Esteban Céspedes

Part of Varela’s work focused on the study of visual perception, particularly on the grounds of an enactivist theory of vision. Problem: Varela held that the problem of misrepresentation and the comparability of visual experience were crucial. We live with other creatures in sensory worlds that are not tractable, so could we share color-similar experiences? We are still missing an integrative enactive framework to tackle the problems of misrepresentation and comparability related to animal color experience. Method: We carried out a literature survey to draw attention to the status of the enactivist theory of vision and to explore how the problems of misrepresentation and comparability may be tackled. Results: As shown, philosophy and computational science have recently incorporated concepts from neurobiology that close gaps between disciplines and support aspects of the enactivist approach of vision. Implications: Epistemological problems related to perception are here tackled, considering some controversial assumptions related to vision. We argue that an enactivist theory of visual perception may not only clarify the problematic consequences of those assumptions, but also fruitfully guide future philosophical and empirical research on this topic. Constructivist content: The presence of singular “visual channels”, as well as physical, sensorimotor and evolutionary factors, constrains our own perceptual experience as proposed by enactivism.

Causal decision theory defines a rational action as the one that tends to cause the best outcomes. If we adopt counterfactual or probabilistic theories of causation, then we may face problems in overdetermination cases. Do such problems affect Causal decision theory? The aim of this work is to show that the concept of causation that has been fundamental in all versions of causal decision theory is not the most intuitive one. Since overdetermination poses problems for a counterfactual theory of causation, one can think that a version of causal decision theory based on counterfactual dependence may also be vulnerable to such scenarios. However, only when an intuitive, not analyzed notion of causation is presupposed as a ground for a more plausible version of causal decision theory, overdetermination turns problematic. The first interesting consequence of this is that there are more reasons to dismiss traditional theories of causation (and to accept others). The second is to confirm that traditional causal decision theory is not based on our intuitive concept of the causal relation.