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10Representing representationsIn P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, Cambridge University Press. pp. 146--161. 1998.
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20Ignorance of meaningIn Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford University Press. 2003.Article
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99A preference for sense and referenceJournal of Philosophy 86 (2): 73-89. 1989.The topic of this paper is the semantic structure of belief reports of the form 'a believes that p'. it is argued that no existing theory of these sentences satisfactorily accounts for anaphoric relations linking expressions within the embedded complement sentence to expressions outside. a new account of belief reports is proposed which assigns to embedded expressions their normal semantic values but which also exploits frege's idea of using senses to explain the apparent failures of extensional…Read more
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14Truth and senseIn Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 15--24. 1995.
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66This paper is principally devoted to comparing and contrasting poverty of stimulus arguments for innate cognitive apparatus in relation to language and in relation to folk psychology. These days one is no longer allowed to use the term ‘innate’ without saying what one means by it. So I will begin by saying what I mean by ‘innate’. Sections 2 and 3 will discuss language and theory of mind, respectively. Along the way, I will also briefly discuss other arguments for innate cognitive apparatus in t…Read more
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101Two theories of namesMind and Language 16 (5). 2001.Two semantic theories of proper names are explained and assessed. The theories are Burge’s treatment of proper names as complex demonstratives and Larson and Segal’s quasi-descriptivist account of names. The two theories are evaluated for empirical plausibility. Data from deficits, processing models, developmental studies and syntax are all discussed. It is concluded that neither theory is fully confirmed or refuted by the data, but that Larson and Segal’s theory has more empirical plausibility
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620On a unitary semantical analysis for definite and indefinite descriptionsIn Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond, Oxford University Press. pp. 420-437. 2004.
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The philosophy of psychologyIn Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject, Oxford University Press. 1998.
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181Keep making senseSynthese 170 (2): 275-287. 2009.In a number works Jerry Fodor has defended a reductive, causal and referential theory of cognitive content. I argue against this, defending a quasi-Fregean notion of cognitive content, and arguing also that the cognitive content of non-singular concepts is narrow, rather than wide.
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41Content and Computation: Chasing the Arrows A Critical Notice of Jerry Fodor's The Elm and the ExpertMind and Language 12 (3-4): 490-501. 1997.
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Please allow me to recapitulate some territory that will be familiar to most readers. Here is how the problem of mental causation has typically been set up since shortly after the onset of non-reductive physicalism. It is now widely assumed that the realm of the physical is causally closed. This means that the probability of any event’s occurring is fully determined by physical causes, and physical causes alone. There is no space in the physical causal nexus for any non-physical event to exert a…Read more
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17Interpreting Davidson (edited book)Center for the Study of Language and Inf. 2001.Donald Davidson is, arguably, the most important philosopher of mind and language in recent decades. His articulation of the position he called "anomalous monism" and his ideas for unifying the general theory of linguistic meaning with semantics for natural language both set new agendas in the field. _Interpreting Davidson_ collects original essays on his work by some of his leading contemporaries, with Davidson himself contributing a reply to each and an original paper of his own
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124Reference, causal powers, externalist intuitions, and unicornsIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 329. 2004.In this chapter, I will compare and contrast singular concepts with what I call
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63IntentionalityIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2005.Article
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37VI*—In the Mood for a Semantic TheoryProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1): 103-118. 1991.Gabriel Segal; VI*—In the Mood for a Semantic Theory, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 103–118, https://doi.org/1.
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O jednorodnej analizie semantycznej deskrypcji określonych i nieokreślonych (tłum. Filip Kawczyński)Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 75. 2010.
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Truth andIn Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 189. 2006.