly binds world. The paper argues that modern systems of work, markets, and social security structurally undermine this condition. Wage labour replaces world-binding with procedural time; social security systems administer the loss of Eigenzeit without being able to remedy it. Poverty thus appears not as a lack of resources, but as a permanent impossibility of living Eigenzeit. This impossibility is conceptualized here as existential prohibition: not as repression or exclusion, but as the structural prevention of viable world-binding. Neurodivergent existences do not function as a special case in this analysis, but as early indicators. Through them, what applies more generally becomes visible: where Eigenzeit is systematically rendered impossible, it is not only individual biographies that collapse, but the ontological viability of societal orders themselves. The paper does not propose reforms; it marks a limit: poverty is not solvable as long as the world is merely administered. The analysis developed here does not arise from detached observation, but from long-term operatoric research in which Eigenzeit was systematically blocked under real institutional conditions.

This paper clarifies the concept of self-determined work as a structurally necessary condition of reality-binding in the context of advanced artificial intelligence. Building on the concept of work-integrated relational agency, which was developed in earlier works as a critique of functionalized labor, it is shown that self-determination was never meant as a normative ideal or ethical preference, but as a prerequisite for work to retain its relation to reality and its capacity for innovation. The central thesis is that work is not to be understood as activity, task fulfillment, or economic function, but as a form of irreversible, world-binding action in which human Eigenzeit is not delegable. Artificial intelligence does not function here as the cause of the problem, but as a structural test case that makes visible which aspects of work can be functionally replaced—and which, in principle, cannot. While AI can formally simulate decisions, interactions, and innovation processes, it is structurally incapable of performing work-integrated relational agency, since it lacks Eigenzeit, responsibility-binding, and an irreversible relation to the world. The paper introduces the concept of Eigenzeit as a category previously missing from the debate on work and shows that self-determined work is necessary because only it can effectively bind Eigenzeit to the world. By contrast, heteronomous work reproduces functioning processes but loses its enactment of reality and increasingly generates simulation instead of innovation. The paper thus provides an ontological clarification of the concept of work under conditions of artificial simulation, without resorting to moral, psychological, or labor-market-based argumentations. Against this background, self-determined work is identified as an ontological stability condition of human world-capability in the age of AI—not as an option, but as a structural necessity.

This paper develops the concept of Eigenzeit as an analytical instrument for investigating neurodivergent life realities. Eigenzeit is neither a concept generated by nor specific to neurodivergence, but arises from prior boundary work on the ontology of decision, responsibility, and world-binding. Eigenzeit denotes the non-delegable instantiation of world-time in action: that form of time in which world is bound at all, carried, and irreversibly co-enacted. Time is not understood here as an ordering category or a logic of deadlines, but as the temporal dimension of enacted world-binding—as the structural context of world-capability. On the basis of this general conception, the paper shows why autistic and ADHD biographies in particular are systematically pushed into overload, breakdown, and dependency within modern institutions. Central societal systems—administration, labour markets, education, social law—operate in time- and structure-administrative regimes that presuppose world-binding while simultaneously undermining it: through standardisation, fragmentation, the simulation of responsibility, and the replacement of real binding by procedures. Deadlines, pacing, and file-based formality are not the core problem here, but symptoms of a deeper deficit of world-capability. Neurodivergence is thus not treated as a deficit, but as a different cost and binding structure of world-relation, in which this structural inoperability becomes visible early and with particular sharpness. Autistic integrity is often characterised by high binding strictness and low capacity for simulation vis-à-vis externally imposed world-regimes; ADHD frequently exhibits a dynamic in which fragmented, externally steered contexts do not allow for stable world-binding. Many phenomena commonly read as “symptoms”—exhaustion, breakdown, avoidance, dysfunctional adaptation—can therefore be reconstructed as Eigenzeit collapse: as the temporal-structural consequence of a prior withdrawal of world-binding. In continuity with They Cannot Understand, Eigenzeit is understood as a specification of the concepts of incommensurability, inoperability, and non-translatability. The paper shifts the focus away from temporal adaptation and therapeutic normalisation toward the question of under what conditions world remains bindable at all—and why the systematic withdrawal of this capacity destabilises not only neurodivergent existences, but the ontological viability of social reality itself.

