Luciano Floridi

The previous chapters have provided a detailed overview of the variety of ethical challenges posed by the development of ICTs. By way of conclusion, in this epilogue I would like to invite the reader to look into the possible future of Information and Computer Ethics. More specifically, I shall try to forecast how the convergence of two fundamental trends of our times, globalization and the development of the information society, may interact with the ethical problems analysed in this book. The exercise will not be based on some untenable technological determinism. Humanity is, and will remain, firmly in charge of its destiny and hence be responsible for it. Rather, it will mean adopting the farmer's view that, with enough intelligence, toil and a bit of luck, one might be able to tell today what one will probably reap tomorrow. Before trying to ‘look into the seeds of time, and say which grain will grow and which will not’ (Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, Scene III, 59–62), two clarifications might be in order. First, the future of globalization is a phenomenon too complex even to sketch in this brief epilogue. For a synthetic, well-balanced and informed overview, the reader may wish to consult Held and McGrew (2001) and consider that this chapter is written from what Held et al. (1999)) have defined as a ‘transformationalist perspective’, according to which ‘globalization does not simply denote a shift in the extensity or scale of social relations and activity.

The paper analyses six ethical challenges posed by cloud computing, concerning ownership, safety, fairness, responsibility, accountability and privacy. The first part defines cloud computing on the basis of a resource-oriented approach, and outlines the main features that characterise such technology. Following these clarifications, the second part argues that cloud computing reshapes some classic problems often debated in information and computer ethics. To begin with, cloud computing makes possible a complete decoupling of ownership, possession and use of data and this helps to explain the problems occurring when different providers of cloud computing retain or relinquish the right to use or own users‘ data. The problem of safety in cloud computing is coupled to that of reliability, insofar as users have to trust providers to preserve their data, applications and content in a reliable manner. It is argued that, in this context, data insurance could play an important role. Regarding fairness, the paper argues that cloud computing is already reshaping the nature of the Digital. Responsibility, accountability and privacy close the ethical analysis of cloud computing. In this case, the thesis is that the necessity to account for the actions of cloud computing users imposes delicate trade-offs between users‘ privacy and the traceability of their operations.

We know very little about mathematical skepticism in modem times. Imre Lakatos once remarked that “in discussing modem efforts to establish foundations for mathematical knowledge one tends to forget that these are but a chapter in the great effort to overcome skepticism by establishing foundations for knowledge in general." And in a sense he was clearly right: modem thought — with its new discoveries in mathematical sciences, the mathematization of physics, the spreading of Pyrrhonist doctrines, the centrality of epistemological foundationalism and the diffusion of the geometrical method in philosophy — was the most natural arena in which skepticism and mathematics could confront each other. The problem remains, however, that no investigation of the whole topic has yet been attempted. Thus, as far as we know, mathematical certainties should have clashed with skeptical doubts, but whether and to what extent there was indeed a historical debate on mathematical skepticism in modern thought remains to be ascertained.

Philosophers have recently begun to address the new intellectual challenges arising from the world of information and the information society. Consequently, a new and vitally important area of research has begun to emerge, the philosophy of information (PI). This paper is the first attempt to analyse the potential nature of PI systematically. The paper aims to explain (1) what PI is (2) how PI has emerged (3) why there should be a new philosophical discipline such as PI, (4) what PI’s scientific goals are and, finally, (5) what interpretations of PI are possible, either as a philosophy of science/technology or as a philosophy of information design. It is argued that PI is the philosophy for the information age, as it offers the systematic treatment of the philosophical foundations of the world of information and of an information society.

