•  250
    The philosophy of science has lost its self-confidence. Structures in Science (2001) is an advanced textbook that explicates, updates and integrates the best insights of logical empiricism and its main critics. This "neo-classical approach" aims at providing heuristic patterns for research.The book introduces four ideal types of research programs (descriptive, explanatory, design and explicative) and reanimates the distinction between observational laws and proper theories without assuming a the…Read more
  •  2
  •  95
    The instrumentalist abduction task and the nature of empirical counterexamples: Reply to Atocha Aliseda
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 190-192. 2005.
    This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as we…Read more
  •  9
    'Thisgrue' and 'thisemerald-part': Reply to John Welch
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 138-140. 2005.
  •  21
    Toward a geometrical theory of truth approximation: Reply to Thomas Mormann
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 455-457. 2005.
    This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as we…Read more
  •  34
    The non-standard approach to confirmation and the ravens paradoxes: Reply to Patrick Maher
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 109-128. 2005.
  •  28
    Truth approximation by empirical and aesthetic criteria: Reply to David Miller
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 356-360. 2005.
    Polish version, see Kuipers (2002) "O dwóch rodzajach idealizcji I konkretyzacki. Przypadek aproksymacji prawdy"
  •  18
    Unintended consequences and the case of abduction: Reply to Roberto Festa
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 521-525. 2005.
  •  194
    Surprisingly enough, modified versions of the confirmation theory of Carnap and Hempel and the truth approximation theory of Popper turn out to be smoothly synthesizable. The glue between confirmation and truth approximation appears to be the instrumentalist methodology, rather than the falsificationist one.By evaluating theories separately and comparatively in terms of their successes and problems (hence even if they are already falsified), the instrumentalist methodology provides – both in the…Read more
  •  118
    The dual foundation of qualitative truth approximation
    Erkenntnis 47 (2): 145-179. 1997.
    The main formal notion involved in qualitative truth approximation by the HD-method, viz. ‘more truthlike’, is shown to not only have, by its definition, an intuitively appealing ‘model foundation’, but also, at least partially, a conceptually plausible ‘consequence foundation’. Moreover, combining the relevant parts of both leads to a very appealing ‘dual foundation’, the more so since the relevant methodological notions, viz. ‘more successful’ and its ingredients provided by the HD-method, can…Read more
  •  73
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
  •  92
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
  •  33
    Design research programs and the logic of their development
    with Rein Vos and Hauke Sie
    Erkenntnis 37 (1). 1992.
    Design research programs attempt to bring together the properties of available materials and the demands derived from intended applications. The logic of problem states and state transitions in such programs, including assessment criteria and heuristic principles, is described in settheoretic terms, starting with a naive model comprising an intended profile and the operational profile of a prototype. In a first concretization the useful distinction between structural and functional properties is…Read more
  •  147
    Naive and refined truth approximation
    Synthese 93 (3). 1992.
    The naive structuralist definition of truthlikeness is an idealization in the sense that it assumes that all mistaken models of a theory are equally bad. The natural concretization is a refined definition based on an underlying notion of structurelikeness.In Section 1 the naive definition of truthlikeness of theories is presented, using a new conceptual justification, in terms of instantial and explanatory mistakes.
  •  133
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
  •  237
    Beauty, a road to the truth
    Synthese 131 (3): 291-328. 2002.
    In this article I give a naturalistic-cum-formal analysis of therelation between beauty, empirical success, and truth. The analysis is based on the onehand on a hypothetical variant of the so-called `mere-exposure effect'' which has been more orless established in experimental psychology regarding exposure-affect relationshipsin general and aesthetic appreciation in particular (Zajonc 1968; Temme 1983; Bornstein 1989;Ye 2000). On the other hand it is based on the formal theory of truthlikeness a…Read more
  •  115
    In this article I give a naturalistic-cum-formal analysis of the relation between beauty, empirical success, and truth. The analysis is based on the one hand on a hypothetical variant of the so-called 'mere-exposure effect' which has been more or less established in experimental psychology regarding exposure-affect relationships in general and aesthetic appreciation in particular (Zajonc 1968; Temme 1983; Bornstein 1989; (Ye 2000). On the other hand it is based on the formal theory of truthliken…Read more
  •  124
    Non-inductive explication of two inductive intuitions
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (3): 209-223. 1983.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
  •  26
    The reduction of phenomenological to kinetic thermostatics
    Philosophy of Science 49 (1): 107-119. 1982.
    Standard accounts of the micro-reduction of phenomenological to kinetic thermostatics, based on the postulate relating empirical absolute temperature to mean kinetic energy ū=(3/2)kT, face two problems. The standard postulate also allows 'reduction' in the other direction and it can be criticized from the point of view that reduction postulates need to be ontological identities. This paper presents a detailed account of the reduction, based on the postulate that thermal equilibrium is ontologic…Read more
  •  224
    This paper primarily deals with theconceptual prospects for generalizing the aim ofabduction from the standard one of explainingsurprising or anomalous observations to that ofempirical progress or even truth approximation. Itturns out that the main abduction task then becomesthe instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming atan empirically more successful theory, relative to theavailable data, but not necessarily compatible withthem. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress aswell as obse…Read more
  •  22
    The hypothetico-probabilistic (HP-) method as a concretization of the HD-method
    In Sami Pihlström, Panu Raatikainen & Matti Sintonen (eds.), Approaching Truth: Essays in Honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto, College Publications. pp. 179--207. 2007.
  • Verstehen, Einfühlen and Mental Simulation: Reply to Anne Ruth Mackor
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84. 2005.
  • Approaching the Truth With the Rule of Success
    Philosophia Naturalis 21 (2/4): 244-253. 1984.
  • Comparatief realisme versus dichotoom realisme
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 100 (3): 219-227. 2008.
  •  13
    An interesting consequence of the structuralist theory of truth approximation, as developed in my From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, henceforth ICR, concerns so-called ‘inference to the best explanation’. It will be argued that this popular rule among scientific realists can better be replaced by, various kinds of, ‘inference to the best theory’.