Richard Schmitt

Many socialists agree that socialism must be democratic, in the political as well as in the economic arena. But socialist democracy is very different from democracy in a capitalist country. Socialist democracy, it is widely believed, will be participatory: everyone will be a full participant in all decisions affecting his or her life. In this paper I argue that this conception of socialist democracy needs a lot more work. Not all decisions can be made by everybody affected by a decision. Many decisions that affect large numbers of persons must be made by representatives. But representation is subject to several serious weaknesses which are not products of capitalism. They will be obstacles to democracy also under socialism. Today we do not know what a socialist democracy would look like

The theme is socialist solidarity. Schmitt notes that efforts towards solidarity fail because we do not know how to put our ideals in practice. The example is taken from the early kibbutzim. The founders were clear about their socialist principles but did not know how to put those in practice in such simple situations as the distribution of clothing. Schmitt concludes from that example that efforts to build socialist solidarity are often impeded by our ignorance of concrete techniques and arrangements needed for a solidary socialist society.

The theme is socialist solidarity. Schmitt notes that efforts towards solidarity fail because we do not know how to put our ideals in practice. The example is taken from the early kibbutzim. The founders were clear about their socialist principles but did not know how to put those in practice in such simple situations as the distribution of clothing. Schmitt concludes from that example that efforts to build socialist solidarity are often impeded by our ignorance of concrete techniques and arrangements needed for a solidary socialist society

Socialism is meant to be democratic. Socialist democracy demands solidarity but it remains unclear what solidarity consists of. Theorists provide a range of different characterizations of solidarity which are adequate in their contexts but will not suffice as the basis for socialist democracy. This paper shows how we should not understand that needed solidarity; it is not merely a solidarity based on commonalities that overlooks difference. On the contrary, it needs to be a kind of solidarity that establishes close but complex relations between various groups through their commitment to taking their differences seriously. There are many different ways of taking differences seriously. At the end, this paper makes some suggestions for further research to clarify the concept of solidarity in spite of difference.

Socialism is meant to be democratic. Socialist democracy demands solidarity but it remains unclear what solidarity consists of. Theorists provide a range of different characterizations of solidarity which are adequate in their contexts but will not suffice as the basis for socialist democracy. This paper shows how we should not understand that needed solidarity; it is not merely a solidarity based on commonalities that overlooks difference. On the contrary, it needs to be a kind of solidarity that establishes close but complex relations between various groups through their commitment to taking their differences seriously. There are many different ways of taking differences seriously. At the end, this paper makes some suggestions for further research to clarify the concept of solidarity in spite of difference.

The paper reflects on the methods democratic systems use for arriving at decisions. The most popular ones are elections where the majority rules and deliberative democracy. I argue that both of these do not measure up to the demands of democracy. Whether we use voting with majority rule or deliberative methods, only a portion of the citizenry is allowed to rule itself; minorities are always excluded. Instead of voting with majority ruler or deliberative methods, I suggest that we employ mediation to reach agreement in democratic publics.

The paper reflects on the methods democratic systems use for arriving at decisions. The most popular ones are elections where the majority rules and deliberative democracy. I argue that both of these do not measure up to the demands of democracy. Whether we use voting with majority rule or deliberative methods, only a portion of the citizenry is allowed to rule itself; minorities are always excluded. Instead of voting with majority ruler or deliberative methods, I suggest that we employ mediation to reach agreement in democratic publics.

A central challenge common to democratic processes is the inability of citizens to reach agreement on any given matter. Most frequently these disagreements are settled by vote, victory going to the majority. But majority rule is a fairly recent technique. Traditionally decisions were made by some form of non-opposition. This paper describes several versions of that decision-making technique and then shows how mediation methods, also known as “ADR”, can replicate these traditional ways of overcoming disagreement. The paper argues that these techniques are frequently superior to electoral methods of reaching agreement.

Jon Elster believes that methodological individualism is self-evident (Elster 1986, 66). Not finding it so, and being suspicious of philosophers who claim that their views are so obvious as to demand no arguments in their favor, I went back to retrace the outlines of the methodological individualism debate. It turns out that the participants to the debate disagree widely as to what they are arguing about; it is not obvious to them what methodological individualism is. The defenders of methodological individualism agree with their critics much more than those critics acknowledge. Each side ascribes views to the other which its proponents disown explicitly.

Calls for a rapprochement between analytic philosophy and phenomenology have lately been issued in England and America. It is not altogether clear what such calls intend. No one, I suspect asks for an attempt to restate, say, Austin’s views on language in Heideggerian jargon. More likely the unspoken hope is that, on the contrary, someone would enable analytic philosophers to understand what Husserl and Heidegger and some of the other phenomenologists have to say. This requires nothing less than a translation of these thinkers’ statements not only into a different natural language but into a different philosophical vocabulary. Translating German philosophical works into English is difficult. Translating Husserl’s or Heidegger’s views into a vocabulary acceptable to analytic philosophers is considerably more laborious. However arduous the task, translations from the vocabulary of Husserl or Heidegger into analytic jargon are possible. The present paper shows that they are, by discussing Heidegger’s distinction between ’vorhanden sein’ and ’zuhanden sein’ in reasonably plain English.