Uno dei principali problemi nello studio della mente e della sua "collocazione" consiste nell'identificazione del corretto Livello di Astrazione a cui le varie descrizioni fenomeniche e le corrispondenti ipotesi esplicative possono essere sviluppate e confrontate. L'articolo contribuisce all'attuale dibattito metodologico in filosofia della mente analizzando due nozioni fondative, quella di modello e quella di simulazione, sulla base del concetto di Livello di Astrazione. L'ambito è quello del Metodo delle Astrazioni, proposto in Floridi e Sanders [2003]. Il Metodo delle Astrazioni si basa su una particolare branca dell'informatica teorica, quella dei Metodi Formali (Roever e Engelhardt [1998]; Woodcock e Davies [1996]), dove la matematica discreta è utilizzata per descrivere analiticamente le specifiche del comportamento di sistemi che elaborano informazioni. I sistemi sono descritti in termini di osservabili e regole di transizione, cioè come sistemi di transizione. Le descrizioni comportano l'utilizzo di variabili che rappresentano osservabili nella realtà, astraendo da altri eventuali osservabili. L'idea di fondo del Metodo delle Astrazioni è che tale processo di filtraggio sia ineliminabile in qualsiasi accesso alla realtà. Il tentativo di sondare un sistema in maggiore profondità produce una maggiore astrazione delle teorie e degli oggetti teorici che descrivono tale sistema. Il Metodo delle Astrazioni si presenta quindi come uno strumento per organizzare e chiarificare le varie teorie che intendono fornire una spiegazione della realtà o della conoscenza. La principale tesi dell'articolo è che "modello" e "simulazione" non possano essere pensati come nozioni a sé stanti, ma che la loro natura possa essere chiarita nei termini di tipi di relazioni tra sistemi di transizione. Nello specifico, si argomenta che la relazione di simulazione è una relazione tra gli osservabili di sistemi di transizione, mentre il modello è una relazione tra le regole di transizione di questi sistemi. Dati questi due nuovi tipi di relazioni, è possibile arricchire con ulteriori strutture di analisi il Metodo delle Astrazioni, estendendo la sua applicabilità. Queste strutture sono discusse nell'articolo come "Reti di Astrazione".

Library information science (LIS) should develop its foundation in terms of a philosophy of information (PI). This seems a rather harmless suggestion. In Floridi (2002a), I have articulated some of the reasons why I believe that PI can fulfill the foundationalist needs better than SE can. In this contribution, I clarify some aspects of my proposal (Floridi, 2002a) in favor of the interpretation of LIS as applied PI. The aim of the article is to remove some ambiguities and possible misunderstandings that might prevent the correct evaluation of my position, so that disagreement can become more constructive.

The use of "levels of abstraction" in philosophical analysis (levellism) has recently come under attack. In this paper, we argue that a refined version of epistemological levellism should be retained as a fundamental method, which we call the method of abstraction. After a brief introduction, in section two we make clear the nature and applicability of the (epistemological) method of levels of abstraction. In section three, we show the fruitfulness of the new method by applying it to five case studies: the concept of agenthood, the Turing test, the definition of emergence, quantum observation and decidable observation. In section four, we further characterise and support the method by distinguishing it from three other forms of "levellism": (i) levels of organisation; (ii) levels of explanation and (iii) conceptual schemes. In this context, we also briefly address the problems of relativism and antirealism. In the conclusion, we indicate some of the work that lies ahead, two potential limitations of the method and some results that have already been obtained by applying the method to some long-standing philosophical problems.

The paper introduces a new model of telepresence. First, it criticises the standard model of presence as epistemic failure, showing it to be inadequate. It then replaces it with a new model of presence as successful observability. It further provides reasons to distinguish between two types of presence, backward and forward. The new model is then tested against two ethical issues whose nature has been modified by the development of digital information and communication technologies, namely pornography and privacy, and shown to be effective.

The Philosophy of Information is a new area of research at the intersection of philosophy and computer science [4]. It concerns (a) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics (especially computation), utilization (especially computer ethics) and sciences; and (b) the elaboration and application of computational and information-theoretic methodologies to philosophical problems. Past work by members of our group has concentrated on (a), and in this paper we explore (b). In a nutshell, we ask what computer science can do for philosophy, rather than what the latter can do for the former.

