Luciano Floridi

The SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic has caused social and economic devastation. As the milestone of two years of ‘living with the virus’ approaches, governments and businesses are attempting to develop means of reopening society whilst still protecting public health. However, developing interventions – particularly technological interventions – that find a safe, socially acceptable, and ethically justifiable balance between these two seemingly opposing demands is extremely challenging. There is no one right solution, but the current most popular ‘solution’ is the so-called ‘COVID-19 Vaccine Passport’ (also known as COVID-19 passes or certificates), the use of which may be supported by both human rights and international public health law if they are designed and implemented appropriately. (We use the term ‘Vaccine Passport’ because it has been adopted by the popular press. Though it has been used in many ways, here we use it generically to refer to a document that certifies that an individual has been vaccinated against COVID-19 and on that basis grants the bearer more liberties than to those who have not been vaccinated. Later, we will discuss why it is necessary to move beyond considering only vaccinations, which informs our preferred term of ‘COVID-19 Status Pass’.) We set out to answer the following questions: how should governments and businesses assess the risks in light of human rights, public health ethics, and digital ethics concerns which emerge from developing and deploying COVID-19 Vaccine Passports? What design decisions should businesses make when developing COVID-19 Vaccine Passports to help ensure they respect human rights, and both public health and digital ethics? Do the implications for human rights, public health, and digital ethics vary depending on where and when COVID-19 Vaccine Passports are used? What are the rights and powers of the individual to object to or seek remedy for the use of COVID-19 Vaccine Passports? How can the risks of inequalities and social division derived from the deployment of COVID-19 Vaccine Passports be avoided or mitigated? We conducted a literature review and documentary analysis, supplementing our findings with news articles where appropriate. The following pages report our results, concluding with a series of actionable recommendations for businesses, national governments, and supranational organisations.

The Cambridge Companion to Humanism. Jill Kraye. Cambridge Companions to Literature. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xvii + 320. £35.00 hbk, £12.95 pbk. ISBN 0–521–43038–0, 0–521–43624–9. Scepticism in the History of Philosophy ‐ A Pan‐American Dialogue. Edited by Richard H. Popkin. Dordrecht‐Boston‐London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996. pp. xxii + 285, hbk, £99.00, ISBN 0–7923–3769–7 Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe. David B. Ruderman. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1995. pp. xi + 392. ISBN 0–300–06112–9 Pluralism and The Personality of the State. David Runciman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. xiv + 279. £35.00. ISBN 0521–55191–9 Gassendi et L'Europe. Edited by Sylvia Murr. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1997. pp. 494. FF 240. ISBN 2–7116–1306–2 Nicholas Malebranche: Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion. Edited by Nicholas Jolley, trans. by David Scott. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. xlii + 287. John Locke: Anleitung des menschlichen Verstandes. Eine Abhandlung von den Wunderwerken. In der Übersetzung Königsberg 1755 von Georg David Kypke, edited by Terry Boswell, Riccardo Pozzo and Clemens Schwaiger. Stuttgart‐Bad Cannstatt, 1996, 2 vols., pp. xxviii + 2187pp. viii + 140. DM 186. ISBN 3–7728–1711–4 Leibniz's ‘New System’. Edited by Roger S. Woolhouse, Florence, Leo S. Olschki, 1996. pp. x + 201. ISBN 88–222–4454–0. Mary Astell: Political Writings. Edited by Patricia Springborg. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xlviii + 286. £45.00 £15.95 ISBN 0–521–41800–3 0–521–42845–9 Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Edited by Sylvana Tomaselli. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. xxxvii + 349. £35.00, £8.95 ISBN 0–521–43053–4 0–521–43633–8 Knud Haakonssen: Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. pp. x + 386. £45.00 hbk. ISBN 0–521–49686–1. £15.95 pbk. ISBN 0–521–49802–3 Hartwig Wiedebach: Die Bedeutung der Nationalität für Hermann Cohen. Europaea Memororia. Studien und Texte zur Geschichte der europäischen Ideen. Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 1997. pp. viii + 340.

