Esteban Céspedes

The notion of context has been central to many debates and theories in recent decades. It is well-defined in some disciplines, such as linguistics or philosophy of language. However, there are other disciplines, for example, within the empirical sciences, where this is not always the case. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to test whether the different notions of context in the philosophy of language can be applied to the field of synthetic biology in order to gain more clarity in the latter area. In this way, besides contributing to a general characterization of the idea of context that allows a conceptual understanding of contexts, it will also be possible to study their role in scientific and technological research. Second, and to illustrate the fruitfulness of this intersection between disciplines, we show–through the use of corpus methods—how the application of the notion of context from the philosophy of language allows us to shed light on some of the central concepts in synthetic biology, namely, the distinction between synthesis and analysis. On this basis, our perspective will enable us to revisit the relationship between the philosophy of language and the philosophy of biology.

Although it is broadly accepted that semantic interpretation depends on various kinds of conditions, it is still a big challenge to provide an account of meaning that clarifies how the plurality of meaning structures can be stabilized. In this paper, we analyze the ambiguity of interpretive processes, proposing a model that schematizes the mechanisms that can lead to the arrest of so-called unlimited semiosis. Although we elaborate our analysis mainly on the grounds of Eco’s account of unlimited semiosis, we would also like to put an emphasis on Peirce’s notion of habit, in order to tackle some relevant issues concerning it. Our proposal defines conceptual dynamics in topological terms. It shows how a recursive mechanism within semiosis can generate a basin of conceptual attraction, allowing the understanding of a phenomenon that is traditionally studied in a very qualitative way: how infinite semiosis can serve in different contexts of discourse. The basic idea can be applied to systems that process information in general, and the resulting conclusions are in principle applicable to texts, works of art, oral messages, and any sign or set of signs.

The notion of a causal process is introduced in this chapter, on which physical accounts of causation are based. First, Wesley Salmon’s mark transmission theory is described. After briefly pointing out some unclear elements of this theory, Phil Dowe’s conserved quantity theory is presented. What a causal process is depends on the conservation laws. This makes the conserved quantity account an empirical theory of causation, thereby allowing for a new way of clarifying overdetermination cases. I will suggest that adopting such an account can be regarded as implementing the fine-graining strategy in a way that is compatible with causal contextualism.

This chapter will introduce the notion of causation based on counterfactual dependence. This notion forms the basis of the counterfactual account of causation. Different cases of overdetermination will be considered and it will be explained how these pose problems to the counterfactual account of causation. These problems motivate new ways of defining causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals, such as the account of causal influence or the causal modelling account. The point of view of causal contextualism will also be introduced—namely, the view that the truth of causal claims may vary relative to the context from which they are evaluated. Causal contextualism will be defended in many ways within this work. I will argue in this chapter that event fine-graining in the light of causal contextualism is at the basis of any strategy used to clarify overdetermination scenarios.

It is shown in the present chapter how causal contextualism can be applied to the problem of the causal exclusion of mental states. This problem is also considered as a way of approaching the problem of overdetermination. André Fuhrmann’s Manuscrito 25:3–17 (2002) characterisation of causal exclusion and explanatory exclusion as two distinct arguments is presented. Assuming particularly different contexts of explanation, the explanatory exclusion argument is not problematic and overdetermination with regard to explanation is not really generated.

A notion of causation based on the ranking functions of degrees of belief is presented in this chapter. The notion of cause is identified with the notion of a reason, which is defined in terms of a conditional ranking function. On these grounds, an epistemic theory of causation can be developed. It will be shown that the epistemic aspect of this account permits clarifying overdetermination cases in a novel way. A comparison of the ranking-theoretic approach to causation with the counterfactual analysis of causation and with the causal modelling account is also conducted.

Being supposedly the ground for an exchange system that does not depend on central, top-down regulation, cryptocurrencies increasingly need new algorithmic and policy-driven rules to maintain their trustworthiness and capacity to exhibit empirically supported growth. The present paper offers a conceptual and philosophical discussion on whether and how cryptosystems could be able to generate resilient development in a way that is coherent with a non-reductionist view of positive economics. As proposed, a plausible way to understand them can be achieved considering their complexity and their concrete, local features, which have to be grasped both in terms of formal and material specificity.

The present paper proposes three desiderata that methodologies for collaboration between philosophy and ethnobiology should satisfy. The account considers that a focus on a sentimentalist virtue epistemology is necessary to effectively address problems and challenges in such collaborations. Our focus on sentimentalism is further elaborated through three desiderata: (D1) The context of the collaboration should encourage receptivity among practitioners; (D2) collaborations should aim to produce knowledge that addresses the problems faced by stakeholders; and (D3) relevant communities and collaborators for each case should be included by attuning to the conditions of the collaboration. To support our argument, we present the methodology of Field Environmental Philosophy as a case study in which attention to these desiderata is thoroughly present, resulting in a successful collaboration. We argue that these desiderata are crucial for understanding collaborations between philosophy and ethnobiology.

As a non-representationalist form of integrating methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism, this work proposes a distinction between phenomenic and rational intuitions. Since this is not a static distinction, it offers a way of observing in which sense the apparent circularity between mental and theoretical representations is not a vicious one. The argument’s plausibility will have to be reinforced through considerations about the unstability of ontologies and about how to conceive conflicting intuitions.

One of the problems that are often indicated as a criticism of different forms of representationalism is the difficulty to find definitions that are neither semantic nor realist in a simple sense. The present work tackles this class of critiques from a contextualist point of view, assuming those semantic aspects that are necessary for a concept of representation, but showing that semantic relations of representation should neither be static, nor referential in a classical and strictly realist sense. Two distinctions are crucial for our proposal: On the one hand, we have the distinction between closed and open systems; on the other, a tripartite distinction between structural, informational and semantic representations. On this basis, we understand representations in terms of asymmetric variations between contextual models.

