•  190
    Subjective character and reflexive content (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1): 191-198. 2004.
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry
  •  188
    In these comments on Bernard Williams's probing and provocative paper, I shall first try to develop a line of response to the pair of problems Williams poses concerning Aristotle's account of soul. I shall then offer some reactions, of a more general sort, to his discussion of hylomorphism (henceforth "HMism"). In particular, I want to suggest that, though HMism is in part a form of inoffensive materialism, it is more than just that. And I want to urge also that HMism need not be tempted towards…Read more
  •  171
    Experience and the physical
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 117-28. 2006.
    Strawson’s challenging and provocative defence of panpsychism1 begins by sensibly insisting that physicalism, properly understood, must unflinchingly countenance the occurrence of conscious experiences. No view, he urges, will count as ‘real physicalism’ (p. 4) if it seeks to get around or soften that commitment, as versions of socalled physicalism sometimes do. Real physicalism (hereinafter physicalism tout court) must accordingly reject any stark opposition of mental and physical, which is not…Read more
  •  170
    Color, mental location, and the visual field
    Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1): 85-93. 2001.
    Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processes
  •  166
    in Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions, ed. Patrick Grim, New York and London: Automatic Press, forthcoming.
  •  155
    (not intended for publication), Replies to Strawson and Block in Colloquium at the CUNY Graduate Center, December 13, 2006.
  •  152
    consciousness. Such unconscious processing always " Cambridge, UK " tends to re?ect habitual or strong responses. From this
  •  150
    Consciousness and the mind
    Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July): 227-251. 2002.
    Everyone — or almost everyone — was agreed that what is [mental] … has a common quality in which its essence is expressed: namely the quality of being conscious — unique, indescribable, but needing no description. All that is conscious … is [mental], and conversely all that is [mental] is conscious; that is self-evident and to contradict it is nonsense
  •  148
    The timing of conscious states
    Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2): 215-20. 2002.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioningRead more
  •  144
    Contemporary discussions typically give somewhat sort shrift to the theory of judgment Descartes advances in the Fourth Meditation.' One reason for this relative neglect is presumably the prima facie implausibility of the theory. It sounds odd to say that, in believing something, one's mental affirmation is an act of free will, on a par with freely deciding what to do. In addition, Descartes advances the theory as a way to explain the possibility of human error, which doubtless strikes many as a…Read more
  •  142
    Being conscious of ourselves
    The Monist 87 (2): 161-184. 2004.
    What is it that we are conscious of when we are conscious of ourselves? Hume famously despaired of finding self, as against simply finding various impressions and ideas, when, as he put it, “I enter most intimately into what I call myself.” “When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions.”
  •  138
    A striking difference between those fields we classify as humanities and those we regard as sciences is the attitude within each field toward its history. Learning about literature, music, or the visual arts requires becoming knowledgeable about a significant amount of the history of those areas. And education in these fields, at whatever level, invariably involves some study of great accomplishments in the past. By contrast, scientific work and standard scientific textbooks make little referenc…Read more
  •  135
    PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.
  •  133
    Higher-order theories of consciousness
    Scholarpedia 3 (5): 4407. 2008.
    in Scholarpedia, forthcoming
  •  129
    Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4): 911-18. 1993.
    whatever it is that occurs in between the two. Though superficially tempting, this idea heightens the air of mystery surrounding consciousness. As far..
  •  129
    Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as …Read more
  •  124
    But there is another reason, equally important. We distinguish among thoughts, feelings, and sensations by virtue of their characteristic representational properties. In particular, we describe thoughts and emotions in terms of the things they are about and how they represent those things. And we characterize sensations by reference to their qualitative properties and the things..
  •  115
    There are a few things I’d like to say in reply to Adrienne Prettyman’s interesting paper, “Empty Thoughts: An Explanatory Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness,” in which she discusses the objection to higher-order theories from the possibility those theories leave open that a higher-order awareness represents one as being in a state that one is not actually in
  •  108
    Book reviews 581 (review)
    The focus of Mark Rowlands’s admirable, richly argued book is phenomenal consciousness, in particular, how such consciousness arises from processes that are not themselves phenomenally conscious. Rowlands examines several views on this question, arguing that their failures point toward his own intriguing, novel position, which he develops in the final three chapters.
  •  108
    Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem (edited book)
    Prentice-Hall. 1971.
    An expanded and updated edition of this classic collection
  •  97
    The Rosenthal-Sellars correspondence on intentionality
    with Wilfrid S. Sellars
    In Ausonio Marras (ed.), Intentionality, Mind and Language, University of Illinois Press. 1972.
    In response to your kind offer to read through portions of the typescript of my thesis pertaining to your views on intentionality, I am sending you a copy of an introductory section to such a chapter.{1} The enclosed typescript represents a first draft, for which I apologize, but I thought it might be useful to get any comments you might have in at the ground floor, so to speak
  •  93
    Dintre fenomenele mentale, nici unul nu pare să reziste atât de bine explicaţiei precum conştiinţa. Parţial, dificultatea se datorează faptului că folosim termenul „conştient” şi alţii înrudiţi să dea seama de anumite fenomene distincte ale căror legături nu sunt întotdeauna clare. Iar acest lucru duce adesea la amestecarea acestor fenomene distincte. De aceea, orice încercare de a explica conştiinţa trebuie să înceapă prin a distinge diferitele lucruri pe care le numim conştiinţă. Un astfel de …Read more
  •  93
    Mind-body materialism is at its most inviting in the context of trying to give a unified treatment of the natural world. And the principle challenge it faces is to do justice to the distinguishing features of mental phenomena, which set them off from nonmental, physical reality. This challenge it not easy to meet. In 1971 I suggested that the difficulty in meeting it makes especially appealing the eliminative materialism of Feyerabend and Rorty. If adopting the materialist view that mental pheno…Read more
  •  88
    , encapsulates his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. his deep hostility to Marxist thinking. By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, By contrast, my own allusion is friendly, and is meant to point up a nice parallel and is meant to point up a nice parallel my argument has with a schematic my argument has with a schematic aspect of Marx’s thinking. aspect of Marx’s thinking.
  •  83
    Consciousness science: real progress and lingering misconceptions
    with Ned Block, David Carmel, Stephen M. Fleming, Robert W. Kentridge, Christof Koch, Victor A. F. Lamme, and Hakwan Lau
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (11): 556-557. 2014.
  •  82
    René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy
    Topoi 34 (2): 541-548. 2015.
    The major goal of René Descartes’s rich and penetrating recent book, Meditations on First Philosophy, is to develop a methodology for the discovery of the truth, more specifically, a methodology that accommodates the dictates of a mathematical physics for our view of physical reality. Such a methodology must accordingly deal with and seek to defuse the apparent conflict between a mathematical physics and our commonsense picture of things, a conflict that continues to pose difficult challenges. T…Read more