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62A Routley-Meyer Semantics for Łukasiewicz 3-valued LogicProceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 19 29-34. 2018.Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics was introduced in the early seventies of the past century. RM-semantics was intended to model classical relevant logics such as the logic of the relevant conditional R and the logic of Entailment E. But, ever since Routley and Meyer’s first papers on the topic, this essentially malleable semantics has been used for characterizing more general relevant logics or even non-relevant logics. The aim of this paper is to provide an RM-semantics with respect to…Read more
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797Minimal Negation in the Ternary Relational SemanticsReports on Mathematical Logic 39 47-65. 2005.Minimal Negation is defined within the basic positive relevance logic in the relational ternary semantics: B+. Thus, by defining a number of subminimal negations in the B+ context, principles of weak negation are shown to be isolable. Complete ternary semantics are offered for minimal negation in B+. Certain forms of reductio are conjectured to be undefinable (in ternary frames) without extending the positive logic. Complete semantics for such kinds of reductio in a properly extended positive lo…Read more
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72The Class of All Natural Implicative Expansions of Kleene’s Strong Logic Functionally Equivalent to Łkasiewicz’s 3-Valued Logic Ł3Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (3): 349-374. 2020.We consider the logics determined by the set of all natural implicative expansions of Kleene’s strong 3-valued matrix and select the class of all logics functionally equivalent to Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued logic Ł3. The concept of a “natural implicative matrix” is based upon the notion of a “natural conditional” defined in Tomova.
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153Belnap-Dunn semantics for natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong three-valued matrix II. Only one designated valueJournal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 29 (3): 307-325. 2019.This paper is a sequel to ‘Belnap-Dunn semantics for natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong three-valued matrix with two designated values’, where a ‘bivalent’ Belnap-Dunn semantics is provided for all the expansions referred to in its title. The aim of the present paper is to carry out a parallel investigation for all natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix now with only one designated value.
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117Partiality and its dual in natural implicative expansions of Kleene’s strong 3-valued matrix with only one designated valueLogic Journal of the IGPL 27 (6): 910-932. 2019.Equivalent overdetermined and underdetermined bivalent Belnap–Dunn type semantics for the logics determined by all natural implicative expansions of Kleene’s strong 3-valued matrix with only one designated value are provided.
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86A 2-set-up Routley-Meyer Semantics for the 4-valued Relevant Logic E4Bulletin of the Section of Logic 45 (2). 2016.The logic BN4 can be considered as the 4-valued logic of the relevant conditional and the logic E4, as the 4-valued logic of entailment. The aim of this paper is to endow E4 with a 2-set-up Routley-Meyer semantics. It is proved that E4 is strongly sound and complete w.r.t. this semantics.
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67Blocking the Routes to Triviality with Depth RelevanceJournal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (4): 493-526. 2014.In Rogerson and Restall’s, the “class of implication formulas known to trivialize ” is recorded. The aim of this paper is to show how to invalidate any member in this class by using “weak relevant model structures”. Weak relevant model structures verify deep relevant logics only.
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147Belnap-Dunn semantics for natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong three-valued matrix with two designated valuesJournal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 29 (1): 37-63. 2019.ABSTRACTA conditional is natural if it fulfils the three following conditions. It coincides with the classical conditional when restricted to the classical values T and F; it satisfies the Modus Ponens; and it is assigned a designated value whenever the value assigned to its antecedent is less than or equal to the value assigned to its consequent. The aim of this paper is to provide a ‘bivalent’ Belnap-Dunn semantics for all natural implicative expansions of Kleene's strong 3-valued matrix with …Read more
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81Reduced Routley–Meyer semantics for the logics characterized by natural implicative expansions of Kleene’s strong 3-valued matrixLogic Journal of the IGPL 27 (1): 69-92. 2019.The aim of this paper is to provide a reduced Routley–Meyer semantics for the logics characterized by all natural implicative expansions of Kleene’s strong 3-valued matrix (with two designated values, as well as with only one) susceptible to be interpreted in Routley–Meyer semantics.
