Niels Weidtmann

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Die vier Weisen im Garten der Philosophie: Anfangsgründe eines globalen Humanismus by Rainer SchulzerNiels Weidtmann (bio)Die vier Weisen im Garten der Philosophie: Anfangsgründe eines globalen Humanismus. By Rainer Schulzer. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2023. Pp. 290, Paper € 49.90, ISBN 978-3-495-99837-3.Rainer Schulzer has written an inspiring book, not yet translated into English, about “the four sages in the garden of philosophy.” The garden, created by Inoue Enryō, the founder of Toyo University, in Tokyo in 1904, invites visitors to reflect on philosophy. Its centerpiece is the so-called “Shrine of the Four Sages” who, according to Inoue, are Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, and Kant. Schulzer, who is himself a professor of philosophy at Toyo University, takes Inoue’s compilation of the four sages as a starting point to reflect on the diversity of sources of a “global humanism.” He argues that the humanist concern for a justification of ethics without referring to metaphysics and religion as it characterizes Renaissance humanism as well as Kant’s ethics can already be found among the various thinkers of the Axial Age (p. 221). Confucius, Buddha, and Socrates are introduced by short texts contributed to the book by Yoshida Kōhei, Takemura Makio, and Volker Gerhardt. However, because Schulzer does not want to let the portraits stand alone, but rather see them located in the “horizon of a global humanism,” he prefaces them with his own assessments.Firstly, Schulzer shows why, despite major differences, it seems justified to regard the three axial sages as thinkers of a humanism centered on the question of how to lead a good life. He counters the prejudice that East Asian virtue teachings, especially Confucianism, were based on the dogmatic duty to fulfil social roles, whereas European-Western ethics of freedom led to ruthless individualism. Instead, he convincingly shows that a complex and mutually constitutive relationship between freedom and social roles can be found in both traditions. Regarding Buddhism, Schulzer explains why it does not aim for salvation in the afterlife; the unworldly life of Buddhist monks thus does not mean a denial of life, but rather serves the realization and acceptance of transience. In the concluding chapter of his humanistic localization of the three sages, Schulzer turns to the doctrine of retaliation, based on which he closely links Buddhist teachings with Kant’s philosophy. According to Schulzer, Buddhism sets itself apart from the karmic doctrine of reincarnation, according to which a person’s well-being depends on their behavior in a previous life, by transferring the doctrine of retaliation to the inner self. The endeavor is no longer for a better [End Page 1] future life, but for the “spirit already liberated from suffering and fear of death during one’s lifetime” (p. 87). Schulzer argues with Kant that a liberated spirit can only be achieved with a clear conscience. However, the attempt to transfer Hans Kelsen’s theory that the discovery of causality, which Kelsen attributes to the pre-Socratics, arose from the ancient doctrine of retaliation in Buddhism and to understand the doctrine of dependent origination, above all the realization that all suffering can be traced back to ignorance, as a theory of causality is somewhat overstepping the mark. Buddhist cognition, as Schulzer himself notes, is not interested in causality as an explanatory principle but aims precisely at breaking the so-called “twelve-link chain of dependent origination.” We would first have to ask about the respective meaning of causality; incidentally, this also applies to the European tradition, in which what we are used to calling causality today can only be traced back to one of the four causes named by Aristotle.The portraits of the three sages start with Yoshida Kōhei introducing us to Confucius as a virtuous teacher who first and foremost endeavored to ensure the well-being of his students and taught them to find their own role in society. Volker Gerhardt approaches Socrates from the perspective of Nietzsche and Kant. The main point of reference for him is that Socrates, like no other, stands for “moral self-determination,” “self-knowledge” and the experience of the divine in an “intimate relationship with...

