Vasil Gluchman

The analysis of moral subject in consequentialist ethics (as a kind of nonutilitaristic consequentialism) aims to show, that moral subject is of basie importance for it - regardeless to the fact, that its analysis focuses predominantly on action and its concequences. It is the moral subject, which enables the action and its consequences to be performed. So understanding the conditions of moral subjecťs action means understanding the moral subject itself. This understanding draws upon the typology of moral subjects that makes the prediction of certain kinds of action as well as oftheir consequencies possible.

In the article, we analyse ethical and moral issues of public administration in region of Eastern Slovakia through some cases of the last years. We focused on self-governing regions, namely the Košice and Prešov self-governing regions. We identified two fundamental situations where failures on the side of public administrators occur: selection processes for vacant positions, be it directly in public administration or institutions that fall under its domain, and public procurement with regard to the acquisition of goods and services. The year 2009 was the year of elections to self-governing regions which is why a great number of negative cases dealt with the election campaign. Further, we stated that negative cases dealt with failures of bodies of self-governing regions from both the legal (breaking the law) and moral viewpoint. By claiming that public administrators failed morally, we meant breaking moral norms and rules. Contradictions, which were identified (from the ethical viewpoint), predominantly result from the conflict between public and private interests. In many cases, private interests of public administrators are preferred at the expense of public interests. And it is exactly this preference (a conflict of interests) that is sensitively perceived by the public.

In his Education of a Christian Prince (1516) Erasmus applies ancient and Christian virtues to the functions of a Christian prince. Slovak humanist Ján Milochovský (1630 – 1684), who new Erasmus’s work, expanded in his Ornamentum Magistratus Politici (1678) the scope of the ethical and moral functions of a prince, focusing on three fundamental virtues: piety, justice and tolerance. The paper offers an analysis of Erasmus’s political ethics and examines the impact of the latter on the Slovak humanism of the second half of the 17th century, especially in the writings of Ján Milochovský.

Prominent critics of consequentialism hold that utilitarianism is not capable of accepting authentic human values, because the consequentialist viewpoint is impersonal. According to it consequentialist rationality has no axiological limits and it can think about doing the unthinkable. The main objective of the paper is to show that human dignity has a significant position in the author's conception of ethics of social consequences (a non-utilitarian consequentialism) arguing for a particular theory of the value of human dignity. The author argues that the ethics of social consequences is capable of accepting human dignity as well as all authentic human moral values. He believes that ethical theory of social consequences (as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism) can provide the element missing whose lack was unveiled by the critics of utilitarianism.

I am not trying to present a full concept of professional ethics of an academic. I would like to focus on philosophical and ethical reflection of the specific area of an academic work in Slovakia. Almost two hundred years ago, the Slovak enlightenment philosopher Ján Feješ (1764 - 1823) responded to the situation of his era and he stated that a reviewer must, in the given area, be even better educated than the author himself. A different example can be found in Honoré de Balzac’s great novel Lost Illusions where he also described journalistic practice of the first half of the 19th century. Part of the novel was based on his own experience with acrimonious critique. The situation concerning, for example academic reviewing in Slovakia in the present day is, possibly in some instances, even more critical than Feješ or Balzac suggested. This no longer concerns the quality of papers and book of essays but the number of works published; and evaluation of academics is partly dependant on whether they have published in a reviewed or a non-reviewed book, indexed journals, worldly known publishers, etc. There has to be a just requirement placed on critical reviews, as Feješ and others cautioned, and that is that they should not be informative reviews only for the sake of someone getting a reviewed work but truly critical reviews from people qualified in the given area of academic subjects and the aim of which should not lie in settling scores or expressing personal preferences but a constructive view of the issue. The problem in Slovak academic community (especially in humanities and social sciences), however, lies in the fact that critical reviews are not considered a challenge for discussion or polemics but are shifted to the personal level including settling scores with the critical reviewer. Quoting and referencing is another problematic area in Slovak academic life, which, in the present period, has almost become a fetish, as it is a criterion of qualification enhancement and evaluation of academics. That is why quotations and references are artificially made for colleagues, friends and acquaintances, or even already published works are faked to contain quotes and references for the needs of future qualification enhancement. To summarise, I would like to propose three aims which could become a part of professional ethics of the academics (in Slovakia).