The word data (sing. datum) is originally Latin for “things given or granted”. Because of such a humble and generic meaning, the term enjoys considerable latitude both in its technical and in its common usage, for almost anything can be referred to as a “thing given or granted” (Cherry [1978]). With some reasonable approximation, four principal interpretations may be identified in the literature. The first three captures part of the nature of the concept and are discussed in the next section. The fourth is the most fundamental and satisfactory, so it is discussed separately, in section three. On its basis, some further clarifications about the nature of data are introduced in sections four to six. A reminder about the social, legal and ethical issues raised by the use of data concludes this entry.

I love information upon all subjects that come in my way, and especially upon those that are most important. Thus boldly declares Euphranor, one of the defenders of Christian faith in Berkley’s Alciphron (Berkeley, (1732), Dialogue 1, Section 5, Paragraph 6/10). Evidently, information has been an object of philosophical desire for some time, well before the computer revolution, Internet or the dotcompandemonium (see for example Dunn (2001) and Adams (2003)). Yet what does Euphranor love, exactly? What is information? The question has received many answers in different fields. Unsurprisingly, several surveys do not even converge on a single, unified definition of information (see for example Braman 1989, Losee (1997), Machlup and Mansfield (1983), Debons and Cameron (1975), Larson and Debons (1983)).

In Floridi (2005), I argued that a definition of semantic information in terms of alethically-neutral content–that is, strings of well-formed and meaningful data that can be additionally qualified as true or untrue (false, for the classicists among us), depending on supervening evaluations–provides only necessary but insufficient conditions: if some content is to qualify as semantic information, it must also be true. One speaks of false information in the same way as one qualifies someone as a false friend, (i.e. not a friend at all). This leads to a refinement of the initial definition into: [Def]: p qualifies as semantic information if and only if p is (constituted by) well-formed, meaningful and veridical data. [Def] captures the general consensus reached by the debate and mentioned at the outset of this section. According to it, semantic information is, strictly speaking, inherently truth-constituted and not a contingent truth-bearer, exactly like knowledge but unlike propositions or beliefs, for example, which are what they are independently of their truth values and then, because of their truth-aptness, may be further qualified alethically.

Recreational Drugs European Network (ReDNet) project aims to use the Psychonaut Web Mapping Project database (Psychonaut Web Mapping Group, 2009) containing novel psychoactive compounds usually not mentioned in the scientific literature and thus unknown to clinicians as a unique source of information. The database will be used to develop an integrated ICT prevention approach targeted at vulnerable individuals and focused on novel synthetic and herbal compounds and combinations. Particular care will be taken in keeping the health professionals working directly with young people showing problematic behaviors regularly updated in terms of novel compounds and combinations as well. A user-friendly project website will be developed aimed primarily at delivering the information/prevention approaches, but will also be a way of communicating with project partners and relevant stakeholders (e.g. thematic forum facilities, instant messages, blogs, video chat, wikiblog, newsletters distributed via mailing list). The website will support various ICT prevention tools, including an SMS alert service. Different areas and sections will be aimed specifically at the different target groups.

In written and spoken communications, figures of speech (e.g., metaphors and synecdoche) are often used as an aid to help convey abstract or less tangible concepts. However, the benefits of using rhetorical illustrations or embellishments in visualization have so far been inconclusive. In this work, we report an empirical study to evaluate hypotheses that visual embellishments may aid memorization, visual search and concept comprehension. One major departure from related experiments in the literature is that we make use of a dual-task methodology in our experiment. This design offers an abstraction of typical situations where viewers do not have their full attention focused on visualization (e.g., in meetings and lectures). The secondary task introduces “divided attention”, and makes the effects of visual embellishments more observable. In addition, it also serves as additional masking in memory-based trials. The results of this study show that visual embellishments can help participants better remember the information depicted in visualization. On the other hand, visual embellishments can have a negative impact on the speed of visual search. The results show a complex pattern as to the benefits of visual embellishments in helping participants grasp key concepts from visualization.

