•  30
    Lehrer on 'could'-statements
    Philosophical Studies 32 (4). 1977.
  •  19
    Representations don't need rules: Reply to James Garson
    with John Tienson
    Mind and Language 9 (1): 1-24. 1994.
  •  9
    MILLER, Seumas Joint Action
    with Kai Nielsen, Michael Pendlebury, Philip Percival, Mark Sainsbury, David Sapire, Charles Sayward, Philip Hugly, and Mark Timmons
    Philosophical Papers 1 (259): 65. 1992.
  •  43
    Review of Levine's Purple Haze (review)
    Noûs 40 (3). 2006.
  •  306
    Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat
    with John L. Tienson and George Graham
    In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. 2004.
  •  32
    Soft laws
    with John L. Tienson
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1): 256-279. 1990.
  •  1
    On What There Isn'tMaterial Beings
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3): 693. 1993.
  •  31
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind (edited book)
    with John L. Tienson
    Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1991.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
  •  63
    Practicing safe epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 102 (3). 2001.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, rel…Read more
  • Reality and Humean Supervenience confronts the reader with central aspects in the philosophy of David Lewis, whose work in ontology, metaphysics, logic, probability, philosophy of mind, and language articulates a unique and systematic foundation for modern physicalism
  •  112
    A nonclassical framework for cognitive science
    with John L. Tienson
    Synthese 101 (3): 305-45. 1994.
      David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alterna…Read more
  •  44
    Representation without rules
    with John L. Tienson
    Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1): 147-74. 1989.
  •  18
    The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz [hacek over z] Potrc [hacek over c] argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of…Read more
  •  35
    Levels of description in nonclassical cognitive science
    with John L. Tienson
    Philosophy 34 159-188. 1992.
    David Marr provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science . Thus, by focusing on levels of descr…Read more
  • Essays on Paradoxes
    Oup Usa. 2016.
    This volume brings together Terence Horgan's essays on paradoxes, both published and new. A common theme unifying these essays is that philosophically interesting paradoxes typically resist either easy solutions or solutions that are formally/mathematically highly technical. Another unifying theme is that such paradoxes often have deep-sometimes disturbing-philosophical morals.
  •  53
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology
    with John L. Tienson
    MIT Press. 1996.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
  •  1
    Critica -. 2008.
  •  181
    Mary Mary, quite contrary
    Philosophical Studies 99 (1): 59-87. 2000.
  •  92
    Cognitive systems as dynamic systems
    with John Tienson
    Topoi 11 (1): 27-43. 1992.
  •  25
    Settling into a new paradigm
    with John L. Tienson
    Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1): 97-113. 1987.
  •  48
    How to be realistic about folk psychology
    Philosophical Psychology 1 (1): 69-81. 1988.
    Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific …Read more
  •  77
  •  41
    Supervenient bridge laws
    Philosophy of Science 45 (2): 227-249. 1978.
    I invoke the conceptual machinery of contemporary possible-world semantics to provide an account of the metaphysical status of "bridge laws" in intertheoretic reductions. I argue that although bridge laws are not definitions, and although they do not necessarily reflect attribute-identities, they are supervenient. I.e., they are true in all possible worlds in which the reducing theory is true
  •  20
    Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement
    with David Henderson
    Synthese 1-20. forthcoming.
    Some hold that beliefs arising out of certain sources such as perceptual experience enjoy a kind of entitlement—as one is entitled to believe what is thereby presented as true, at least unless further evidence undermines that entitlement. This is commonly understood to require that default epistemic entitlement is a non-evidential kind of epistemic warrant. Our project here is to challenge this common, non-evidential, conception of epistemic entitlement. We will argue that although there are ind…Read more