This book explores the complexity of two philosophical traditions, extending from their origins to the current developments in neopragmatism. Chapters deal with the first encounters of these traditions and beyond, looking at metaphysics and the Vienna circle as well as semantics and the principle of tolerance. There is a general consensus that North-American (neo-)pragmatism and European Logical Empiricism were converging philosophical traditions, especially after the forced migration of the European Philosophers. But readers will discover a pluralist image of this relation and interaction with an obvious family resemblance. This work clarifies and specifies the common features and differences of these currents since the beginning of their mutual scientific communication in the 19th century. The book draws on collaboration between authors and philosophers from Vienna, Tübingen, and Helsinki, and their networks. It will appeal to philosophers, scholars in the history of philosophy, philosophers of science, pragmatists and beyond.

This article explores the ontological status of experience. It starts by pointing out the difference between pragmatism’s empirical and Husserl’s transcendental notion of experience. Even though pragmatism, just like phenomenology, claims that in experience the experiencing and the experienced, i. e., subject and object or, in Dewey’s terms, organism and environment, belong together and may have mutual impact onto one other, this pragmatic approach does not analyze the reality of experience itself but locates experience in the empirical world. Husserl’s analysis of transcendental consciousness reveals the constitution of the empirical world by experience and therefore takes a first step beyond pragmatism’s notion of experience. However, if the world is constituted by experience, then phenomenology will have to inquire into the constitution of experience itself. In the article this is called the experience of experience or the self-experiencing experience. Only when experience can be phenomenologically proven in its self-constitution does it no longer presuppose subjectivity, but can be interpreted as the selfconstitution of reality. This must be the actual concern of a philosophy that goes back to experience if it is not to stop halfway in its attempt to found both, speculative thinking and the empirically working sciences, in experience.

Fabio Ciaramelli, La distruzione del desiderio. Il narrcisismo nell'epoca del consumodi massa, Bari: Dedalo 2000, 219 S.; Regula Giuliani (Hg.): Merleau-Ponty und die Kulturwissenschaften. München: Fink 2000 (Übergänge; Bd. 37), 361 S.; Thomas Franz, Der Mensch; und seine Grundphänomene. Eugen Finks Existentialanthropologie aus der Perspektive der Strukturanthropologie Heinrich Rombachs, Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach 1999, 193 S.; Thomas Fuchs: Leib, Raum, Person. Enwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 2000, 419 S. Ders.: Psychopathologie von Leib und Raum. Phänomenologisch-empirische Untersuchungen zu depressiven und paranoiden Erkrankungen. Darmstadt: Steinkopff 2000, 323 S.

Nicht-westliche Gemeinwohlkonzeptionen sind so vielfältig und heterogen, dass sie sich keinesfalls auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner bringen lassen. In manchen Fällen sind die Unterschiede zu westlichen Konzeptionen offensichtlich, andere Konzeptionen dagegen sind den westlichen durchaus ähnlich. Wichtig ist, dass eine ernsthafte Beschäftigung mit nicht-westlichen Gemeinwohlkonzeptionen nicht bei der Kenntnisnahme zusätzlicher Vielfalt stehenbleiben darf, sondern nach den Grunderfahrungen fragen muss, die sich in den verschiedenen Konzeptionen wiederfinden. Darin liegt die Chance, rückblickend auch auf jene Grunderfahrungen aufmerksam zu werden, die westlichen Gemeinwohlkonzeptionen zugrunde liegen.

Based on her own experience of long years of statelessness, Arendt demands that the right of the individual to belong to a political community be recognized as the only human right. However, while the »right to have rights« can serve as a regulative idea, belonging that respects an individual’s personhood can neither be decreed nor granted but must have constitutive meaning for the individual. In the article, belonging therefore is described as different ways of a human’s being-in-the-world or simply as different ways of experience.

