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41How to be a Good Non-Naturalist: Epistemology as Rational Reconstruction in Carnap and his PredecessorsIn Frank Hofmann (ed.), Rationalität, Realismus, Revision / Rationality, Realism, Revision: Vorträge des 3. internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie vom 15. bis zum 18. September 1997 in München / Proceedings of the 3rd international Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy September 15-18, 1997 in Munich, De Gruyter. pp. 856-861. 2000.
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26Verzeichnis der Autorinnen und Autoren/List of AuthorsIn Frank Hofmann (ed.), Rationalität, Realismus, Revision / Rationality, Realism, Revision: Vorträge des 3. internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie vom 15. bis zum 18. September 1997 in München / Proceedings of the 3rd international Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy September 15-18, 1997 in Munich, De Gruyter. pp. 873-878. 2000.
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Ontology in Cognitive PerspectiveGlobal Philosophy 18 (1): 25-36. 2008.Ontology cannot be left to the natural sciences, if only because it deals also with hypothetical and fictional objects. It pivots about proto-categorical issues relating to the features of objects of any and all kinds. This brings into its range issues that test the limits of knowledge by asking questions that are inherently unanswerable (for example: “What is an instance of an occurrence that no one ever mentions?”). And it raises issues of norms and values that science (in its usual configurat…Read more
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INTERVIEW: Pragmatischer Idealismus oder idealistischer Pragmatismus?Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 42 (5): 883-904. 2014.
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1Über einen zentralen Unterschied zwischen Theorie und PraxisDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 47 (2): 171-182. 2014.
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1Über philosophische Systematisierung: Plausibilität und Hegels VisionDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 53 (2): 179-202. 2014.
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H20: Hempel-Helmer-Oppenheim: Eine Episode aus der Geschichte der Wissenschaftstheorie des zwanzigsten JahrhundertsDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 44 (5): 779-806. 2014.
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Nature and Understanding: The Metaphysics and Method of ScienceClarendon Press. 2000.Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. Rescher seeks to describe - in a way accessible to philosophers and nonphilosophers alike - the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. This is the culmination of many years of penetrating work in this area of philosophy by one of its …Read more
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7Ethical Idealism: An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of IdealsUniversity of California Press. 1992.Is it rational to strive for the unattainable? In this short and provocative study, Nicholas Rescher vigorously defends both the rationality and practicality of seriously pursuing impossible dreams.
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Presidential Views on Philosophical ProgressIn The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series, . pp. 237-252. 2015.
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Error: (On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong)University of Pittsburgh Press. 2006.In _Error_, Nicholas Rescher presents a fresh analysis of the occurrence, causality, and consequences of error in human thought, action, and evaluation. Rescher maintains that error-avoidance and truth-achievement are distinct but equally important factors for rational inquiry, and that error is inherent in the human cognitive process (to err is human). He defines three main categories of error: cognitive (failure to realize truths); practical (failure related to the objective of an action); and…Read more
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13Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical PerspectiveUniversity of Pittsburgh Press. 1972.Nicholas Rescher examines the controversial social issue of the welfare state, and offers philosophical thoughts on the limits and liabilities of government and society. Questioning some of the principal assumptions of democratic theory and classical liberalism, Rescher theorizes that the current system is not a be-all end-all, but rather a necessity with limited scope that will ultimately fail to achieve its objectives. He further purports that the welfare state must be a transitional phase to …Read more
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Unselfishness: The Role of the Vicarious Affects in Moral Philosophy and Social TheoryUniversity of Pittsburgh Press. 1995.In _Unselfishness_, Nicholas Rescher criticizes the stance of many contemporary moral philosophers and social theorists-that rationality conflicts with morality, and instead defends the position of historical thinkers who believed that the worth of altruism is irreducible and that its rationalization does not require recourse to prudential self-interest. To support his position, Rescher provides detailed examples, and a theoretical critique of utilitarian morality.
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2Luck: The Brilliant Randomness Of Everyday LifeUniversity of Pittsburgh Press. 2001.Luck touches us all. "Why me?" we complain when things go wrong—though seldom when things go right. But although luck has a firm hold on all our lives, we seldom reflect on it in a cogent, concerted way. In _Luck_, one of our most eminent philosophers offers a realistic view of the nature and operation of luck to help us come to sensible terms with life in a chaotic world. Differentiating luck from fate (inexorable destiny) and fortune (mere chance), Nicholas Rescher weaves a colorful tapestry o…Read more
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2The Promise of Process PhilosophyIn George W. Shields (ed.), Process and Analysis: Whitehead, Hartshorne, and the Analytic Tradition, State University of New York Press. pp. 49-66. 2012.
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2The Concept of RandomnessTheoria 27 (1): 1-11. 2008.Though there be no such thing as chance in the world, our ignorance of the real causes of any event begets a like species of belief or opinion.
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25On Philosophical Systematization: Plausibility and the Hegelian VisionSouthern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3): 415-442. 2010.
Nicholas Rescher
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