•  19
    Modelling the noncomputational mind: Reply to Litch
    Philosophical Psychology 10 (3): 365-371. 1997.
    I explain why, within the nonclassical framework for cognitive science we describe in the book, cognitive-state transitions can fail to be tractably computable even if they are subserved by a discrete dynamical system whose mathematical-state transitions are tractably computable. I distinguish two ways that cognitive processing might conform to programmable rules in which all operations that apply to representation-level structure are primitive, and two corresponding constraints on models of cog…Read more
  •  17
    Transglobal reliabilism
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 171-195. 2006.
  •  81
    Cognition needs syntax but not rules
    with John L. Tienson
    In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell. pp. 147--158. 2006.
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the world humans would find …Read more
  •  78
    Consciousness and intentionality
    with George Graham and John L. Tienson
    In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 468--484. 2007.
  •  83
    Themes in my philosophical work
    In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan, Atlanta: Rodopi. pp. 1-26. 2002.
    I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in effect, con…Read more
  •  119
    On What There Isn’t (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 693. 1993.
  • Authors' replies
    with John L. Tienson
    Acta Analytica 22 (22): 275-287. 1999.
  •  7
    Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy
  •  81
    The phenomenology of first-person agency
    with John L. Tienson and George Graham
    In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation, Imprint Academic. pp. 323. 2003.
  •  102
    Robust vagueness and the forced-March sorites paradox
    Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language): 159-188. 1994.
    I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign …Read more
  •  29
  •  1
    The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology
    Mind and Language 8 (2): 282-297. 1993.
  •  3
    Books Reviews
    Mind 100 (398): 290-293. 1991.
  •  37
    The case against events
    Philosophical Review 87 (1): 28-47. 1978.
  •  175
    Causal compatibilism and the exclusion problem
    Theoria 16 (40): 95-116. 2001.
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discus…Read more
  •  2
    Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (Supplement): 19-38. 1983.
  •  82
    Supervenience and cosmic hermeneutics
    Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1): 19-38. 1984.
  •  12
    Josep Corbi raises several worries about the metaethical position that Mark Timmons and I have articulated and defended, which we call “nondescriptivist cognitivism.â€â€¦ His remarks prompt some points of clarification…. Timmons and I characterize descriptive content as “way-the-world-might-be†content. We maintain that “base case†beliefs—roughly, those non-evaluative and evaluative beliefs whose contents have the simplest kinds of logical form—are of two types: a non-evaluative b…Read more
  •  264
    (1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380
  •  98
    The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness
    The Monist 81 (2): 313-330. 1998.
    Transvaluationism makes two fundamental claims concerning vagueness. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: vague discourse is governed by semantic standards that are mutually unsatisfiable. But second, vagueness is viable and legitimate nonetheless; its logical incoherence is benign.
  •  6
    Settling into a new paradigm
    with John Tienson
    In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 241--260. 1991.
  •  4
    Representations Without Rules in Philosophy of Mind
    with John Tienson
    Philosophical Topics 17 (1): 147-174. 1989.
  •  5
    Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes From the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim (edited book)
    with Marcelo Sabates and David Sosa
    Cambridge University Press. 2015.
    How does mind fit into nature? Philosophy has long been concerned with this question. No contemporary philosopher has done more to clarify it than Jaegwon Kim, a distinguished analytic philosopher specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. With new contributions from an outstanding line-up of eminent scholars, this volume focuses on issues raised in Kim's work. The chapters cluster around two themes: first, exclusion, supervenience, and reduction, with attention to the causal exclusion …Read more
  •  319
    Jackson on physical information and qualia
    Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April): 147-52. 1984.