Ricardo Tavares Da Silva

According to the principle of special relativity, the laws of nature are the same for systems at rest and for systems in uniform and rectilinear motion: for the formulation of the laws of nature, the body C and the body C´, which, relative to the former, is in uniform and rectilinear motion, are equivalent. Galileo, in the Dialogue on the Two Greatest Systems of the World, developed the following argument in favor of such a principle: two bodies C and C´, which are in uniform and rectilinear motion in relation to a third body C´´, with the same direction and speed, are at rest in relation to one another; therefore, what is applicable to rest, is applicable to uniform and rectilinear motion. Einstein, in On the Influence of Gravity in the Propagation of Light, generalizes the principle of relativity: all reference bodies C, C´, etc., are equivalent for the formulation of the laws of nature, whatever their state of motion is. The argument is analogous to that of Galileo: two bodies in free fall are at rest in relation to each other; therefore, what is applicable to rest, is applicable to constant acceleration. I argue that those arguments are invalid: to say that rest is shared motion does not mean that rest is, simply, movement. Therefore, one can only conclude that the laws of nature are the same for systems at rest and for systems with shared motion.

According to the traditional view, the following incompatibility holds true: in reasoning, either there is warrant (certainty) or there is novelty. If there is warrant, there is not novelty: that would be the case of deductive reasoning. If there is novelty, there is not warrant: that would be the case of inductive reasoning. Causal reasoning would belong to the second group because there is novelty and, therefore, there is not warrant in it. I argue that this is false: reasoning may have novelty and, nevertheless, be a deductive one. That is precisely what happens in (some) causal reasoning. And I will develop the following line of argumentation: one thing is to warrant that some state of affairs exists and other thing is to warrant that warrant. So we may have correct deductive reasoning without having certainty of that correction, like in some cases of causal reasoning.

Contrary to what is commonly held, negligence (namely, conscious negligence) and willfulness (namely, recklessness) are not distinguished on the basis of the volitional element but on the basis of the cognitive element, since negligence implies ignorance-mistake, being the volitional element common to both figures. On the other hand, if, in negligence, the representation of the typical fact is something that exists less than what objectively exists, in the attempt, on the contrary, it is something that exists more. Hence, attempt implies assumption-mistake. In conclusion, whenever there is a mistake and criminal liability occurs, the “normal” cases of liability, those associated with the commission of a willful and consummate crime, are excluded.

This paper aims to provide an adequate philosophical groundwork to normativity. More specifîcally, the author argues in favor of its axiological nature: from a philosophical point of view, normativity only becomes intelligible if values are taken into account. Therefore values arise as a necessary condition of normativity. Although not sufficient, values are the decisive condition in distinguishing norms from other relations of the same type. The thought of axiologists like Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann is discussed even though their theories do not fully explain how norm and value interrelate.

The problem of the selection of the legislative representatives is the problem of knowing how this representatives are selected. The electoral system is the system that most democratic organizations have adopted and has become so present nowadays that we take for granted the identification between electoral system and representative democracy. However the meaning of ‘representative democracy’ has no reference to a specific mode of selection of the representatives. Being compatible with the democratic principle, the criteria of competence for the exercise of the legislative function ought to be the instituted mode of selection, for it is the best one. In general, this is precisely what representation aims in the context of division of labour: to leave to the experts the exercise of some social function belonging to all.

Regarding the selection of the legislative representatives, the elective system is the system that most democratic organizations have adopted. It has become so present nowadays that we take for granted the identification between elective system and representative democracy. But is this identification a correct one? I argue that it is not, since the meaning of 'representative democracy' has no reference to specific mode of selection of the representatives. And, since democracy and other methods of selection are compatible, it should adopted the best one. The criteria of competence for the exercise of the political power ought to be the adopted method of selection, for it is the best one. I too argue that, in the context of division of labor into public and private labor, this is precisely what public representation aims: to leave to the experts the exercise of public labor.

RESUMO De acordo com a teoria das funções de verdade, a verdade/falsidade de uma proposição é computável a partir da verdade/falsidade das suas proposições “internas”: para cada proposição há uma função entre valores de verdade. Aplicada a proposições modais, origina a semântica dos mundos possíveis e, aplicada a proposições normativas, origina uma semântica que reduz os conceitos normativos aos conceitos modais, a semântica modal. Esta redução fica posta em questão com a existência dos chamados ‘paradoxos da lógica deôntica’. Estes não podem ser vistos como meras anomalias, mas devem ser vistos como indícios da incorreção da semântica modal. Em todos eles, a regra da necessitação, assim como o axioma da distribuição, “não batem certo”. Não obstante, o cumprimento/incumprimento das normas já é computável a partir da verdade/falsidade das proposições que expressam os estados de coisas devidos. ABSTRACT According to the theory of truth-functions the truth/falsehood of a proposition is computable from the truth/falsehood of its “internal” propositions: for each proposition there is a function between truth values. Possible world semantics arises from the application of that theory to modal propositions; modal semantics - the reduction of normative concepts to modal concepts - arises from its application to normative propositions. But the ‘paradoxes of deontic logic’, as they are called, undermine such reduction: they cannot be seen as mere anomalies but instead as evidence for the wrongness of modal semantics. In all these paradoxes, the necessitation rule, as well as the distribution axiom, fail. Nevertheless, the fulfillment/nonfulfillment of norms is computable from the truth/falsehood of the propositions which express the required states of affairs.