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37General philosophy of science (edited book)North Holland. 2007.While the special volumes of the series of Handbooks of the Philosophy of Science address topics relative to a specific discipline, this general volume deals ...
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165A realist partner for Linda: confirming a theoretical hypothesis more than its observational sub-hypothesisSynthese 184 (1): 63-71. 2012.It is argued that the conjunction effect has a disjunctive analog of strong interest for the realism–antirealism debate. It is possible that a proper theory is more confirmed than its (more probable) observational sub-theory and hence than the latter’s disjunctive equivalent, i.e., the disjunction of all proper theories that are empirically equivalent to the given one. This is illustrated by a toy model
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84Empirical progress and truth approximation by the 'hypothetico-probabilistic method'Erkenntnis 70 (3). 2009.Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional…Read more
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47A brand new type of inductive logic: Reply to Diderik BatensPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 248-252. 2005.In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
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23Aesthetic induction versus coherence: Reply to Paul ThagardPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 371-374. 2005.
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18Background knowledge and the structuralist approach: Reply to Jaap KampsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 338-342. 2005.
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12Coherence: Reply to Gerard VreeswijkPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 404-406. 2005.
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21Confirmation and truthlikeness: Reply to Gerhard SchurzPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 160-166. 2005.
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38Causal composition and structured wholes: Reply to Robert CauseyPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 463-465. 2005.
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92Another start for abduction aiming at empirical progress: Reply to joke MeheusPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 218-220. 2005.This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as we…Read more
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21Kinds of micro-explanation: Reply to Erik Weber and Helena de preesterPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 187-190. 2005.
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19Functional specification and fish swimming backward: Reply to Arno WoutersPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 294-298. 2005.
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19Domain and vocabulary extension: Reply to Bert HammingaPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 337-340. 2005.
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6Kinds of explanatory successes: Reply to Adam Grobler and Andrzej wiśniewskiPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 311-314. 2005.
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37Comparing properties and profiles: Reply to Maarten FranssenPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 154-156. 2005.
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11Intending in terms of reasons for actions: Reply to Jeanne PeijnenburgPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 234-236. 2005.
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10Mathematics and explication: Reply to Jean Paul Van bendegemPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 170-173. 2005.
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55Kepler, Newton, Einstein and the string theory: Reply to David AtkinsonPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 103-105. 2005.
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28Logics of scientific cognition: Reply to Johan Van BenthemPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 420-427. 2005.
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184Logic in service of philosophy of science: Reply to Isabella Burger and Johannes HeidemaPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 489-492. 2005.
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18Moderate realism and metaphors: Reply to Hans MooijPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 506-510. 2005.
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26Problem reduction and its relevance: Reply to Thomas NicklesPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 134-137. 2005.
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162Qualitative and quantitative inference to the best theory: Reply to Ilkka NiiniluotoPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 276-280. 2005.
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13On designing historically adequate formal reconstructions: Reply to Eric ScerriPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 211-216. 2005.
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30Overdetermination and reference: Reply to Emma RuttkampPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 437-439. 2005.
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14One versus many intended applications: Reply to Sjoerd ZwartPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 396-402. 2005.
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19On bridging philosophy and sociology of science: Reply to jesús Zamora BonillaPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 370-372. 2005.
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2Structures for computational assistance in drug design: Reply to Alexander Van den BoschPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 360-363. 2005.