Nicholas Rescher

Virtually every sector of philosophy comes into play when addressing the implications of the “ultimate why” question of existence. Its ramifications extent to the logic of totality, the metaphysics of being, the epistemology of ultimacy, the axiology of existence, the theology of creation, and even the aesthetics of world design. The problem-structure of this crucial issue pervades the entire range of philosophical concern and (figuratively speaking) constitutes an ocean where all of the thought-streams of the discipline ultimately flow together.

Nowhere is the systemic inter-connectedness of the various branches of philosophical deliberation more clearly evident than in aporetic situations. For the several propositions that form such a problematic cluster will generally come from entirely different branches of the field, and thereby put entirely different sorts of issues into systemic interrelatedness. His circumstance is strikingly clear in that second example given above—the free will apory, which brings together in cohesive unity three very different branches of philosophy—the theory of deliberation and decision, the theory of human action, and the theory of causal explanation.

The validation of inductive reasoning pivots on the distinction between consequential or inferential reason on the one hand, and gap-filling or enthymematic thinking on the other. It accordingly calls for the crucial bifurcation into the theoretical and the practical that runs across the entire landscape of philosophical endeavor. The study of inductive reasoning accordingly crosses over into a wide spectrum of philosophical concerns: normative reasoning, the theory of rationality, the epistemology of belief validation, the philosophical anthropology of cognitive practice, and the ethics of belief. We here have a clear example of philosophy’s rejection of compartmentalization.

The present discussion highlights an unexpected connection between, on the one hand, the metaphysics of rationality and reason’s place in the universe, the moral theory of duty and obligation, and the philosophical anthropology of personal conduct. Its deliberations rest on the unbreakable linkage between the philosophical elucidation of our human place in the world’s scheme of things and the ethics of proper comportment toward one another in view of our shared condition as rational beings. The problem of proper behavior creates an inseparable unity of concern embracing ethics, philosophical anthropology, and metaphysics in coordinated interrelationship.

Close analysis of the idea of control shows that it is so complex and convoluted that it becomes difficult to say exactly what is at issue. And while control has been a key theme in the theory of science and technology, and historically has also always been an issue that has figured importantly in ethics and moral philosophy, the details of the matter have not received the attention they deserve, elucidating the connections of the complexities involved and disconnections between the two is an issue which, for obscure reasons, has not always received the amount of attention that is its proper due. The present discussion has made a modest effort toward filling the gap.

Philosophical guidance is incomplete because in being based on principle it has to be generic. Philosophy can elaborate the advantage of having a congenial life-partner, but it cannot instruct you whether to marry Tom or Jerry. It can confirm the advantage of having a satisfying career but not specify whether it is to be in teaching or tailoring.Its teachings being conditional and confined to generalities means that philosophy cannot avoid conjecture. And this is so for the straightforward reason that there is a substantial gap between the data at philosophy’s disposal and the issues it needs to resolve. Those issues prove difficult, complex, and far-reaching problems. But with the data of philosophy confined to the fruits of human experience and scientific understanding, we must acknowledge both as limited and incomplete resources. The resulting information gap means that philosophy is in the position to having to address very large and complex issue on the basis of comparatively imperfect and incomplete data—a gap which can only be filled by plausible supposition and sensible guesswork. The very nature of the epistemic situation of philosophy as a rational discipline precludes the realization of absolute certainly, so that conjecture and plausible supposition are unavoidable recourses in the circumstances at issue.

Risk is the chancing of negativity—of some loss or harm. To take a risk is to resolve one’s act-choices in a way that creates or enhances the chance of an unfortunate eventuation, rendering the occurrences of something unwanted more likely. And to be at risk is to be so circumstanced that something unpleasant might happen, some misfortune occur. Risk is correlative with the chance of a mishap—and it exists whenever there are probabilistically indeterminate outcomes some of which are of negative character. Risks face us with the possibility that something untoward may occur, leaving us unable to foretell any specific outcome with categorical assurance.

Only after the range of possible outcomes of a chancy situation is determined can one assess the opportunities and risks that the situation poses. And these outcomes have to be seen as plausible prospects for realization over the nearer term. Possibilities for the longer term and more distant consequences become increasingly obscure with the elongation of the timespan and thereby become too problematic for realistic consideration. It is accordingly useful to distinguish between the outcome of a chancy situations, and its more eventual result. Thus if X makes a $10 bet with Y, the outcome could be a win for X, while the result might be X’s purchase of a cigar. The theory of rational deliberation generally leaves aside these imponderable longer-term matters of result and eventual ultimacy out of sight.