Vasil Gluchman

In her book Hans Jonas’s Ethic of Responsibility: From Ontology to Ecology (2013), Theresa Morris explores many aspects of Jonas’s ethics of responsibility, including his focus on the potential negative consequences of human scientific and technological progress for the future. Morris argues that Jonas’s understanding of consequences should not be equated with consequentialism, which she associates with classical utilitarianism and its Greatest Happiness Principle. Unlike Morris, I concluded that, when analyzing Jonas’s view of consequences and his value structure, Jonas’s ethics of responsibility aligns more closely with the ethics of social consequences, a type of non-maximizing consequentialism.

ABSTRACTĽudovít Štúr (1815–1856), the most significant figure of the Slovak national movement in the first half of the nineteenth century, wrote in the early 1850s the book Slavdom and the World of the Future, which was first published in Russia after his death in 1867 thanks to the Russian Slavist Vladimir I. Lamansky. In this book, Štúr criticised the West, Catholicism, and Protestantism, and envisioned the future of the Slavs as united with the idealised Tsarist Russia, converting to Orthodoxy, and adopting Russian as the literary language of all Slavs. Since its first publication, the book has elicited a range of responses, from celebratory praise – particularly from Russian pan-Slavists – through understanding and apologetic reflections (mainly from Slovak authors) to sharp critical rejections, especially from Polish writers. The article aims to analyse the reflections on Štúr’s work Slavdom and the World of the Future, considering the changing perceptions since its initial publication.

The topic of consequences is central to consequentialism in general. That is why it is important to be familiar with the opinions of those who dealt with consequences primarily from a non-consequentialist viewpoint, such as Kant. When studying this issue, attention should be paid to three areas. Firstly, what the true character of Kant’s ethics is. Secondly, what the position and role of consequences in Kant’s ethics are. Thirdly, how the relationship of Kant’s ethics to consequentialism is classifi ed. To summarise the fi rst area regarding the character of Kant’s ethics: Kant considers accepting the a priori moral law (as the initial motif for actions) as the criterion which determines the moral character of actions and the fulfi lment of moral obligation resulting from this law. This emphasises the intentional character of Kant’s ethics. It, naturally, does not contradict the well-known fact that Kant’s ethics also has a signifi cant teleological dimension provided by the realm of ends. However, this is a different aspect of the issue which the studied area of Kant’s relationship to consequences is not concerned with. In the summary of the second area, i.e. the position and role of consequences in Kant’s ethical theory, it could be said that Kant considers such actions that are performed in accordance with requirements resulting from moral obligations as good, regardless the consequences. In the case of different actions, i.e. those that are not based on meeting moral obligations but merely on legal obligations or even actions contradictory to any obligation, consequences can be taken into consideration. Kant regards it important to, in a measure, note (especially negative) the consequences of specifi c actions by rational beings. In no way does Kant consider consequences a criterion of moral actions nor an expression of the moral value in a rational being. Those utilitarian or consequentialist theories which, in some way, declare an adherence to Kant’s ethics do not provide any confi rmation either that it is consequences where common features of these conceptions with Kant can be found. Then, the result of the research is that Kant only pays scant regard to consequences of actions by rational beings, and that is at the level of legal actions based on hypothetical imperative. Kant’s understanding of consequences, their position and role in his ethical theory, does not provide any reason to claim that there is a similarity between Kant and utilitarianism or consequentialism concerning issues regarding consequences. Kantians, utilitarians as well as consequentialists are aware of this. Key words : Kant, consequentialism, moral law, moral obligation, David Cummiskey, Kantian utilitarianism, ethics of social consequences.

The first part of the article explores the forms of intellectual resistance that Dominik Tatarka displayed against Stalinist communist power in Czechoslovakia during the 1950s and 1960s, as reflected in his literary and essayistic works. In the second part, the author examines Tatarka’s life and work during the 1970s and 1980s, shedding light on the background of his resistance to the communist regime of “real socialism”. This resistance is illustrated through his identification with the Carpathian bandit and shepherd. The author argues that this identification represents Tatarka’s genuine stance, highlighting the hypocrisy of the communist party, which portrayed itself as a defender of workers’ interests while simultaneously persecuting the working peasants and shepherds who resisted its control.

