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21The Elusiveness of Mental ActsIn Die Rolle der Sprache in der Theoriebildung (DFG-Netzwerk Philosophie der Alltagssprache und Phänomenologie), . 2024.peer reviewed.
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324On Noticing Transparent States: A Compatibilist Approach to TransparencyEuropean Journal of Philosophy 31 (2): 398-412. 2022.According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or “diaphanous”. This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner‐awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency. To date, most attempts to do so require a rejection of strong transparency in favor of weak transparency. In this view, transparent states can be attended to by attending (in the right way)…Read more
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157The Occamization of 'Meaning': Ryle and BrentanoLogique & Analyse 256 511-532. 2021.To Occamize a nominal expression N is to show that, despite grammatical appearances, N does not name, or denote, an entity. This article argues that the Occamization of ‘meaning,’ which was central to Gilbert Ryle’s meta-philosophy, had already been advanced by Franz Brentano. The core thesis of the article is that Brentano’s notion of ‘content,’ albeit different from that of linguistic rules, does a similar job of eliminating expendable entities. If the meaning of a linguistic expression is not…Read more
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779Misleading Expressions: The Brentano-Ryle ConnectionIn Arnaud Dewalque, Charlotte Gauvry & Sébastien Richard (eds.), Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School: Reassessing the Brentanian Legacy, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 95-118. 2021.This chapter argues that Gilbert Ryle’s account of misleading expressions, which is rightly considered a milestone in the history of analytic philosophy, is continuous with Brentano’s. Not only did they identify roughly the same classes of misleading expressions, but their analyses are driven by a form of ontological parsimony which sharply contrasts with rival views in the Brentano School, like those of Meinong and Husserl. Section 1 suggests that Ryle and Brentano share a similar notion of ana…Read more
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9IntroductionIn Arnaud Dewalque & Venanzio Raspa (eds.), Psychological Themes in the School of Alexius Meinong, De Gruyter. pp. 1-10. 2019.
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413The Reception of Positivism in Whewell, Mill and BrentanoIn Ion Tanasescu, Alexandru Bejinariu, Susan Krantz Gabriel & Constantin Stoenescu (eds.), Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill: With Translations of Original Writings on Philosophy as Science by Franz Brentano, De Gruyter. 2022.This article compares and contrasts the reception of Comte’s positivism in the works of William Whewell, John Stuart Mill and Franz Brentano. It is argued that Whewell’s rejection of positivism derives from his endorsement of a constructivist account of the inductive sciences, while Mill and Brentano’s sympathies for positivism are connected to their endorsement of an empiricist account. The mandate of the article is to spell out the chief differences between these two rival accounts. In the las…Read more
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18Psychological Themes in the School of Alexius Meinong (edited book)De Gruyter. 2019.This volume addresses key aspects of the philosophical psychology elaborated by Alexius Meinong and some of his students. It covers a wide range of topics, from the place of psychological investigations in Meinong's unique philosophical program to his thought-provoking views on perception, colors, "Vorstellungsproduktion," assumptions, values, truth, and emotions.
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427The Phenomenology of MentalityIn Denis Fisette, Guillaume Frechette & Hynek Janoušek (eds.), Franz Brentano’s Philosophy after Hundred Years – From History of Philosophy to Reism, Springer. pp. 23-40. 2020.This chapter offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception. Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is,…Read more
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345A Critique of Meinongian AssumptionsIn Arnaud Dewalque & Venanzio Raspa (eds.), Psychological Themes in the School of Alexius Meinong, De Gruyter. pp. 85-108. 2019.This article argues that Meinong’s analysis of assumption, while exploring the variety of phenomenological primitives in a more promising way than Brentano did, nevertheless fails to adequately account for the noncommittal character of assumptive attitudes and the difference between assumptive and other neighbouring attitudes. Section 1 outlines an overall framework for the philosophical analysis of assumptions and cognitive attitudes. Section 2 gives an overview of Brentano’s analysis of cognit…Read more
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358Brentano's Case for OptimismRivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 111 (4): 835-847. 2019.Call metaphysical optimism the view that this world is the best of all possible worlds. This article addresses Franz Brentano’s case for metaphysical optimism. I argue that, although Brentano does not offer any conclusive argument in favour of the latter, he disentangles many related issues which are interesting in their own right. The article has five sections corresponding to five claims, which I argue are central to Brentano’s view, namely: metaphysical optimism is best spelled out as the vie…Read more
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330Natural Classes in Brentano's PsychologyBrentano‐Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 16 111-142. 2018.This article argues that Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena is best understood against the background of the theories of natural classification held by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Section 1 offers a reconstruction of Brentano’s two-premise argument for his tripartite classification. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the reception and historical background of the classification project. Section 3 addresses the question as to why a classification of mental phenomena is needed …Read more
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23Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School: Reassessing the Brentanian Legacy (edited book)Palgrave-Macmillan. 2021.This collection of fourteen original essays addresses the seminal contribution of Franz Brentano and his heirs, to philosophy of language. Despite the great interest provoked by the Brentanian tradition and its multiple connections with early analytic philosophy, precious little is known about the Brentanian contribution to philosophy of language. The aim of this new collection is to fill this gap by providing the reader with a more thorough understanding of the legacy of Brentano and his school…Read more
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53Du nombre des sensPhilosophie 124 (1): 6-11. 2014.§ 1. Selon la tradition, les sens sont au nombre de cinq. Ce nombre semble toutefois insuffisant à certains. Aristote déjà avait soulevé la question de savoir si ce qu’on appelle le sens du toucher ne devait pas être divisé en un sens du chaud et du froid et en un sens de l’aqueux et du sec. D’autres ont voulu distinguer un sens musculaire, et l’on a aussi parlé d’un sens temporel et d’un sens spatial...