Vývoj informačních a komunikačních technologií (ICT) radikálně proměňuje nejen to, jak rozumíme světu a jak vzájemně komunikujeme, ale také způsob, jakým se díváme sami na sebe a jak chápeme svou vlastní povahu, existenci a odpovědnost. Rozšíření ICT tak představuje čtvrtou revoluci v dlouhém procesu přehodnocování základní podstaty a role lidstva ve vesmíru: jakožto lidstvo netvoříme nehybný střed vesmíru (kopernikovská revoluce), nelišíme se nijak mimořádně od zbytku zvířecího světa (darwinovská revoluce) a zdaleka nejsme sami pro sebe ve svém vědomí zcela transparentní (freudovská revoluce). ICT nám nyní dávají najevo, že nepředstavujeme izolované, odpojené činitele, ale informační organismy, kteří spolu s jinými druhy těchto činitelů sdílejí globální prostředí, v konečném pohledu utvářené z informací, takzvanou infosféru (Turingova revoluce).

This book presents cutting edge research on the new ethical challenges posed by biomedical Big Data technologies and practices. 'Biomedical Big Data' refers to the analysis of aggregated, very large datasets to improve medical knowledge and clinical care. The book describes the ethical problems posed by aggregation of biomedical datasets and re-use/re-purposing of data, in areas such as privacy, consent, professionalism, power relationships, and ethical governance of Big Data platforms. Approaches and methods are discussed that can be used to address these problems to achieve the appropriate balance between the social goods of biomedical Big Data research and the safety and privacy of individuals. Seventeen original contributions analyse the ethical, social and related policy implications of the analysis and curation of biomedical Big Data, written by leading experts in the areas of biomedical research, medical and technology ethics, privacy, governance and data protection. The book advances our understanding of the ethical conundrums posed by biomedical Big Data, and shows how practitioners and policy-makers can address these issues going forward.

This book presents cutting edge research on the new ethical challenges posed by biomedical Big Data technologies and practices. ‘Biomedical Big Data’ refers to the analysis of aggregated, very large datasets to improve medical knowledge and clinical care. The book describes the ethical problems posed by aggregation of biomedical datasets and re-use/re-purposing of data, in areas such as privacy, consent, professionalism, power relationships, and ethical governance of Big Data platforms. Approaches and methods are discussed that can be used to address these problems to achieve the appropriate balance between the social goods of biomedical Big Data research and the safety and privacy of individuals. Seventeen original contributions analyse the ethical, social and related policy implications of the analysis and curation of biomedical Big Data, written by leading experts in the areas of biomedical research, medical and technology ethics, privacy, governance and data protection. The book advances our understanding of the ethical conundrums posed by biomedical Big Data, and shows how practitioners and policy-makers can address these issues going forward.

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first, I shall briefly analyse the phenomenon of “big data”, and argue that the real epistemological challenge posed by the zettabyte era is small patterns. The valuable undercurrents in the ocean of data that we are accumulating are invisible to the computationally-naked eye, so more and better technology will help. However, because the problem with big data is small patterns, ultimately, the game will be won by those who “know how to ask and answer questions” (Plato, Cratylus, 390c). This introduces the second part, concerning information quality (IQ): which data may be useful and relevant, and so worth collecting, curating, and querying, in order to exploit their valuable (small) patterns? I shall argue that the standard way of seeing IQ in terms of fit-for-purpose is correct but needs to be complemented by a methodology of abstraction, which allows IQ to be indexed to different purposes. This fundamental step can be taken by adopting a bi-categorical approach. This means distinguishing between purpose/s for which some information is produced (P-purpose) and purpose/s for which the same information is consumed (C-purpose). Such a bi-categorical approach in turn allows one to analyse a variety of so-called IQ dimensions, such as accuracy, completeness, consistency, and timeliness. I shall show that the bi-categorical approach lends itself to simple visualisations in terms of radar charts.

In Floridi (2005), I argued that a definition of semantic information in terms of alethically-neutral content–that is, strings of well-formed and meaningful data that can be additionally qualified as true or untrue (false, for the classicists among us), depending on supervening evaluations–provides only necessary but insufficient conditions: if some content is to qualify as semantic information, it must also be true. One speaks of false information in the same way as one qualifies someone as a false friend, (i.e. not a friend at all). This leads to a refinement of the initial definition into: [Def]: p qualifies as semantic information if and only if p is (constituted by) well-formed, meaningful and veridical data. [Def] captures the general consensus reached by the debate and mentioned at the outset of this section. According to it, semantic information is, strictly speaking, inherently truth-constituted and not a contingent truth-bearer, exactly like knowledge but unlike propositions or beliefs, for example, which are what they are independently of their truth values and then, because of their truth-aptness, may be further qualified alethically.