The author examines Ľudovít Štúr’s controversial book Slavdom and the world of the future (1867) from a new perspective. He formulates two hypotheses regarding the intentions that led Štúr to write this work. According to the first hypothesis, Štúr’s book was about a pragmatic political calculation on how to secure the future of the Slavs, including the Slovaks, in the new political order of Europe after the revolutions of 1848–1849, namely under Russian domination. Within the second hypothesis, the author examines to what extent Štúr’s book can be read as a dystopia of the future of the Slavs under Russian domination. In conclusion, the author states that the second hypothesis seems more likely in the contemporary geopolitical context (Crimean War) in which Štúr’s book was written.

In Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx characterized work under capitalism as forced and alienated. The opposite was supposed to be liberated work as a result of the elimination of private property and the exploitation of man’s work. The author examines the forms of work in Francoist Spain and socialist (communist) Slovakia. He concluded that despite the political and ideological differences between both regimes, in both cases it was forced and alienated labour. Marx’s words about the liberation of labour after the socialization of the means of production and the elimination of exploitation did not come true.

The authors examine the Slovak ethos of plebeian resistance to the First World War in several of its forms. First, they examine intellectual forms of resistance against war, against its Christian justification. Several Slovak authors emphasized that the First World War was in direct contradiction to Christian ethics, asserting that it served as proof of the failure of all European nations and their elites, who were proud of their humanity and ability to solve problems peacefully. Secular authors who based their opposition to the First World War on universal cultural and moral values represented the second form of resistance. After the end of the war, they also expected the equal rights of the Slovak ethnic group in the new post-war situation. The third form of resistance is literature, and the authors of the article focused mainly on Milo Urban’s novel Živý bič (1927) as the most important anti-war novel of Slovak interwar literature reflecting wartime events in the Orava village of Ráztoky.

Rodney G. Peffer argues that Karl Marx cannot be considered a utilitarian, a consequentialist, or a nonutilitarian consequentialist. Based on ethics of social consequences as one of the versions of nonutilitarian consequentialism, the author examines Marx’s early journalistic articles concerning the common good published mainly in the Rheinische Zeitung. The author verifies the hypothesis that Marx was a nonutilitarian consequentialist in the given period with regard to the common good. By examining Marx’s views on freedom of the press and censorship, as well as his criticism of the feudal experiences of Prussia, the author came to the conclusion that Marx’s views expressed in early journalism are close to ethics of social consequences and thus to nonutilitarian consequentialism.

The author studies the Magyar and Slovak ideas of common good that concerned the inhabitants of Hungary in the first half of the 19th century. The Magyar model was based on the rights of an individual, their civic duties, and virtues. Its realisation, however, lay in preferring the interests of the Magyar nation and required the adoption of full Magyar national identity, i.e. assimilation and ethnocide of the non-Magyar inhabitants of Hungary. The author characterises this model as exclusive, chauvinist, and nationalist-Messianic, masquerading as liberal values. On the other hand, the Slovak model of common good was based on the presumption of equal rights and duties for all citizens of Hungary while preserving the possibility of the growth, development, and cultivation of each individual, including the opportunity to gain education in one’s own mother tongue. The author perceives the Slovak model as inclusive, pluralist, and humanist; he considers it as a better alternative for the future of Hungary, which, however, could not be pursued. That means there were two incompatible approaches to the common good of the inhabitants of Hungary, which resulted in the downfall of Hungary.

SummaryThe author studies the form of philosophical optimism in Slovak Lutheran ethics in the first half of the 19th century in the views of Ján Kollár and Ján Chalupka. Herder’s philosophy of history and his philosophy of historical progress significantly influenced Slovak Lutheran ethics of the given period. In the author’s view, Kollár and Chalupka mainly appreciated human history as progress in all parts of life and refused glorification of the past. However, they did not limit their assessment to a positive evaluation of the present; they used one’s own mistakes and faults to appeal to moral development of man and placed to the forefront the belief in a better future of mankind in the form of humanity.

