Niels Weidtmann

Up to this century African philosophic sagacity has relied on the oral tradition of didactic wisdoms. In contrast to the prevailing view that oral tradition is inferior to literacy, I argue that it in fact has its proper meaning which is not overcome by literacy. A critical analysis of the particular arguments made by didactic wisdoms therefore requires an understanding of this proper meaning at first hand. The main characteristic of oral tradition is the fact that it does not lead to a break between the historical and the contemporary horizon which would make it necessary to hermeneutically reconcile them. Rather the historical horizon always is "co-present" with the contemporary one. On the one hand this fact gives greater authority to oral traditions, but on the other hand it also subjects the historical level of their meaning to a more constant reflection, critique and change.The intercultural dialogue first of all has to be concerned with an understanding of the fundamental processes which structure any human life-world such as oral and literate tradition. This may help to overcome the strict dichotomy between these two ways of handing down traditions and can make all different cultures become conscious of the oral aspects of their own traditions.

Experience of something strange does not mean there is a strange thing that becomes experienced but rather it means that something is experienced as being strange. The same holds true for recognizing a stranger; the person recognized is not by herself a stranger but she becomes recognized as such. Thus, the denomination strange/stranger depends on the process of experience and recognition. Waldenfels has shown that experience is much more than simply an intentional act; it befalls a person who in experiencing something reacts to a claim that comes from outside and that can never be answered entirely. Therefore, experience has some elements of strangeness in its own structure. It is these elements that allow something or someone to be experienced as being strange. However, what exactly is experienced as being strange greatly depends on the particular situation as well as on previous experiences. In this paper I thus argue that the experience of strangeness correlates with the history of previous experiences. Since cultures mainly are characterized by a common history of experiences, what counts as being strange differs from culture to culture. An Intercultural Philosophy, therefore, would have to go beyond the analysis of an experience of strangeness by itself experiencing interculturality