The current crises of modern societies—ranging from political incapacity to act, through the reproducibility crisis in science, to the simulation of responsibility in administration and AI—cannot be adequately understood as mere problems of programs, morality, or governance. They point to a deeper deficit: an inadequate ontology of time. Starting from the dominance of block-time models in physics, philosophy of science, and political practice, this paper develops the concept of Eigenzeit as a categorical alternative. Eigenzeit denotes the non-delegable instantiation of world-time in human action, in which decision, responsibility, and irreversible world-binding are inseparably intertwined. Time thus appears not as a given dimension or measurable duration, but as the effect of irreversible closures in structurally incomplete worlds. In contrast to block time, probabilistic models of freedom, and information-ontological approaches (e.g., simulation, “It from Bit”), decision is not understood as a selective or aggregative act, but as an ontologically binding set-point. This entails fundamental consequences: reproducibility proves to be a criterion of closed world-forms; politics proves structurally incapable of deciding Eigenzeit collectively; and human and fundamental rights prove insufficient insofar as they implicitly address the human being without protected Eigenzeit as an object. Eigenzeit is thus not proposed as another model of time, but as a necessary ontological category for irreversible, non-simulable world-conditions, and as the foundation of a theory of societal reality formation beyond administration, simulation, and symbolic politics.

Contemporary approaches to biological repair increasingly rely on simulation-based ontologies of form. From bioelectric control models and morphogenetic setpoints to regenerative medicine and cancer reprogramming, healing is conceived as the restoration of a lost or damaged target state. These approaches presuppose that form is in principle retrievable, that the space of possibility remains intact, and that temporal history can be functionally neutralized. Building on the ontological clarification developed in Morphology Without Memory (10.5281/zenodo.18449106), this paper argues that such repair ontologies operate under a fundamental illusion. They confuse formal stabilization with ontological integration and treat simulation as a substitute for world-formation. Central to this illusion is the neglect of Eigenzeit: the non-transferable, irreversible emergence-time of living systems. While form may be reproduced, shifted, or overwritten, its genealogical temporality cannot be reconstructed. Using paradigmatic cases—biological cloning, bioelectric morphogenetic interventions, and contemporary narratives of cancer repair—the paper shows that simulation-based healing necessarily produces temporally displaced forms: coherent in appearance, functional in the short term, yet ontologically unstable. What is stabilized is not a restored organism, but a simulated order lacking endogenous temporal grounding. The analysis demonstrates that the instability observed in cloning and large-scale regenerative interventions is not a contingent technical failure, but a structural consequence of bypassing Eigenzeit. Repair, when understood as return, is therefore impossible. What can emerge instead is only a new self-similarity under altered spatio-temporal conditions—an emergence that can neither be guaranteed, controlled, nor preserved through simulation. In conclusion, the paper argues for a strict ontological distinction between morphology, simulation, and repair. It maintains that repair technologies remain legitimate only insofar as they acknowledge their non-restorative character. Where healing is conceived as overwrite, reset, or reconstruction, repair ontologies risk producing new pathologies rather than resolving existing ones.