According to author, value of human dignity has its place in his ethics of social consequences which is a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism. This is so because it is compatible with the value of positive consequences that creates one of the crucial criteria in ethics of social consequences. There exist two aspects of human dignity in this ethical theory. The first is related to the value of life that is worthy of esteem and respect, which brings positive consequences (moral biocentrism), second aspect is related to the fact that human dignity is a function of the positive consequences of our action and behavior prevailing over the negative consequences of our action and behavior. This creates a basis for assigning moral agents with an additional, qualitative value of human dignity. In caseof human beings without developed consciousness and who are only potential moral agents, the first aspect of human dignity is dominant in our judgments about them. In the judgments concerning moral agents the second aspect of human dignity dominates.

In the author’s view the humanity has its place in the ethics of social consequences : its implementation leads directly to positive social consequences, i.e. the main evaluation criteria in this conception. However, in applying the principle of humanity one has to see humanity as the protection of sustainable life according to the degree, to which an individual human life meets at least minimal qualitative standards of human life. The resulting idea is that a person living only on the biological level should be let die. This is not an expression of non-humanity, as it is not in case of helping a dying person with fatal diagnosis in his ever increasing suffering. As the problem of war is concerned, according to the author no war is human, as it always brings about dying of innocent people

Ethics of social consequences as a form of satisficing non-utilitarian consequentialism can be one of the methodological basis of bioethics education. The primary values in ethics of social consequences are humanity, human dignity and moral rights, which are developed and realized in correlation with positive social consequences. Secondary values in ethics of social consequences include justice, responsibility, moral duty and tolerance. The author analyses human dignity and humanity as principles of bioethics education.

The analysis of moral subject in consequentialist ethics (as a kind of nonutilitaristic consequentialism) aims to show, that moral subject is of basie importance for it - regardeless to the fact, that its analysis focuses predominantly on action and its concequences. It is the moral subject, which enables the action and its consequences to be performed. So understanding the conditions of moral subjecťs action means understanding the moral subject itself. This understanding draws upon the typology of moral subjects that makes the prediction of certain kinds of action as well as oftheir consequencies possible.

Author applies four models of professional ethics of politicians (Aristotle’s virtuous citizen, Machiavelli’s prince, Erasmus’ man of values and Weber’s responsible politician) to politics and politicians in Slovakia since the first half of the 20th century to the present. According to author, there is possible to identify Milan Hodža with Weber’s model, Alexander Dubek with Aristotle’s one, Vladimír Meiar and Robert Fico are identified with Machiavelli’s model and Iveta Radiová with Erasmus’ model of professional ethics of politician in Slovakia.

Martin Rázus (1888—1937) was one of the most important personalities of Slovak Lutheran social, political, cultural, literary, and intellectual life during the first half of the twentieth century. First, I examine the picture of Slovak rural morality portrayed in the works of Rázus, particularly his 1929 novel Svety [Worlds], in which Rázus presents the morality of the people in the Slovak countryside from the beginning of the twentieth century until the end of the 1920s. Second, as the ethical and moral issues of life are crucial topics of Rázus's philosophical and ethical reasoning, I examine Rázus's ethical treatise Argumenty [Arguments] (1932), in which he develops, explains, and philosophically justifies many of his ideas concerning the ethics and morality expressed in his literary works and political and religious essays

In his Education of a Christian Prince Erasmus applies ancient and Christian virtues to the functions of a Christian prince. Slovak humanist writer Ján Milo- chovský , who new Erasmus’s work, expanded in his Ornamentum Magistratus Politici the scope of the ethical and moral functions of a prince, focusing on three fundamental virtues: piety, justice and tolerance.The paper offers an analysis of Erasmus’s political ethics and examines the impact of the latter on the Slovak humanism of the second half of the 17th century, especially in the writings of Ján Milochovský