Nicholas Rescher

Main description: No short book on the explanation of existence can afford the hubris of claiming to accomplish this task. And certainly no such claim can be or is being made here. What is at issue is not-and cannot be-an actual explanation. Rather, what is attempted here is at the very most a rough sketch of the conceptual architecture that an adequate explanation can be expected to exhibit. No more is achieved than a rough and general indication of the direction in which a satisfactory explanation can unfold. A vast amount of detail will have to be filled in to provide a tenable explanation. Only the rough shape that the explanation will have to take is something that one can map out in the basis of considerations of general principles, giving reasons why alternative directions are less promising and how objection to the indicated direction can be removed or mitigated. But the move from a general direction to a specific and detailed pathway calls for more than is-or can be-attempted here.

Process philosophy has established itself as one of the 20th century's prime contributions to philosophical thought and Nicholas Rescher has for many years figured among its prime exponents. His new book Process Philosophical Deliberations collects together ten studies illuminating various aspects of this many-sided philosophical approach. Among the topics treated are the nature of process philosophy itself, as well as its implementation in such areas as epistemology, value theory, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of science.

This book is avowedly written in what has been rather patronizingly called the affable spirit of compromise or conciliation between science and religion. Its key thesis is that these two enterprises can and should be seen as complementary in addressing different albeit interrelated questions: on the one side the nature of the natural world and our place in it, and on the other how we should proceed and act so as to capitalize on the opportunities that our place in the world affords to us for shaping our lives in a meaningful and satisfying way. How the world works is the crux of the one enterprise and how we are to live is that of the other.

Over the years Nicholas Rescher has published various essays on religious issues from a philosophical point of view. The chapters of the present volume collect these together, joining to them four further pieces which appear here for the first time (Chapters 3, 7, and 8). While these studies certainly do not constitute a system of religious philosophy, they do combine to give a vivid picture of a well-defined point of view on the subject-the viewpoint of a Roman Catholic philosopher who, in the longstanding manner of this tradition, seeks to harmonize the commitments of faith with the fruits of inquiry proceeding under the auspices of reason.

Nicholas Rescher's interest in issues of social philosophy, now dating back over forty years, have resulted in four previous books: Distributive Justice (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1966), Welfare: the Social Issues on Philosophical Perspective (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), Public Concerns (Lanham, MI: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), and Fairness (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002). Additionally, however, he has during this time also written more than a dozen essays on various particular problems and issues of this domain-usually in response to the needs of some special occasion. The aim of the present volume is to collect this material together in coordinative conjunction. The resultant book will not only offer a panorama of Rescher's views on some of the key issues of the field, but also convey a sense of the procedural ways and means by which Rescher think that philosophical deliberations can serve to shed some instructive light on such ever-controversial matters. For Rescher is convinced in theory and has sought to illustrate in practice that constructive thinking in this domain calls for implementing a quantitative approach from a moral perspective, and that neither the measurable quantities not the intangible values of the situation can be overlooked in a cogent assessment of the issues. It is his hope that these essays will confirm the justice of this conviction.

A doctrine of intelligent design through evolution is not going to find many friends. It is destined to encounter opposition on all sides. Among scientists the backlog of evolution will have little patience for intelligent design. Among religiousists, many who form intelligent design have their doubts about evolution. In the general public s mind there is a diametrical opposition between evolution and intelligent design: one excludes the other. This book will argue that this view of the matter is not correct, and that in actuality one can regard evolution itself as a pathway to intelligent design. We would do well to go beyond The Origin of Species and taking as our guide such works as W. Wentworth Thomson s On Growth and Form acknowledging that evolutionary adaptation can result in solutions of a sort that intelligence could readily ratify. Accordingly, what the present book seeks is a naturalization of Intelligent Design that sees such design as itself the result of natural and evolutionary processes."

The essays included in this volume are a mixture of old and new. Three of them make their first appearance in print on this occa sion (Nos III, IV, and V). The remaining four are based upon materials previously published in learned journals or anthologies. (However, these previously published papers have been revised and, generally, expanded for inclusion here.) Detailed acknowl edgement of prior publications is made in the notes to the relevant articles. I am grateful to the editors of these several publications for their kind permission to use this material. I am grateful to an anonymous reader for the Western Ontario Series for some useful corrigenda. And I should like to thank John Horty and Lily Knezevich for their help in seeing this material through the press. NICHOLAS RESCHER Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania May, 1980 xi INTRODUCTION The unifying theme of these essays is their concern with Leibniz's metaphysics of nature. In particular, they revolve about his cos mology of creation and his conception of the real world as one among infinitely many equipossible alternatives.

This paper surveys our inescapable limits as cognitive agents with regard to a full world of fact: the well-known metamathematical limits of axiomatic systems, limitations of explanation that doom a principle of sufficient reason, limitations of expression across all possible languages, and a simple but powerful argument regarding the limits of conceivability. In ways demonstrable even from within our limits, the full world of fact is inescapably beyond us. Here we propose that there must nonetheless be a totality of fact, and that despite our limits we can know something of its general character. The world as the totality of fact must form a plenum, with a radically unfamiliar formal structure that contains distinct elements corresponding to each element of its own power set.

Nicholas Rescher examines the controversial social issue of the welfare state, and offers philosophical thoughts on the limits and liabilities of government and society. Questioning some of the principal assumptions of democratic theory and classical liberalism, Rescher theorizes that the current system is not a be-all end-all, but rather a necessity with limited scope that will ultimately fail to achieve its objectives. He further purports that the welfare state must be a transitional phase to a more affluent postindustrial society-a satisfying life, rather than an adequate one.

Since classical antiquity, theorists have struggled with the problem of self-reference originating in the Liar Paradox of Eubulides: “Does someone who says ‘I am lying’ lie?” Does he speak truly or falsely? The consensus resolution has been to dismiss the contention “This statement is false” as meaningless incoherent on grounds of self-contradiction. Leibniz also deemed the claim incoherent, but not on grounds of self-contradiction incoherence however on grounds of embarking on an infinite and incompletable series of meaningfulness-presuppositions. He thus introduced a novel and constructive mode of semantical analysis.

Principles -- Questions -- Ideas -- Principles of truth and acceptance -- Presumption as a pathway to plausibility -- Conjecture and the move from mere plausibility and presumption to acceptability -- Plausibility conflicts and paradox -- From conjecture to belief and from belief to knowledge -- The epistemic gap and grades of acceptance -- Cognitive thresholds -- Intuitive knowledge -- Experience and induction -- Distributive vs. collective explanation -- Cognitive importance -- Problems of prediction -- Error and cognitive risk -- Problems of skepticism -- Trust -- Common sense -- How science works -- Scientific realism and its problems -- The anthomorphic contextuality of science -- Ignorance and limits of knowledge -- On systemic "best fit" reasoning -- Inference from the best systematization -- The cyclic unity of reason -- Fact, fiction and functional surrogacy -- A pragmatic coda.