Analogy (Latin: proportio) is the epistemological principle par excellence for the ancient world. Plato calls it the "most beautiful bond" that holds the cosmos together. For Aristoteles, analogies between different species and genera should enable a better understanding of structural features in biology. The most powerful relationship, however, is the one known as Pros-hen, which forms the basis of all being-analogy teachings in the Middle Ages. In the 20th century, analogical thinking finds its way into phenomenology and psychoanalysis. This volume presents analogy starting from antiquity through the Middle Ages and modern times and explores its potential in the context of contemporary philosophical discussions. With contributions by Prof. Dr. Damir Barbarić, Dr. Marcel Bodea, Prof. Dr. Johannes Brachtendorf, Dr. Elenio Cicchini, Prof. Dr. Virgil Ciomoș, Prof. Dr. Ion Copoeru, Dr. Nicoletta Di Vita, Prof. Dr. Karen Gloy, Prof. Dr. Michael Heidelberger, Dietmar Koch, Dr. Dalia Nassar, Dr. Alina Noveanu, Dr. Manuel Schölles, Dr. Simon Schüz and Dr. Niels Weidtmann.

Der vorliegende Band umfasst Beitrage zu einem zentralen Thema bei Platon: 'Physis' kann bei Platon im naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne als physische, biologische, materielle Natur oder im ubertragenen Sinne als eigenes Wesen, etwa hinsichtlich Seele, Kosmos oder Gottlichem, verstanden werden. So werden in diesem Band medizinische, biologische und kosmologische Ansatze ebenso wie ontologische, epistemologische und padagogische Themen zu Platons 'Physis'-Konzept fokussiert. Die zeitgenossische Nomos-Physis-Diskussion Platons mit den Sophisten sowie seine sprach- und kulturphilosophischen Uberlegungen spielen hier eine wichtige Rolle. Die anspruchsvolle literarische Gestaltung der Platonischen Dialoge ist fur die genannten Fragestellungen hochst relevant, ebenso die Auseinandersetzung spaterer platonischer Philosophen mit Platons Physis-Konzept. Mit Beitragen von:Michele Abbate, Christian Brockmann, Ramon Cornavaca, Diego De Brasi, Pantelis Golitsis, Julia Knauss, Dietmar Koch, Mai Oki-Suga, Irmgard Mannlein-Robert, Oliver Primavesi, Mario Regali, Carlos Steel, Angela Ulacco.

Eine phänomenologische Bildanalyse muss, wie jede andere Bildanalyse auch, primär nach dem Bildsinn fragen. Dabei darf sie aber den Verweisungszusammenhang, der für den Sinn des Dargestellten konstitutiv ist, nirgendwo anders hernehmen als allein aus dem Bild – und das auch dann, wenn nur ein einzelner Gegenstand dargestellt ist. Das bedeutet, dass Verweisungszusammenhang und dargestellter Gegenstand, Bild und Bildsinn zugleich gesehen werden müssen. Darin, dass dies möglich ist, liegt, so soll in diesem Beitrag gezeigt werden, die philosophische Bedeutung des Bildes. Das Bild lässt über das hinaus, was sich in ihm zeigt, die Dimension des Sich-zeigens selbst mit aufgehen und sichtbar werden. Es ist mehr als ein bloßer Wahrnehmungsgegenstand, es ist ein Wahrnehmungsereignis, das es möglich macht, dass der Sehende an ihm und damit am Prozess des Sichtbarwerdens und Sich-zeigens selbst teilhat. Anders als beispielsweise in der hermeneutischen Theorie angenommen, gründet solche Teilhabe nicht im positiven Vorurteil des Bildbetrachters, sondern im Widerfahrnischarakter des Sehens. Besonders charakteristisch ist dieser Widerfahrnischarakter für das Sehen des Künstlers. Der Künstler bildet nicht das ab, was sichtbar vor ihm liegt, sondern er lässt sich vom Sichtbaren berühren und befremden und forscht nach der unsichtbaren Herkunft des Sichtbaren. Zu sehen vermag der Künstler erst in dem Augenblick, in dem sich das Moment des Unsichtbaren als das Sichtbarwerden selbst erweist. Das geschieht, wenn das Sichtbare von neuem sichtbar wird – nun aber so, dass der Prozess des Sichtbarwerdens den Künstler mit einschließt, weil das Sichtbare für ihn sichtbar wird. Sein Sehen hat am Sichtbarwerden des Gesehenen teil. Tatsächlich setzt Sichtbarkeit immer ein solches Sehen voraus und ist nie einfach gegeben. Deswegen gilt auch für den Betrachter des Bildes etwas ganz Ähnliches wie für den Künstler. Er muss das, was dem Künstler im Schaffensprozess wiederfährt, in der Betrachtung zu wiederholen versuchen. Eben deshalb, weil das Sehen von Bildern vom Betrachter fordert, sich auf das Ereignis des Sichtbarwerdens einzulassen, anstatt die Bilder mithilfe eines von außen herangezogenen Wissens zu interpretieren, sind Bilder in einem interkulturellen Kontext von besonderem Interesse. Sie vermögen auch solche Sinnzusammenhänge sicht- und erfahrbar zu machen, für die der Betrachter noch kein positives Vorurteil ausgebildet hat und für die ihm deshalb auch adäquate diskursive Anknüpfungspunkte fehlen.

