•  247
    Alvin Goldman’s contributions to contemporary epistemology are impressive—few epistemologists have provided others so many occasions for reflecting on the fundamental character of their discipline and its concepts. His work has informed the way epistemological questions have changed (and remained consistent) over the last two decades. We (the authors of this paper) can perhaps best suggest our indebtedness by noting that there is probably no paper on epistemology that either of us individually o…Read more
  •  13
    Kim on the Mind--Body Problem (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4): 579-607. 1996.
    For three decades the writings of Jaegwon Kim have had a major influence in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. Sixteen of his philosophical papers, together with several new postscripts, are collected in Kim [1993]. The publication of this collection prompts the present essay. After some preliminary remarks in the opening section, in Section 2 I will briefly describe Kim's philosophical 'big picture' about the relation between the mental and the physical. In Section 3 I will situate Kim's ap…Read more
  •  21
  •  49
    The semantic blindness objection to contextualism challenges the view that there is no incompatibility between (i) denials of external-world knowledge in contexts where radical-deception scenarios are salient, and (ii) affirmations of external-world knowledge in contexts where such scenarios are not salient. Contextualism allegedly attributes a gross and implausible form of semantic incompetence in the use of the concept of knowledge to people who are otherwise quite competent in its use; this b…Read more
  •  56
  •  139
    Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic
    Philosophical Papers 29 (2): 121-153. 2000.
    Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual s…Read more
  •  84
    Expressivism and contrary-forming negation
    Philosophical Issues 19 (1): 92-112. 2009.
    No Abstract
  •  3
    Transvaluationism: The Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 14 (1): 20-35. 2006.
  •  88
    Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (1): 95-115. 2001.
    Causal compatibilism claims that even though physics is causally closed, and even though mental properties are multiply realizable and are not identical to physical causal properties, mental properties are causal properties nonetheless. This position asserts that there is genuine causation at multiple descriptive/ontological levels; physics-level causal claims are not really incompatible with mentalistic causal claims. I articulate and defend a version of causal compatibilism that incorporates t…Read more
  •  133
    Transvaluationism about vagueness: A progress report
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1): 67-94. 2010.
    The philosophical account of vagueness I call "transvaluationism" makes three fundamental claims. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: it essentially involves mutually unsatisfiable requirements that govern vague language, vague thought-content, and putative vague objects and properties. Second, vagueness in language and thought (i.e., semantic vagueness) is a genuine phenomenon despite possessing this form of incoherence—and is viable, legitimate, and indeed indispensable.…Read more
  •  21
    Attitudinatives
    Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (2). 1989.
  •  20
    Replies to papers
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1): 302-340. 2002.
    Jaegwon Kim argues that one should distinguish naturalism from materialism, and that both should be construed as ontological rather than epistemological. I agree, on both counts. Although I have sometimes tended to slur together materialism and naturalism in of my writings (as is done in much recent philosophy), I do think that it is important to distinguish them. It is a serious philosophical task to get clearer about how each position is best articulated, and about ways that one could embrace …Read more
  •  3
    Editors’ Introduction
    with David Henderson
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (Supplement): 15-15. 2000.
  •  131
    Facing Up to the Sorites Paradox
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 6 99-111. 2000.
    The ancient sorites paradox has important implications for metaphysics, for logic, and for semantics. Metaphysically, the paradox can be harnessed to produce a powerful argument for the claim that there cannot be vague objects or vague properties. With respect to logic, the paradox forces a choice between the highly counterintuitive ‘epistemic’ account of vagueness and the rejection of classical two-valued logic. Regarding semantics, nonclassical approaches to the logic of vagueness lead natural…Read more
  •  22
    Editor’s Introduction by Terry Horgan
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement): 1-1. 1995.
  •  15
  •  98
    Abundant truth in an austere world
    with Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč
    In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 137--167. 2006.
    What is real? Less than you might think. We advocate austere metaphysical realism---a form of metaphysical realism claiming that a correct ontological theory will repudiate numerous putative entities and properties that are posited in everyday thought and discourse, and also will even repudiate numerous putative objects and properties that are posited by well confirmed scientific theories. We have lately defended a specific version of austere metaphysical realism which asserts that there is real…Read more
  •  22
    Materialism: Matters Of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction
    Philosophical Studies 131 (1): 157-183. 2006.
    How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions
  •  88
    I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an…Read more
  •  137
    Transglobal evidentialism-reliabilism
    Acta Analytica 22 (4): 281-300. 2007.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account…Read more