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20L'intentionnalité cognitive et ses modes : Reinach critique de BrentanoPhilosophie 128 (1): 20-33. 2015.
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19Recension de: Denis Seron, Objet et signification. Matériaux phénoménologiques pour la théorie du jugement, Paris, Vrin, 2003Revue Internationale de Philosophie 2006 (2). 2006.
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18Külpe on Cognitive AttitudesDiscipline filosofiche. 27 (2): 157-176. 2017.This paper offers a reconstruction of Külpe’s theory of cognitive attitudes from the perspective of contemporary debates about cognitive phenomenology. I argue that Külpe’s view contrasts with analytic mainstream approaches to the same phenomena in at least two respects. First, Külpe claims, cognitive experiences are best described in terms of occurrent cognitive acts or attitudes toward sensory, imagistic or intellectual contents. Second, occurrent cognitive attitudes are intransitively cons…Read more
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18Psychological Themes in the School of Alexius Meinong (edited book)De Gruyter. 2019.This volume addresses key aspects of the philosophical psychology elaborated by Alexius Meinong and some of his students. It covers a wide range of topics, from the place of psychological investigations in Meinong's unique philosophical program to his thought-provoking views on perception, colors, "Vorstellungsproduktion," assumptions, values, truth, and emotions.
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15The Normative Force of Perceptual JustificationIn Maxime Doyon & Thiemo Breyer (eds.), Normativity in Perception, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 178-195. 2015.It seems uncontroversial that perceptual experiences provide us with some “normative support” for beliefs or judgments about our surroundings. Provided that the normative force of perceptual justification is something that manifests itself in consciousness or something we commonly experience, what are its phenomenal features? To put it differently: What is it to experience the normative force of perceptual justification? In the first section I will briefly comment on the demand of a unified theo…Read more
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14La critique de la théorie des valeurs dans 'l'origine de l'uvre d'art'Revue Philosophique De Louvain 103 (3): 390-414. 2005.
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12Suppose you perceive a cup of wonderful Italian coffee on the table in front of you. Is your visual experience best described as a representation-of a cup of coffee or as a relation-to a cup of coffee? Representationalism and relationalism, I suggest, are two prominent options under discussion in the present-day philosophical investigations on perception. In this paper, I want to argue that both options are on the wrong track. The reason, basically, is that they are at odds with the analytical d…Read more
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11When you are in a joyful mood, how do you know that it is so? On a Cartesian picture, the answer is that you’ve got some immediate, noninferential apprehension of your being joyful, such as this noninferential apprehension is analogous to sense perception, and unlike sense perception, it makes it unquestionable or evident to you that you presently are in a joyful mood. In this paper, I defend this view against some classical objections, arguing that pre-reflective self-consciousness actually is …Read more
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9IntroductionIn Arnaud Dewalque & Venanzio Raspa (eds.), Psychological Themes in the School of Alexius Meinong, De Gruyter. pp. 1-10. 2019.
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9Que signifie le « primat de la raison pratique » en théorie de la connaissance?Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 4 124-168. 2008.Partant du constat que la majeure partie des débats concernant un éventuel « primat de la raison pratique » se jouent pour ainsi dire en amont de la phénoménologie husserlienne, j’entreprends d’abord de retracer les deux sources de la thèse du « primat de la raison pratique », telle qu’elle est défendue dans l’école néokantienne de Bade, à savoir la source kantienne-fichtéenne, qui concerne le caractère « normatif » du critère de validité de la connaissance, et la source brentanienne-bergmannien…Read more
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9Expérience perceptuelle et contenus multiplesBulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique. 2011.Mon intention est de discuter quelques aspects du débat actuel sur la perception qui oppose les partisans du conceptualisme (essentiellement John McDowell et Bill Brewer) aux partisans du non-conceptualisme (Fred Dretske, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, Michael Tye, Tim Crane, José Luis Bermúdez, Adina Roskies et d?autres). Je commencerai par fixer le cadre théorique du débat, par clarifier son enjeu et par retracer brièvement son origine. Ensuite, je mettrai en évidence une difficulté majeu…Read more
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7Deux théories de l'analyse psychique: Wundt et BrentanoIn Charles-Edouard Niveleau (ed.), Vers une philosophie scientifique. Le programme de Brentano, Demopolis. 2014.objectif de ce chapitre est de réévaluer succinctement les relations entre la phénoménologie et la psychologie expérimentale naissantes à partir des positions de Franz Brentano et de Wilhelm Wundt. Contrairement à une idée reçue, je suggère, d’une part, que les programmes analytiques de Brentano et de Wundt reposent tous deux sur un procédé expérimental consistant à faire varier les parties des phénomènes psychiques étudiés. Mais je suggère aussi, d’autre part, que les théories de l’analyse psyc…Read more
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6In this chapter, it is argued that Weber's particular combination of Von Kries' naturalistic paradigm and Rickert's antinaturalistic paradigm might become less puzzling if we return to the interpretation that emerged in the middle of the nineteen-twenties within the South-Western School of neo-Kantianism. The basic intuition which underlies this interpretation is that the social sciences are best understood as generalizing cultural sciences. On this understanding, they differ both from the natur…Read more
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3What is the phenomenal structure of our perceptual experiences? In this talk, I suggest that perceptual experiences – like consciousness in general – have a mereological structure, that is, a structure in which the most basic relation is that of parthood. I do not provide any definitive argument for this view. I just want to suggest (i) that the mereological approach is untouched by the usual objections coming from the proponents of the Unified Field Theory (James, Searle, Tye), (ii) that the Un…Read more
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L'ontologie Fondamentale Est-elle Une Ontologie Ou Une Sémantique? Note Sur La Lecture Néokantienne De HeideggerDaimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 40 57-68. 2007.Mi objetivo, en este artículo, es clarificar el programa de Heidegger denominado «ontología fundamental». La lectura crítica hecha por el neokantiano Rudolf Zocher permite mostrar algunas ambigüedades de dicho programa. Se examinan tres tesis: 1. el concepto de «ontología fundamental» es equívoco; 2. la diferencia entre «teoría fundamental» y «teoría fundada» permite suprimir esta equivocidad; 3. la «ontología fundamental» es esencialmente una teoría del sentido o una semántica
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The Rise of the Brentano SchoolIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, Routledge. pp. 225-235. 2017.In this chapter, I give a bird’s eye view of the Brentano School from a rather historical perspective. My leading hypothesis is that one crucial factor explaining the rise of the school is Brentano’s unique strategy, within the academic context of the time, to promote the revival of philosophy as a rigorous science. After a brief introduction, I reconstruct the three main phases in the school’s development, namely Brentano’s teaching in Würzburg, his teaching in Vienna, and Anton Marty’s teachin…Read more
Liège, Liege, Belgium
Areas of Specialization
Phenomenology and Consciousness |
19th Century Austrian Philosophy |
Theories of Consciousness |
Intentionality |
Areas of Interest
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