The ethics of social consequences is a means of satisficing non-utilitarian consequentialism that can be used to approach disaster issues. The primary values in the ethics of social consequences are humanity, human dignity and moral rights, and these are developed and realized to achieve positive social consequences. The secondary values found in the ethics of social consequences include justice, responsibility, moral duty and tolerance. Their role and purpose is given by their ability to help achieve and realize moral good. Fair treatment within moral issues stems from applying primary as well as secondary values. The nature of these values cannot be determined exclusively in ordinary circumstances. However, in extraordinary circumstances (disasters), not all the requirements relating to the value structure of the ethics of social consequences need be considered in its entirety. In extraordinary circumstances, values are prioritised and realized. Primary values are realized prior to secondary ones. When prioritizing primary values, the realization of positive social consequences, or at least minimizing the negative social consequences, takes priority over other primary values. In disaster bioethics especially, it is often necessary to find a way to minimize the negative social consequences; thus, actions where positive social consequences are prevalent are preferred.

The author studies Leibniz’s views of vindicating God for the existence of evil in the world, as well as the idea of the best of all possible worlds, including the past and present criticism. Following Leibniz, he opted for the presentation of Herder’s philosophy of history as one of the most significant forms of philosophical optimism that influenced the first half of the 19th century, including contemporary debates on and critiques of the topic. He defines Herder’s concept as the philosophy of historical progress, which also significantly influenced Slovak philosophy of the given period. The main goal of the article is to present Leibniz’s and Herder’s views as a starting point for the Slovak philosophy of optimism and historical progress of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century.

UNESCO Philosophy Day/Night 2016 was full of intellectual input and efforts for critical reflection in a popular form which, we would like to hope, could motivate, in a great number of people, an interest in philosophy not only as cultural heritage but also a dynamic and constantly developing sphere of thought which is no less relevant at present than it was in the past. It could, thus, be concluded that, in the true sense, the event was a celebration of philosophy and human thought in a complex form.

The author examines the motives for the behaviour and actions of Dr. Skreta, the main character of Kundera’s novel The Farewell Waltz. The starting point of the novel was the social and political situation in totalitarian Czechoslovakia at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. He compares it to the situation in the developed western world and comes to a realization that there were many similarities in medicine; however, there were significant differences with regard to external factors. The health care system in western democratic societies were placed in contrast with Czechoslovakia, where a doctor’s activities and the system of health care were subordinated to the political, ideological, and social intentions of totalitarian power. In this context, the author has come to the conclusion that Dr. Skreta’s motives for acting arose from his moral responsibility for the country’s future. Dr. Skreta waged a latent personal “moral war” against the totalitarian regime. This was also reflected in his opposition to the preferred morality of socialist health care professionals. Part of this was his eugenics project. According to the author, in the context of ethics of social consequences, Dr. Skreta was a responsible moral agent seeking a better future not only for the country and its people, but his personal selfish interests.

This article analyses and assesses the arguments opposing capital punishment put forward by Ján Kollár (1793–1852), a representative of Central European Evangelical/Lutheran Enlightenment rationalism, using the definition of criminal practice in Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century as the basis. Consequently, the author pays attention to the movement for reform in criminal law and practices, initiated in Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century by Cesare Beccaria, including his argumentation against capital punishment. In this context, the author presents and investigates 13 arguments against capital punishment defined by Kollár in his 1815 diary. The author came to the conclusion that Kollár, in his arguments against capital punishment, followed, to a certain extent, the views of Beccaria and eighteenth -century adherents of the French Enlightenment; however, Kollár’s actual argumentation is rationalistically based on ethical values of humanity and justice with significant space also dedicated to utilitarian aspects of rejecting capital punishment adopted from reformists of criminal law.

Professional ethics is most frequently associated with deontological ethics; however, lately it has been developed in the context of virtue ethics. A great number of authors have criticised the possible alignment of professional ethics with consequentialist ethics. Author defines the structure of professional ethics that would correspond to the needs of forming a professional ethical framework as well as the value tendencies of consequentialist ethics in its non-utilitarian form. There is an emphasis on the values of humanity, human dignity and moral right of man, also taking into regard values of justice, liability, tolerance and responsibility (all that in an effort to achieve a prevalence of positive over negative consequences.