The present paper clarifies a structural tension within indimergence-based ontologies: on the one hand, the consistent assumption of curvature, negative topology, and irreversible loss of possibility implies that every stabilized world necessarily ends in a funnel-like constriction. On the other hand, earlier works have shown that indimergence is not only closing but simultaneously differentiating, implying new orders of complexity that cannot be understood as a mere continuation of the same world. Without explicit clarification, this gives rise to the impression of an ontological contradiction between the end of the world and emergence. The paper argues that this contradiction is only apparent and results from an insufficient determination of temporality. Time is not defined as a neutral medium, but as the trace of irreversible loss of possibility. The funnel therefore does not designate the end of reality, but the end of that form of time under which a particular world can exist in a stable manner at all. In this understanding, the singularity does not mark a future point within the same temporal order, but the limit of the applicability of world-time itself. Indimergence thus performs a double, logically non-temporal operation: it terminates the world-capability of a given topology while simultaneously implying another order of differentiation that is neither world-internal, nor sequential, nor processual. The ontological space of possibility within which phenomena such as recurrence occur is likewise subject to the curvature produced by indimergence and is therefore not available as a neutral space of emergence. Within this framework, complexity does not grow through continuation within the world, but through an ontological displacement of the conditions of world-formation. The paper thereby disciplines both funnel-shaped end-time readings and emergence-idealistic misunderstandings, and precisely determines the boundary between the end of the world, the end of time, and differentiation.

The current debate on morphology in biology, complexity research, and AI implicitly rests on the assumption that form possesses a kind of memory: as a blueprint, setpoint, attractor, or information-like target state that is in principle reconstructible, manipulable, or simulable. This assumption links otherwise heterogeneous approaches—from biological morphogenesis (e.g. Michael Levin) and pre-geometric order models (Stuart Kauffman) to contemporary AI and simulation narratives—into a shared ontology of feasibility. The present text rejects this ontology. It argues that morphology has no memory in the sense of stored information, internal blueprints, or retrievable target states. The central conceptual error of the debate lies in the equation of folding with space. Folding describes topological constraints of form within a given space; it accounts for self-similarity, stability, and structural continuity. Space itself, however, does not arise from folding, but from Stülpung (ontological inversion)—that is, from a Seinsverschiebung (shift of being) in which potential is irreversibly lost and a relational negative space appears as a surrounding field of distortion. This negative space—here conceptualized as negative topology (Negativtopologie)—carries no memory and no information. It operates solely as a temporal constraint on form, determining what can still become possible under altered conditions. Morphological “remembering” is therefore not an access to the past, but the irreversible effect of already closed possibility spaces. Repair can consequently never be a return, but only the emergence of new self-similarity under changed spatio-temporal conditions. From this perspective it becomes clear that both biological control fantasies and AI-based simulations necessarily encounter an ontological limit. Simulation operates in the mode of folding—through state spaces, representations, and reconstructions—and thereby loses its connection to ontological inversion and negative topology. The text therefore does not propose an alternative morphological model, but a boundary determination within an operator-based research programme: it disciplines the concepts of form, space, memory, and repair, and marks the point at which feasibility, control, and simulation exceed their ontological domain of validity.

This paper reconstructs and condenses core theoretical concepts from Gesellschaft ohne Vertrauen (2005/2025) by Timothy Speed and situates them within a contemporary interdisciplinary context of debates on emergence, non-locality, and morphology. Central to the analysis is the concept of Fixpunkte (focal points), understood as epistemic singularities of conscious systems: non-producible, non-algorithmically derivable condensations through which inner order, orientation, and creative dynamics take shape. Fixpunkte mark those moments in which a new order of reality folds out of diffuse experience—without being explainable through linear processes. Building on this, the paper develops a morphological perspective on order in which social, cultural, and cognitive structures are not conceived as stable systems, but as temporary foldings between openness and condensation. The Bran-Spiral is introduced as a non-metaphorical structure that describes cyclical movements of differentiation and integration in consciousness and culture, without recourse to teleological models of development. In contrast to classical theories of emergence and process, order is not understood here as the result of an underlying dynamic, but as the consequence of irreducible orientational events that resist full ontologization. In its concluding section, the paper positions this approach in relation to more recent work on morphological intelligence (e.g. Levin), resonance theory (Rosa), and the work of S. A. Kauffman, and indicates why further theoretical development does not lie in a deepening of ontological mechanics, but in the marking of their limit. The paper thus presents itself as a conceptual consolidation and genealogical clarification of an approach formulated early (2005) and gaining renewed relevance today.