Chung-Ying Cheng

In inquiring into the nature of deconstruction in Derrida we see that it hides an opposite aspect of onto‐generative emergence as stated in the wording of the Yijing. What is hidden is the movement of difference‐making and generalizing repetition by way of certain presupposed reality. In examining Derrida's notion “différance”, his contrast between an ontology of presence and a philosophy of absence, in explaining the origin of meaning à la de Saussure, has transformed into the polaristic structure of all differences, whether it be in language or in things. The Saussurian distinction between the signifier and the signified no doubt reflects this polarity but not reveals an underlying transcendent‐immanent principle called “différance,” or, the dao 道 in Chinese philosophy. This “difference” in language leads to ramification of meanings which could be self‐deconstructive such as the extended use of the word “spirit” demonstrates.

Traditional scholarship seems not to pay sufficient attention to the fact that Daxue 《大學》 has established a system of ethical and political philosophy on the basis of the idea of xin 心 (heart-mind) whereas the Zhongyong 《中庸》 has argued for the participation of the human person in the creativities of heaven and earth based on the onto-generative nature (xing 性) of the human person. How to explain this fact and interrelate and integrate these two systems become both a historical challenge and a theoretical issue in the understanding of the Confucian philosophy of humanity as we find in the Lunyu 《論語》

This article is to argue that virtue is experienced and understood in Confucian ethics as power to act and as performance of a moral action, and that virtue as such has to be onto-cosmologically explicated, not just teleologically explained. In other words, it is intended to construct an integrative theory of virtues based on both dao and de. To do so, we will examine the two features of de, as the power that is derived from self-reflection and self-restraining, and as the motivated action for attaining its practical end in a community. Only by a self-integrated moral consciousness can one’s experience, action and ideal remain in consistency and coherence, which leads us to the Aristotelian notion of virtue as excellence and enables us to see how virtue as aretê could be introduced as a second feature of de, namely as the power for effective action in the whole system of virtues, apart from the first feature of de as self-restraining power. We will conclude that reason and virtue are practically united and remain inseparable, and that taking into account the onto-cosmological foundation of virtues, reason and virtue are inevitably the moving and advancing forces for the formation and transformation of human morality just as they are motivating and prompting incentives for individual moral action.

This article, from my onto-generative and onto-hermeneutic theories, will explore how Confucian virtue ethics could be modernized and globalized by answering challenges of civic duties, human rights, policy planning and decision-making regarding social and communal development with considerations of maximal sustainable goodness or benefits to both individual and groups. In doing so, we come to recognize the multifunctional potency of Confucian virtues in meeting modern and postmodern needs and demands in a complicated global-local environment, and see how this development of civic and other kinds of virtues form a unifying foundation for the justification, discovery and sustainable source of insights and motivations for vital action.

Kant has attempted to develop a foundation of his metaphysics of morals and this foundation ultimately turns out to be a religious one. Consequently, the question for Kant is whether morality also provides a practical foundation for independent religious faith. In contrast, we see Confucianism as providing a system of morality which has its own religiousness or sense of ultimateness in terms of a robust form of moral life and its practice of li 禮 and reflective thinking on humanity. In this article, I wish to present these two forms of moral thinking which can be respectively titled moral theology and onto-ethics. A relative evaluation shows how a world morality could be consistent or justified within one’s own religious tradition and yet can be and should be open to a common people humanity we experience as couched in an open cosmos we observe.