The priority and absoluteness of rights is often gist for ethical debates. I consider these issues from the perspective of my ethical theory, which I call the "ethics of social consequences." The ethics of social consequences is one means of satisfying non-utilitarian consequentialism. It is characterized by the principles of positive social consequences, humanity, human dignity, legality, justice, responsibility, tolerance as well as moral obligation. I analyze Gewirth’s position regarding the absoluteness of rights as well as Nagel’s opinion that rights enjoy priority forever. However, I also concentrate on Williams’s critique of utilitarianism. I contend that the priority of the protection and respect of individual rights in ordinary situations is acceptable. However, the individual must respect the rights and justified interests of other concerned people. Nevertheless, in extraordinary situations one must accept that consequences are more significant than rights.

The author studies selected fundamental literary records from Great Moravia of the 9th century (The rules of the holy fathers [Zapovědi svatych otcov], Judicial law for laymen [Zakon sudnyj ljudem], Nomocanon [Nomokanon], Adhortation to rulers [Vladykam zemle Božie slovo velit]) presumably compiled, translated or created by Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, the Thessaloniki brothers. In the context of defining early and medieval Christian ethics, the author concluded that the texts in question contain elements of the Christian code of ethics, by means of which Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius, following the model of the Byzantine Emperors Leo III and Constantine V, wished to form the social morality of Great Moravia. Based on this, the author holds the opinion that the history of Christian ethics in Moravia, Slovakia and Bohemia goes as far back as the activities of Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius and the period of Great Moravia.

The paper analyzes the concept of work in Slovak Marxist–Leninist philosophy and ethics in the second half of the twentieth century by referencing, in particular, Furnham’s critical assessment of the relationship between left-wing ideology and the values of work ethic. The author comes to the conclusion that, on the one hand, Marxist–Leninist ideology and the practice of building socialism made the notion and phenomenon of work into an ideological fetish; on the other hand, however, the real value of work and its contribution to the development of society was depreciated. Instead of bringing about the liberation of work all that it engendered was a new form of its alienation.

Martha C. Nussbaum, in the context of ancient philosophy, formulated ethics of human development based on 10 basic human capabilities as a precondition of meaningful human development, i.e. the ability to live a dignified human life. The paper, thus, deals with a capabilities approach with the aim of analysing the content of the idea of human dignity in Nussbaum’s understanding and its place in the conception of ethics of human development, since human dignity is the very core of the conception in question.

The author of the paper investigates Martha C. Nussbaum’s philosophical concept of education in which education is considered key to all human development. In the first part, the author focuses on some of the more interesting ideas in Nussbaum’s philosophy of education regarding the growth, development and improvement of the individual, community, society, nation, country and humankind. The second part is a critical exploration of the individual in education, looking specifically at the general development of humankind and the shaping of abstract cosmopolitan world citizens, which are the main political goals of Nussbaum’s philosophy of education.

The edited volume presents new and unconventional views of many traditional moral values, such as humanity, human dignity, moral right (of life), justice and responsibility. The originality of the contributions contained in this book is to analyze these values and approaches from the point of view of non-utilitarian consequentialism and ethics of social consequences as one of its forms. The authors of the chapters present new ways of solving many of the contemporary ethical and moral issues, for example, in bioethics, medical ethics, environmental ethics, teaching ethics, and cyber ethics, based on non-utilitarian consequentialism and ethics of social consequences. They also confront these approaches with other ethical theories and philosophical traditions, which serve them as further incentives for the development of non-utilitarian consequentialism and ethics of social consequences in philosophical, applied and professional ethics.

Der slowakische Autor Martin Kukučín (1860-1928) reflektiert in seinem Werk das zeitgenässische Leben des slowakischen und kroatischen Dorfes sowie die Lebensumstände in Prag und Súdamerika am Ende des 19. und in den ersten drei Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts. Vor dem ersten We1tkrieg strebt er noch nach einer Symbiose aus Schänheit, Wahrheit und Gúte, die er im Dorfleben verwirklicht sieht. In seinen im slowakischen ländlichen Raum angesiedelten Werken idealisiert er in dieser Zeit das Dorf und das Leben der Dorfbevälkerung mit warmherzigem Humor. Es erscheint ihm als eine Form von Proto-Kommunitarismus. Nach 1918 rúcken dagegen Fragen der slowakischen Nation und Arbeiterschaft in der neugegrundeten Tschechoslowakischen Republik in den Mittelpunkt seines CEuvres. Damit avanciert Martin Kukučín in seinem literarischen Werk zum praktischen Philosophen, der ethische Grundfragen nach dem guten Leben aufwirft.