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Converse Ackermann Property and Minimal NegationTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 24 (1). 2005.
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95Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics for intuitionistic-type negationsElsevier, Academic Press. 2018.Routley-Meyer Ternary Relational Semantics for Intuitionistic-type Negations examines how to introduce intuitionistic-type negations into RM-semantics. RM-semantics is highly malleable and capable of modeling families of logics which are very different from each other. This semantics was introduced in the early 1970s, and was devised for interpreting relevance logics. In RM-semantics, negation is interpreted by means of the Routley operator, which has been almost exclusively used for modeling De…Read more
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82Dual Equivalent Two-valued Under-determined and Over-determined Interpretations for Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued Logic Ł3Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3): 303-332. 2014.Łukasiewicz three-valued logic Ł3 is often understood as the set of all 3-valued valid formulas according to Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued matrices. Following Wojcicki, in addition, we shall consider two alternative interpretations of Ł3: “well-determined” Ł3a and “truth-preserving” Ł3b defined by two different consequence relations on the 3-valued matrices. The aim of this paper is to provide dual equivalent two-valued under-determined and over-determined interpretations for Ł3, Ł3a and Ł3b. The logic…Read more
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112Relational semantics for the 4-valued relevant logics BN4 and E4Logic and Logical Philosophy 25 (2): 173-201. 2016.The logic BN4 was defined by R.T. Brady in 1982. It can be considered as the 4-valued logic of the relevant conditional. E4 is a variant of BN4 that can be considered as the 4-valued logic of entailment. The aim of this paper is to define reduced general Routley-Meyer semantics for BN4 and E4. It is proved that BN4 and E4 are strongly sound and complete w.r.t. their respective semantics.
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97Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the CAP. A noteTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 20 (2): 183-190. 2005.Two versions of minimal intuitionism are defined restricting Contraction. Both are defined by means of a falsity constant F. The first one follows the historical trend, the second is the result of imposing specialconstraints on F. RelationaI ternary semantics are provided.
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51El sistema Bp+ : una lógica positiva mínima para la negación mínima (The system Bp+: a minimal positive logic for minimal negation)Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 81-91. 2007.Entendemos el concepto de “negación mínima” en el sentido clásico definido por Johansson. El propósito de este artículo es definir la lógica positiva mínima Bp+, y probar que la negación mínima puede introducirse en ella. Además, comentaremos algunas de las múltiples extensiones negativas de Bp+.“Minimal negation” is classically understood in a Johansson sense. The aim of this paper is to define the minimal positive logic Bp+ and prove that a minimal negation can be inroduced in it. In addition,…Read more
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111A simple Henkin-style completeness proof for Gödel 3-valued logic G3Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (4): 371-390. 2014.A simple Henkin-style completeness proof for Gödel 3-valued propositional logic G3 is provided. The idea is to endow G3 with an under-determined semantics of the type defined by Dunn. The key concept in u-semantics is that of “under-determined interpretation”. It is shown that consistent prime theories built upon G3 can be understood as u-interpretations. In order to prove this fact we follow Brady by defining G3 as an extension of Anderson and Belnap’s positive fragment of First Degree Entailme…Read more
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690Anderson And Belnap's Minimal Positive Logic With Minimal NegationReports on Mathematical Logic 36 117-130. 2002.Our question is: can we embed minimal negation in implicative logics weaker than I→? Previous results show how to define minimal negation in the positive fragment of the logic of relevance R and in contractionless intuitionistic logic. Is it possible to endow weaker positive logics with minimal negation? This paper prooves that minimal negation can be embedded in even such a weak system as Anderson and Belnap’s minimal positive logic.