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240Brentano's Mind: Unity Without SimplicityRivista di Filosofia 108 (3): 349-64. 2017.This paper offers a reconstruction of Franz Brentano’s mereological solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness and explores some implications of this solution for the ontology of the mind. In section 1 I sketch Brentano’s ontological distinctions between things, collectives, and divisives. In section 2 I present Brentano’s mereological solution and in section 3 I review his main pro-arguments. Eventually, in section 4 I consider some Jamesian objections to the mereological approach. I…Read more
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393Emotional Phenomenology: Toward a Nonreductive AnalysisMidwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1): 27-40. 2017.In this article I want to create a presumption in favor of a nonreductive analysis of emotional phenomenology. The presumption relies on the claim that none of the nonemotional elements which are usually regarded as constitutive of emotional phenomenology may reasonably be considered responsible for the evaluative character of the latter. In section 1 I suggest this is true of cognitive elements, arguing that so-called ‘evaluative’ judgments usually result from emotional, evaluative attitudes, a…Read more
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18Külpe on Cognitive AttitudesDiscipline filosofiche. 27 (2): 157-176. 2017.This paper offers a reconstruction of Külpe’s theory of cognitive attitudes from the perspective of contemporary debates about cognitive phenomenology. I argue that Külpe’s view contrasts with analytic mainstream approaches to the same phenomena in at least two respects. First, Külpe claims, cognitive experiences are best described in terms of occurrent cognitive acts or attitudes toward sensory, imagistic or intellectual contents. Second, occurrent cognitive attitudes are intransitively cons…Read more
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897The Unity of the Brentano SchoolIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, Routledge. pp. 236-248. 2017.Franz Brentano’s works are not just full of deep and innovative insights into mind, world and values. His views also turned out to be highly influential upon several generations of students, who made them the basis of their own philosophical investigations, giving rise to what is known as the Brentano School (Albertazzi et al. 1996; Fisette & Fréchette 2007). In this chapter, I give a bird’s eye view of the Brentano School from a rather historical perspective. My leading hypothesis is that one c…Read more
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34La critique néokantienne de Kant et l’instauration d’une théorie conceptualiste de la perceptionDialogue 49 (3): 413-433. 2010.ABSTRACT : This paper contributes to explor the historical background of contemporary conceptualism. It suggests that a step forward toward a more promising understanding of this historical background can be made if we focus, not on the much-discussed, controversial position of Kant, but rather on the straightforward position of some main representatives of classical neo-Kantianism. My main hypothesis is that criticisms of Kant’s transcendantal aesthetics coming from Paul Natorp and Bruno Bauch …Read more
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9Expérience perceptuelle et contenus multiplesBulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique. 2011.Mon intention est de discuter quelques aspects du débat actuel sur la perception qui oppose les partisans du conceptualisme (essentiellement John McDowell et Bill Brewer) aux partisans du non-conceptualisme (Fred Dretske, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, Michael Tye, Tim Crane, José Luis Bermúdez, Adina Roskies et d?autres). Je commencerai par fixer le cadre théorique du débat, par clarifier son enjeu et par retracer brièvement son origine. Ensuite, je mettrai en évidence une difficulté majeu…Read more
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15The Normative Force of Perceptual JustificationIn Maxime Doyon & Thiemo Breyer (eds.), Normativity in Perception, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 178-195. 2015.It seems uncontroversial that perceptual experiences provide us with some “normative support” for beliefs or judgments about our surroundings. Provided that the normative force of perceptual justification is something that manifests itself in consciousness or something we commonly experience, what are its phenomenal features? To put it differently: What is it to experience the normative force of perceptual justification? In the first section I will briefly comment on the demand of a unified theo…Read more
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12Suppose you perceive a cup of wonderful Italian coffee on the table in front of you. Is your visual experience best described as a representation-of a cup of coffee or as a relation-to a cup of coffee? Representationalism and relationalism, I suggest, are two prominent options under discussion in the present-day philosophical investigations on perception. In this paper, I want to argue that both options are on the wrong track. The reason, basically, is that they are at odds with the analytical d…Read more
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62Peut-on fonder l’arithmetique sur la logique pure? La controverse entre Natorp et RickertDialogue 46 (1): 43-68. 2007.RÉSUMÉ: Dans cet article, j’entreprends de clarifier le projet (frégéen) d’une logique de l’arithmétique -- tel qu’il a été discuté par Natorp et Rickert -- en distinguant trois questions directrices. Le nombre est-il un objet logique? L’arithmétique est-elle réductible à la logique? Est-il possible de déduire les opérations arithmétiques de lois purement logiques? Ma thèse est que la distinction rigoureuse de ces trois questions permet de lever une grande partie des obscurités qui affectent en …Read more
Liège, Liege, Belgium
Areas of Specialization
Phenomenology and Consciousness |
19th Century Austrian Philosophy |
Theories of Consciousness |
Intentionality |
Areas of Interest
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