David Archard

On 20 May 2025, the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted the Pandemic Agreement at the World Health Assembly in Geneva. After nearly three years of negotiations and after failing to adopt it in 2024, this is a decisive step towards more combined efforts to address future pandemics. The final text of the treaty highlights the need for equitable access to pandemic-related health products and aims to improve the ability of international health regulators to guide countries during future pandemics. There is hope that by learning from mistakes made during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Agreement can be used to address global inequities and make globally equitable resource sharing the norm, preventing harmful practices, such as vaccine hoarding and barriers to data sharing. However, while the current Pandemic Agreement puts equitable access to surveillance, therapeutics, vaccines, and other pandemic-related products at the forefront, many important questions are yet to be answered. The authors of this paper draw attention to ethics preparedness efforts. The piece considers the importance of building the necessary infrastructure for the provision of ethical advice on health-related matters as part of the implementation phases of the WHO Pandemic Agreement to ensure that we learn from the mistakes made during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Whether children have rights is a debate that in recent years has spilled over into all areas of public life. It has never been more topical than now as the assumed rights of parents over their children is challenged on an almost daily basis. David Archard offers the first serious and sustained philosophical examination of children and their rights. Archard reviews arguments for and against according children rights. He concludes that every child has at least the right to the best possible upbringing. Denying that parents have any significant rights over their children, he is able to challenge current thinking about the proper roles of state and family in rearing children. Crucially, he considers the problem of how to define and understand `child abuse'.

John O'Neill argues in a recent article, ‘Should Communitarians be Nationalists?’, that communitarians are wrong to be committed to the defence of ties of nationhood, both because the nation‐state's rise is associated with the disappearance of the ties of community and because the nation is an illusory community. I argue that the evidence that communitarianism is committed as charged to the defence of nationality is unconvincing. Further, the familiar accusation that the nation is a false or unreal community is neither perspicuous nor obviously true. It is important to evaluate the significance and worth of the nation as a community independently of the nationalist prescription that the nation and the state should coincide. The important question is not whether the political community should be a nation, but what sort of community the nation should be.

ABSTRACT I criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve.

ABSTRACT Mary Midgley asserts that my argument concerning the problem of child‐abuse was inappropriately framed in the language of rights, and neglected certain pertinent natural facts. I defend the view that the use of rights‐talk was both apposite and did not misrepresent the moral problem in question. I assess the status and character of the natural facts Midgley adduces in criticism of my case, concluding that they do not obviously establish the conclusions she believes they do. Finally I briefly respond to the charge that my suggestions were illiberal.

Whether children have rights is a debate that in recent years has spilled over into all areas of public life. It has never been more topical than now as the assumed rights of parents over their children is challenged on an almost daily basis. David Archard offers the first serious and sustained philosophical examination of children and their rights. Archard reviews arguments for and against according children rights. He concludes that every child has at least the right to the best possible upbringing. Denying that parents have any significant rights over their children, he is able to challenge current thinking about the proper roles of state and family in rearing children. Crucially, he considers the problem of how to define and understand `child abuse'.

_Children: Rights and Childhood_ is widely regarded as the first book to offer a detailed philosophical examination of children’s rights. David Archard provides a clear and accessible introduction to a topic that has assumed increasing relevance since the book’s first publication. Divided clearly into three parts, it covers key topics such as: John Locke’s writings on children Philippe Ariès’s _Centuries of Childhood_ children’s moral and legal rights a child’s right to vote and to sexual choice parental rights to privacy and autonomy defining and understanding child abuse. The third edition has been fully revised and updated throughout with a new chapter providing an in-depth analysis of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and Part 2 has been restructured to move the reader from general theoretical considerations of children’s rights through to practical issues. This volume is ideal reading for advanced studies across Philosophy, Social Work, Law, Childhood Studies, Politics, and Social Policy.

Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics of Thought By James W. Bernauer Humanities Press International, 1990. Pp. 261. ISBN 0–391–03740–4. $15.00 pbk. Hipparchia's Choice, An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, Etc. By Michèle Le Doeuff, translated by Trista Selous Basil Blackwell, 1991. Pp. vii + 364. ISBN 0–631–17639‐X. £45. Psychology Edited by Stephen Everson Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 269. ISBN 0–521–35338–6. £32.50. On the Nature and Existence of God By Richard M. Gale Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 422. ISBN 0–521–40300–6. £35. The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State Edited by Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit Basil Blackwell, 1989, pbk 1991. Pp. vii + 207. ISBN 0–631–18088–5. £14.95 pbk. Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to play games with words By Roy Harris Routledge, 1988, pbk 1990. Pp. xv +136. ISBN 0–415–05225–4. £9.99 pbk. Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences By Geoffrey Hawthorn Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. xiii + 192. ISBN 0–521–40359–6. £27.50. Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy By Stephen Houlgate Routledge, 1991. Pp. 288. ISBN 0–415–06658–1. £35. Locke on Money. Volumes I and II By Patrick Hyde Kelly Clarendon Press, 1991. Vol. 1 Pp. xv + 342. ISBN 0–19–82456–7. £50.00 Vol. II Pp. vii + 322. ISBN 0–19–824837–7 £45.00. L'Union substantielle. I. Blondel et Leibniz By Marc Leclerc Culture et Vérité, 1991. Pp. v + 415. ISBN 2–87299–014–3. Plato's Parmenides By C. C. Meinwald Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. 192. ISBN 0–1–506445–3. £27.50. Idee und Weltwille: Schopenhauer als Kritiker Hegels By Alfred Schmidt Carl Hanser Verlag, 1988. Pp. 175. ISBN 3–446–15161–3.

This article responds to the familiar characterisation of Mary Warnock as someone whose major achievements as a public intellectual, such as the Report on human fertilisation and embryology, were at the expense of philosophical rigour and integrity. I explicate her lifelong commitment to practical morality, and her understanding of ethics and of the role of feelings in moral judgments, before analysing her important distinction between the private and public moral attitude. ‘Public philosophy’ is what she believes is necessary for those seeking to make a difference in the world of law and policy. I highlight the importance for her of securing ‘acceptable’ legal outcomes, especially on issues of bioscientific development which are the subject of irreconcilable moral disagreements. I compare her distinction with others and contrast its use with relevant writing by John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. Finally, I defend her against misjudged criticism from her philosophical contemporaries, most notably Richard Hare.

Onora O’Neill is one of the foremost moral philosophers writing today. Her work on ethics and bioethics, political philosophy and the philosophy of Kant is extremely influential. Her landmark Reith Lectures on trust did much to establish the subject not only on the philosophical and political agenda but in the world of media, business and law more widely. Reading Onora O’Neill is the first book to examine and critically appraise the work of this important thinker. It includes specially commissioned chapters by leading international philosophers in ethics, Kantian philosophy and political philosophy. The following aspects of O’Neill’s work are examined: global justice Kant the ethics of the family bioethics consent trust. Featuring a substantial reply to her critics at the end of the book, Reading Onora O’Neill is essential reading for students and scholars of ethics and political philosophy.