• Truth and Meaning
    In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.
  •  13
    Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1): 240-243. 1991.
  •  125
    The causal efficacy of content
    Philosophical Studies 63 (July): 1-30. 1991.
    Several philosophers have argued recently that semantic properties do play a causal role. 1 It is our view that none of these arguments are satisfactory. Our aim is to reveal some of the deficiencies of these arguments, and to reassess the question in our own way. In section 1, we shall explain in more detail what is involved in the pretheoretical idea of a causally efficacious property and so provide a fuller sense of the issue. In section 2 we shall discuss Fodor's and Kim's arguments that the…Read more
  •  17
    Commentary on Hanna Pickard, “The Purpose in Chronic Addiction”
    American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (2): 63-64. 2012.
  •  68
    Two Theories of Names
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51 75-93. 2002.
    The aim of this paper is to assess the relative merits of two accounts of the semantics of proper names. The enterprise is of particular interest because the theories are very similar in fundamental respects. In particular, they can agree on three major features of names: names are rigid designators; different co-extensive names can have different cognitive significance; empty proper names can be meaningful. Neither theory by itself offers complete explanations of all three features. But each th…Read more
  •  12
    The Causal Inefficacy of Content
    Mind and Language 24 (1): 80-102. 2009.
    : The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over‐determinationism are prima facie per…Read more
  •  5
    Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship (edited book)
    with Nick Heather
    Oxford University Press. 2016.
    Views on addiction are often polarised - either addiction is a matter of choice, or addicts simply can't help themselves. But perhaps addiction falls between the two? This book contains views from philosophy, neuroscience, psychiatry, psychology, and the law exploring this middle ground between free choice and no choice.
  •  11
    A good understanding of the nature of a property requires knowing whether that property is relational or intrinsic. Gabriel Segal's concern is whether certain psychological properties—specifically, those that make up what might be called the "cognitive content" of psychological states—are relational or intrinsic. He claims that content supervenes on microstructure, that is, if two beings are identical with respect to their microstructural properties, then they must be identical with respect to t…Read more
  •  1
    Knowledge of Meaning
    with Richard Larson
    Mind 109 (436): 960-964. 2000.
  •  7
    Representing representations
    In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, Cambridge University Press. pp. 146--161. 1998.
  •  20
    Ignorance of meaning
    In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford University Press. 2003.
    Article
  •  85
    A preference for sense and reference
    Journal of Philosophy 86 (2): 73-89. 1989.
    The topic of this paper is the semantic structure of belief reports of the form 'a believes that p'. it is argued that no existing theory of these sentences satisfactorily accounts for anaphoric relations linking expressions within the embedded complement sentence to expressions outside. a new account of belief reports is proposed which assigns to embedded expressions their normal semantic values but which also exploits frege's idea of using senses to explain the apparent failures of extensional…Read more
  •  10
    Truth and sense
    In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 15--24. 1995.
  • Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought
    with James Higginbotham
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 68 85-130. 1994.
  •  48
    This paper is principally devoted to comparing and contrasting poverty of stimulus arguments for innate cognitive apparatus in relation to language and in relation to folk psychology. These days one is no longer allowed to use the term ‘innate’ without saying what one means by it. So I will begin by saying what I mean by ‘innate’. Sections 2 and 3 will discuss language and theory of mind, respectively. Along the way, I will also briefly discuss other arguments for innate cognitive apparatus in t…Read more
  • A Slim Book about Narrow Content
    Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209): 657-660. 2002.
  •  98
    Two theories of names
    Mind and Language 16 (5). 2001.
    Two semantic theories of proper names are explained and assessed. The theories are Burge’s treatment of proper names as complex demonstratives and Larson and Segal’s quasi-descriptivist account of names. The two theories are evaluated for empirical plausibility. Data from deficits, processing models, developmental studies and syntax are all discussed. It is concluded that neither theory is fully confirmed or refuted by the data, but that Larson and Segal’s theory has more empirical plausibility
  •  293
    Seeing What is not There
    Philosophical Review 98 (2): 189. 1989.
  • The Segal Discussion
    with Donald Davidson
    Philosophy International. 1997.
  •  164
    Keep Making Sense
    Synthese 170 (2): 275-287. 2009.
    In a number works Jerry Fodor has defended a reductive, causal and referential theory of cognitive content. I argue against this, defending a quasi-Fregean notion of cognitive content, and arguing also that the cognitive content of non-singular concepts is narrow, rather than wide.
  •  7
    Defence of a Reasonable Individualism
    Mind 100 (4): 485-494. 1991.
  •  4
    A Preference for Sense and Reference
    Journal of Philosophy 86 (2): 73-89. 1989.