This work considers Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus as a historical and literary text, showing that it takes the form of a climax, a rhetorical figure in which propositions are set forth as a series. This series takes us from what can be expressed clearly to what cannot be expressed at all, by way of representations whose defects can be remedied by reference to the totality of facts, the composition of the fact, the laws of thought, propositions having sense, the truth-function of …
Read moreThis work considers Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus as a historical and literary text, showing that it takes the form of a climax, a rhetorical figure in which propositions are set forth as a series. This series takes us from what can be expressed clearly to what cannot be expressed at all, by way of representations whose defects can be remedied by reference to the totality of facts, the composition of the fact, the laws of thought, propositions having sense, the truth-function of elementary propositions, and the general form of the proposition. The truth-function itself has the same order. Here logical analysis covers three requirements of representation, and produces these six steps as intermediates. Such a series is skeptical, "throwing the ladder away," given that Wittgenstein does not present any metaphysics of objects. This evidence supports a 'resolute' reading of the work. ;The basis for the Tractatus is found in the scientific culture of Wittgenstein's youth. The terms derive from Heinrich Hertz and his requirements for scientific representation. The technique is based on quantization and combinatorics introduced into statistical models by Ludwig Boltzmann. The need to gain a prospect over the bounds of logical expression arose because of Bertrand Russell's efforts to over-extend logical analysis at the time Wittgenstein was his student. ;There are also discussions covering: the order of the series defining the general form of the elementary proposition; the intense and conflicted relationship between Wittgenstein and Russell, which led to the notion of defining a boundary to the expression of thoughts; and criticisms of Gottlob Frege relative to the manner of expression in the Tractatus. Issues concerning translation of Wittgenstein into English are also discussed. ;Part 2 of this work contains a new translation of Wittgenstein's German text, the aim of which is to reproduce the form of the original propositions. The appendix has a translation of letters from Frege to Wittgenstein with his criticisms of the Tractatus