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82Negation introduced with the unary connectiveJournal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 19 (3): 371-388. 2009.In the first part of this paper (Méndez and Robles 2008) a minimal and an intuitionistic negation is introduced in a wide spectrum of relevance logics extending Routley and Meyer's basic positive logic B+. It is proved that although all these logics have the characteristic paradoxes of consistency, they lack the K rule (and so, the K axiom). Negation is introduced with a propositional falsity constant. The aim of this paper is to build up logics definitionally equivalent to those in the aforemen…Read more
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96Dual Equivalent Two-valued Under-determined and Over-determined Interpretations for Łukasiewicz's 3-valued Logic Ł3Journal of Philosophical Logic (2-3): 1-30. 2013.Łukasiewicz three-valued logic Ł3 is often understood as the set of all 3-valued valid formulas according to Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued matrices. Following Wojcicki, in addition, we shall consider two alternative interpretations of Ł3: “well-determined” Ł3a and “truth-preserving” Ł3b defined by two different consequence relations on the 3-valued matrices. The aim of this paper is to provide (by using Dunn semantics) dual equivalent two-valued under-determined and over-determined interpretations for …Read more
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135A Routley–Meyer Semantics for Gödel 3-Valued Logic and Its Paraconsistent CounterpartLogica Universalis 7 (4): 507-532. 2013.Routley–Meyer semantics (RM-semantics) is defined for Gödel 3-valued logic G3 and some logics related to it among which a paraconsistent one differing only from G3 in the interpretation of negation is to be remarked. The logics are defined in the Hilbert-style way and also by means of proof-theoretical and semantical consequence relations. The RM-semantics is defined upon the models for Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic B+, the weakest positive RM-semantics. In this way, it is to be expec…Read more
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59A constructive negation defined with a negation connective for logics including Bp+Bulletin of the Section of Logic 34 (3): 177-190. 2005.The concept of constructive negation we refer to in this paper is (minimally) intuitionistic in character (see [1]). The idea is to understand the negation of a proposition A as equivalent to A implying a falsity constant of some sort. Then, negation is introduced either by means of this falsity constant or, as in this paper, by means of a propositional connective defined with the constant. But, unlike intuitionisitc logic, the type of negation we develop here is, of course, devoid of paradoxes …Read more
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1Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the CAP. A noteTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 20 (2): 183-190. 2005.
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123Relevance logics and intuitionistic negationJournal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 18 (1): 49-65. 2008.The logic B+ is Routley and Meyer's basic positive logic. We show how to introduce a minimal intuitionistic negation and an intuitionistic negation in B+. The two types of negation are introduced in a wide spectrum of relevance logics built up from B+. It is proved that although all these logics have the characteristic paradoxes of consistency, they lack the K rule (and so, the K axioms).
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46The basic constructive logic for weak consistency and the reductio axiomsBulletin of the Section of Logic 38 (1/2): 61-76. 2009.
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84Generalizing the Depth Relevance Condition: Deep Relevant Logics Not Included in R-MingleNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (1): 107-127. 2014.
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11Intutionistic Propositional Logic with the Converse Ackerman PopertyTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-2): 46-54. 2003.
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71A weak logic with the axiom Mingle lacking the variable-sharing propertyBulletin of the Section of Logic 40 (3/4): 195-202. 2011.As it is well known, Relevance Logic R plus the axiom mingle (R-Mingle) does not have the variable-sharing property (vsp). The aim of this paper is to improve this result by defining a weak logic with the axiom mingle and not included in minimal logic BM lacking the vsp.
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83The basic constructive logic for negation-consistency defined with a propositional falsity constantBulletin of the Section of Logic 36 (1-2): 45-58. 2007.
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144The non-relevant De Morgan minimal logic in Routley-Meyer semantics with no designated pointsJournal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (4): 321-332. 2014.Sylvan and Plumwood’s is the relevant De Morgan minimal logic in the Routley-Meyer semantics with a set of designated points. The aim of this paper is to define the logic and some of its extensions. The logic is the non-relevant De Morgan minimal logic in the Routley-Meyer semantics without a set of designated points
Gemma Robles
Universidad de León
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Universidad de LeónAssociate Professor
León, CL, Spain
Areas of Specialization
| Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
| Logic and Philosophy of Logic |