Vasil Gluchman

We can read about the morality of that time in works by authors who describe or criticize the conduct and activity of the members of those classes taking the lead in the morality of that time. Thus, we can find a lot of information about ancient Greece and its morality in Plato’s presentation of Socrates, Peter Abelard presenting the Middle Ages, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Niccolo Machiavelli, Baldesar Castiglione, but even also Slovak authors such as Martin Rakovský and Juraj Koppay presenting very interesting contemporary facts about the Renaissance.

The author studies the role of Christianity in two forms of 9th century political ethics in the history of Great Moravia, represented by the Great Moravian rulers Rastislav and Svatopluk. Rastislav’s conception predominantly uses the pre-Erasmian model of political ethics based on the pursuit of welfare for the country and its inhabitants by achieving the clerical-political independence of Great Moravia from the Frankish kingdom and, moreover, by utilising Christianity for the advancement of culture, education, literature, law and legality, as well as by spreading Christian ethics and morality in the form of the Christian code of ethics expressed in ethicallegal documents. Svatopluk’s political conception was a prototype of Machiavellian political ethics, according to which one is, in the interest of the country and its power and fame, allowed to be a lion and/or a fox. Svatopluk abused Christianity in the name of achieving his power-oriented goals. Great Moravia outlived Rastislav; it did not, however, outlive Svatopluk, as, shortly after his death, it broke up and ceased to exist. The author came to the conclusion that Rastislav’s conception was more viable, as its cultural heritage lives on in the form of works by Constantine and Methodius.

The authors of the contribution closely follow the published results of their sociological research regarding views of Slovak teachers at primary and secondary schools in the area of relationships with students, parents, colleagues and superiors (Gluchman, & Gluchmanová, 2016). The present contribution analyses views of students at the second level of primary school and at secondary schools by means of evaluating their relationship to teachers, as well as relationships between parents and teachers while students’ views regarding the presence of violence and bullying at school are also addressed. The research results indicate that almost a third of students do not perceive their teachers as ethical models of behaviour and actions; moreover, they have also witnessed instances of corrupt behaviour on the part of teachers. On the other hand, almost two thirds of students appreciate that teachers, when addressing problems at school, proceed in accordance with ethical principles and norms. Unlike teachers, students do not believe serious problems are present when it comes to the behaviour of parents toward teachers. They, however, believe the behaviour of students towards teachers is a more problematic area.

In his article, the author considers possible forms of relationship between Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. In this context, he analyses David Cummiskey’s views which are expressed in his book, Kantian Consequentialism (1996). He demonstrates the possibility of justifying the consequentialism on the basis of Kant’s ethics and its values. Likewise, several other authors (such as Scott Forschler, Philipp Stratton-Lake, Michael Ridge) are of the opinion of the possible compatibility of Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. On the other hand, however, Christine M. Korsgaard is an example of a strict rejection of the similarity between Kant and the consequentialist ethics. The author based on the ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism claims (like Cummiskey), that there are similarities between Kant’s ethics and consequentialism. Unlike Cummiskey, however, he sees similarity in the Kant’s formula of humanity and the understanding of humanity in ethics of social consequences, especially in the form of additional moral value.

With regard to existing concept of the moral education (ethics) in Slovakia, the questions of ethics and morals are only one of the partial sections. The dominant role is played by psychology based on Roberto Olivar’s concept with emphasis on pro–socialization and on Erickson’s concept of the psychosocial development. From the philosophy basis point of view, only Aristotle, even in reduced form and Spranger’s concept of the life forms are mentioned. Philosophy and ethics are only complements to more psychologically based educational program which is resulting from the problematic division of a social and moral experience into egoistic and prosocial. Egoism is presented in a distorted form and is characterized as the cause of all moral evil. However, there are several different types of understanding of the term egoism in philosophy and ethics as for example psychological and ethical egoism, or self-interest. Ethical egoism or self-interest cannot be identified with selfishness. The main aim of moral education should not be only to form the desired children and youth moral orientation but on the other hand, to form morally self-confident individuals who are able to solve the moral problems, to help the others to solve them as well and to be able to bear moral responsibility for their own deeds.

G. E. Moore’s critical analysis of right action in utilitarian ethics and his consequentialist concept of right action is a starting point for a theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences. The terms right and wrong have different meanings in these theories. The author explores different aspects of right and wrong actions in ethics of social consequences and compares them with Moore’s ideas. He positively evaluates Moore’s contributions to the development his theory of moral/right action.

The aim of the paper is to study socio-ethical aspects of Slovak higher education policy in the context of contemporary discussions on university assessment criteria. I conduct an ethical analysis and assess the criteria introduced in Slovakia that consider employment opportunities and the graduate unemployment rate, publishing in high impact journals, participation in European research programmes, etc., which often discriminates against the humanities and social sciences. On the other hand, I also point to the absence of a social contract regarding the common good provided by Slovak universities, drawbacks of a legislative nature which often provide a basis for unethical behaviour within the Slovak academic community and, most often, problems concerning academic ethics in contemporary Slovakia.