In this paper the philosophical thought of Kwasi Wiredu, one of the most prominent contemporary black African thinkers, is reviewed. It is shown that Wiredu argues for a twofold approach to intercultural understanding. On the one hand, cultures differ in their way of conceptualizing the world, each culture owes a distinct "world-view". That is why Black Africa still needs to search for its own identity after being colonized for hundreds of years. Therefore, Wiredu speaks of the need of a "conceptual decolonization". On the other hand, according to Wiredu, all different and culturally bounded "world-views" are based upon a common ground, i.e. the biology of human beings as well as the reality of the world. Wiredu thus argues that an intercultural dialogue has to look for the most plausible "world-view", i.e. it has to ask for the truth of each "world-view". The paper is closed with some critical comments on Wiredus suggestion that there was a "world-view" common to all cultutres that would fit reality best.

Experience of something strange does not mean there is a strange thing that becomes experienced but rather it means that something is experienced as being strange. The same holds true for recognizing a stranger; the person recognized is not by herself a stranger but she becomes recognized as such. Thus, the denomination strange/stranger depends on the process of experience and recognition. Waldenfels has shown that experience is much more than simply an intentional act; it befalls a person who in experiencing something reacts to a claim that comes from outside and that can never be answered entirely. Therefore, experience has some elements of strangeness in its own structure. It is these elements that allow something or someone to be experienced as being strange. However, what exactly is experienced as being strange greatly depends on the particular situation as well as on previous experiences. In this paper I thus argue that the experience of strangeness correlates with the history of previous experiences. Since cultures mainly are characterized by a common history of experiences, what counts as being strange differs from culture to culture. An Intercultural Philosophy, therefore, would have to go beyond the analysis of an experience of strangeness by itself experiencing interculturality

Up to this century African philosophic sagacity has relied on the oral tradition of didactic wisdoms. In contrast to the prevailing view that oral tradition is inferior to literacy, I argue that it in fact has its proper meaning which is not overcome by literacy. A critical analysis of the particular arguments made by didactic wisdoms therefore requires an understanding of this proper meaning at first hand. The main characteristic of oral tradition is the fact that it does not lead to a break between the historical and the contemporary horizon which would make it necessary to hermeneutically reconcile them. Rather the historical horizon always is "co-present" with the contemporary one. On the one hand this fact gives greater authority to oral traditions, but on the other hand it also subjects the historical level of their meaning to a more constant reflection, critique and change.The intercultural dialogue first of all has to be concerned with an understanding of the fundamental processes which structure any human life-world such as oral and literate tradition. This may help to overcome the strict dichotomy between these two ways of handing down traditions and can make all different cultures become conscious of the oral aspects of their own traditions.