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first, I shall briefly analyse the phenomenon of “big data”, and argue that the real epistemological challenge posed by the zettabyte era is small patterns. The valuable undercurrents in the ocean of data that we are accumulating are invisible to the computationally-naked eye, so more and better technology will help. However, because the problem with big data is small patterns, ultimately, the game will be won by those who “know how to ask and answer questions” (Plato, Cratylus, 390c). This introduces the second part, concerning information quality (IQ): which data may be useful and relevant, and so worth collecting, curating, and querying, in order to exploit their valuable (small) patterns? I shall argue that the standard way of seeing IQ in terms of fit-for-purpose is correct but needs to be complemented by a methodology of abstraction, which allows IQ to be indexed to different purposes. This fundamental step can be taken by adopting a bi-categorical approach. This means distinguishing between purpose/s for which some information is produced (P-purpose) and purpose/s for which the same information is consumed (C-purpose). Such a bi-categorical approach in turn allows one to analyse a variety of so-called IQ dimensions, such as accuracy, completeness, consistency, and timeliness. I shall show that the bi-categorical approach lends itself to simple visualisations in terms of radar charts.

This chapter addresses two questions. First, if knowledge is accounted information, how are we supposed (to apply this analysis in order) to understand perceptual knowledge and knowledge by testimony? In the first part of the chapter, I articulate an answer in terms of a re-interpretation of perception and testimony as data providers rather than full-blown cases of knowledge. Second, if perception and testimony are correctly understood as data providers, how are we supposed (to apply this analysis in order) to understand the semantic value of the data provided by such processes? In the second part of the chapter, I argue in favour of a constructionist hypothesis about how data may become meaningful for human cognitive agents through a process of repurposing of natural data/signals. The conclusion of the chapter is that human agents are natural-born data hackers.

This book presents the latest research on the challenges and solutions affecting the equilibrium between freedom of speech, freedom of information, information security, and the right to informational privacy. Given the complexity of the topics addressed, the book shows how old legal and ethical frameworks may need to be not only updated, but also supplemented and complemented by new conceptual solutions. Neither a conservative attitude (“more of the same”) nor a revolutionary zeal (“never seen before”) is likely to lead to satisfactory solutions. Instead, more reflection and better conceptual design are needed, not least to harmonise different perspectives and legal frameworks internationally. The focus of the book is on how we may reconcile high levels of information security with robust degrees of informational privacy, also in connection with recent challenges presented by phenomena such as “big data” and security scandals, as well as new legislation initiatives, such as those concerning “the right to be forgotten” and the use of personal data in biomedical research. The book seeks to offer analyses and solutions of the new tensions, in order to build a fair, shareable, and sustainable balance in this vital area of human interactions.

The post-Westphalian Nation State developed by becoming more and more an Information Society. However, in so doing, it progressively made itself less and less the main information agent, because what made the Nation State possible and then predominant, as a historical driving force in human politics, namely ICTs, is also what is now making it less central, in the social, political and economic life of humanity across the world. ICTs fluidify the topology of politics. They do not merely enable but actually promote (through management and empowerment) the agile, temporary and timely aggregation, disaggregation and re-aggregation of distributed groups around shared interests across old, rigid boundaries represented by social classes, political parties, ethnicity, language barriers, physical barriers, and so forth. This is generating a new tension between the Nation State, still understood as a major organisational institution, yet no longer monolithic but increasingly morphing into a multiagent system itself, and a variety of equally powerful, indeed sometimes even more politically influential and powerful, non-Statal organisations. Geo-politics is now global and increasingly non-territorial, but the Nation State still defines its identity and political legitimacy in terms of a sovereign territorial unit, as a Country. Such tension calls for a serious exercise in conceptual re-engineering: how should the new informational multiagent systems (MASs) be designed in such a way as to take full advantage of the socio-political progress made so far, while being able to deal successfully with the new global challenges (from the environment to the financial markets) that are undermining the legacy of that very progress? In the lecture, I shall defend an answer to this question in terms of a design of political MAS based on principles borrowed from information ethics.