The history of ethical reasoning in Slovakia1 dates back to the beginning of the 16th century, a period when ethics and morals came to the fore of intellectual and philosophical thinking––owing to the influence of the humanism that prevailed during the Reformation2. This cultural and intellectual climate led to the revival of ancient culture, education, philosophy, and ethics, while a focus on purgation encouraged writers to ponder over the questions traditionally raised in ancient ethics: How should we live? How can we live well or have a proper life?

In his Education of a Christian Prince (1516) Erasmus applies ancient and Christian virtues to the functions of a Christian prince. Slovak humanist Ján Milochovský (1630 – 1684), who new Erasmus’s work, expanded in his Ornamentum Magistratus Politici (1678) the scope of the ethical and moral functions of a prince, focusing on three fundamental virtues: piety, justice and tolerance. The paper offers an analysis of Erasmus’s political ethics and examines the impact of the latter on the Slovak humanism of the second half of the 17th century, especially in the writings of Ján Milochovský.

Prominent critics of consequentialism hold that utilitarianism is not capable of accepting authentic human values, because the consequentialist viewpoint is impersonal. According to it consequentialist rationality has no axiological limits and it can think about doing the unthinkable. The main objective of the paper is to show that human dignity has a significant position in the author's conception of ethics of social consequences (a non-utilitarian consequentialism) arguing for a particular theory of the value of human dignity. The author argues that the ethics of social consequences is capable of accepting human dignity as well as all authentic human moral values. He believes that ethical theory of social consequences (as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism) can provide the element missing whose lack was unveiled by the critics of utilitarianism.

I am not trying to present a full concept of professional ethics of an academic. I would like to focus on philosophical and ethical reflection of the specific area of an academic work in Slovakia. Almost two hundred years ago, the Slovak enlightenment philosopher Ján Feješ (1764 - 1823) responded to the situation of his era and he stated that a reviewer must, in the given area, be even better educated than the author himself. A different example can be found in Honoré de Balzac’s great novel Lost Illusions where he also described journalistic practice of the first half of the 19th century. Part of the novel was based on his own experience with acrimonious critique. The situation concerning, for example academic reviewing in Slovakia in the present day is, possibly in some instances, even more critical than Feješ or Balzac suggested. This no longer concerns the quality of papers and book of essays but the number of works published; and evaluation of academics is partly dependant on whether they have published in a reviewed or a non-reviewed book, indexed journals, worldly known publishers, etc. There has to be a just requirement placed on critical reviews, as Feješ and others cautioned, and that is that they should not be informative reviews only for the sake of someone getting a reviewed work but truly critical reviews from people qualified in the given area of academic subjects and the aim of which should not lie in settling scores or expressing personal preferences but a constructive view of the issue. The problem in Slovak academic community (especially in humanities and social sciences), however, lies in the fact that critical reviews are not considered a challenge for discussion or polemics but are shifted to the personal level including settling scores with the critical reviewer. Quoting and referencing is another problematic area in Slovak academic life, which, in the present period, has almost become a fetish, as it is a criterion of qualification enhancement and evaluation of academics. That is why quotations and references are artificially made for colleagues, friends and acquaintances, or even already published works are faked to contain quotes and references for the needs of future qualification enhancement. To summarise, I would like to propose three aims which could become a part of professional ethics of the academics (in Slovakia).

According to author, value of human dignity has its place in his ethics of social consequences which is a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism. This is so because it is compatible with the value of positive consequences that creates one of the crucial criteria in ethics of social consequences. There exist two aspects of human dignity in this ethical theory. The first is related to the value of life that is worthy of esteem and respect, which brings positive consequences (moral biocentrism), second aspect is related to the fact that human dignity is a function of the positive consequences of our action and behavior prevailing over the negative consequences of our action and behavior. This creates a basis for assigning moral agents with an additional, qualitative value of human dignity. In caseof human beings without developed consciousness and who are only potential moral agents, the first aspect of human dignity is dominant in our judgments about them. In the judgments concerning moral agents the second aspect of human dignity dominates.

In the author’s view the humanity has its place in the ethics of social consequences : its implementation leads directly to positive social consequences, i.e. the main evaluation criteria in this conception. However, in applying the principle of humanity one has to see humanity as the protection of sustainable life according to the degree, to which an individual human life meets at least minimal qualitative standards of human life. The resulting idea is that a person living only on the biological level should be let die. This is not an expression of non-humanity, as it is not in case of helping a dying person with fatal diagnosis in his ever increasing suffering. As the problem of war is concerned, according to the author no war is human, as it always brings about dying of innocent people

Ethics of social consequences as a form of satisficing non-utilitarian consequentialism can be one of the methodological basis of bioethics education. The primary values in ethics of social consequences are humanity, human dignity and moral rights, which are developed and realized in correlation with positive social consequences. Secondary values in ethics of social consequences include justice, responsibility, moral duty and tolerance. The author analyses human dignity and humanity as principles of bioethics education.

The analysis of moral subject in consequentialist ethics (as a kind of nonutilitaristic consequentialism) aims to show, that moral subject is of basie importance for it - regardeless to the fact, that its analysis focuses predominantly on action and its concequences. It is the moral subject, which enables the action and its consequences to be performed. So understanding the conditions of moral subjecťs action means understanding the moral subject itself. This understanding draws upon the typology of moral subjects that makes the prediction of certain kinds of action as well as oftheir consequencies possible.