: The notion of growth is one of the most studied notions within economic theory and, traditionally, it is accounted for based on a positivist thesis according to which assumptions are not relevant, if economic models have acceptable predictive power. Following this view, it does not matter whether assumptions are realistic or not. Arguments against this principle may involve a defence of the realistic assumptions over highly idealized or false ones. This article aims in a different direction. Instead of demanding more realism, we can accept the spirit of the mentioned thesis, but, instead, criticize the circularity that may arise by combining different assumptions that are necessary for the explanation of economic growth in mainstream economics. Such a circularity is a key aspect of the well-known problem of providing microfoundations for macroeconomic properties. It is here suggested that the notion of emergence could be appropriate to arrive at a better understanding of growth, clarifying the issues related to circularity, but without totally rejecting the usefulness of unrealistic assumptions.

Although the interest about emergence has grown during the last years, there does not seem to be consensus on whether it is a non-trivial and interesting notion and whether the concept of reduction is relevant to its characterization. Another key issue is whether emergence should be understood as an epistemic notion or if there is a plausible ontological concept of emergence. The aim of this work is to propose an epistemic notion of contextual emergence on the basis of which one may tackle those issues. Resumen Aunque el interés en torno a la emergencia ha crecido durante los últimos años, no parece haber un consenso sobre si es una noción no trivial e interesante ni sobre si el concepto de reducción es relevante para su caracterización. Otra cuestión clave es si la emergencia debería ser entendida como una noción epistémica o si hay un concepto ontológico plausible de emergencia. El objetivo de este trabajo es proponer una noción epistémica de emergencia contextual sobre cuya base uno podría abordar estos problemas.

This work responds to a criticism of effective complexity made by James McAllister, according to which such a notion is not an appropriate measure for information content. Roughly, effective complexity is focused on the regularities of the data rather than on the whole data, as opposed to algorithmic complexity. McAllister’s argument shows that, because the set of relevant regularities for a given object is not unique, one cannot assign unique values of effective complexity to considered expressions and, therefore, that algorithmic complexity better serves as a measure of information than effective complexity. We accept that problem regarding uniqueness as McAllister presents it, but would not deny that if contexts could be defined appropriately, one could in principle find unique values of effective complexity. Considering this, effective complexity is informative not only regarding the entity being investigated but also regarding the context of investigation itself. Furthermore, we argue that effective complexity is an interesting epistemological concept that may be applied to better understand crucial issues related to context dependence such as theory choice and emergence. These applications are not available merely on the basis of algorithmic complexity.

: This is the final part of a three-part paper. In the first part, it was proposed that a notion of phenomenon type could be relevant to tackle some crucial issues about incommensurability. Then, part II had a focus on some remaining problems associated with scientific realism and the possibility of scientific progress. In this part, some ways to solve them are offered, without abandoning the classical features of incommensurability. This can be done by showing that two rival theories may refer to the same phenomenon type even if their ontologies are incompatible and assuming at the same time a non-naïve, moderate scientific realism.

: This is the second part of a three-part paper. In part I, some of the main issues regarding theoretical incommensurability and meaning invariance were considered, introducing the notion of a phenomenon type. Phenomenon types can be treated as subject matters in order to tackle the mentioned issues. Here, I show how a subject matter can be conceived as a common ground of two conflicting theories. However, crucial problems about realism and scientific progress remain. These are introduced in this part of the paper and will be tackled in part III.

Resumen: This is the first part of a three-part paper on incommensurability. Although incommensurability between theories has been object of study during many years, there does not seem to be a clear consensus regarding the notion of meaning according to which it should be characterised. Based on the notion of incommensurability proposed here, the common ground between incommensurable theories is neither determined by the sense nor by the reference of the relevant terms, but by a given phenomenon type, which fixes the subject matter of inquiry. Phenomenon types are understood as expressions that are associated with some phenomenon and describable or understandable in some language. In this proposal, two theories can refer to a same phenomenon type even if they are mutually incommensurable about the concepts used in them to grasp it. This possibility may serve as a way of fixing the subject matter of an investigation and, thus, to characterise the common ground between incommensurable paths of inquiry.: This is the first part of a three-part paper on incommensurability. Although incommensurability between theories has been object of study during many years, there does not seem to be a clear consensus regarding the notion of meaning according to which it should be characterised. Based on the notion of incommensurability proposed here, the common ground between incommensurable theories is neither determined by the sense nor by the reference of the relevant terms, but by a given phenomenon type, which fixes the subject matter of inquiry. Phenomenon types are understood as expressions that are associated with some phenomenon and describable or understandable in some language. In this proposal, two theories can refer to a same phenomenon type even if they are mutually incommensurable about the concepts used in them to grasp it. This possibility may serve as a way of fixing the subject matter of an investigation and, thus, to characterise the common ground between incommensurable paths of inquiry.

The basic goal of this work was to discuss different theories of causation, their difficulties, how they account for our intuitions about the concept of causation, how clearly they analyse that concept, and how they relate to each other. Apart from discussing the general virtues of each theory, I placed special focus on the way in which these theories confront different types of overdetermination cases. These cases are characterised by the feature that a given effect can be caused by more than one event. The fundamental idea defended in this work is that, in order to describe overdetermination cases appropriately, a theory of causation must appeal in some way to causal contextualism. Causal contextualism was understood as the thesis that the truth value of causal claims depends on the context in which they are evaluated. Although the notion of context has been used in this work in a loose way, the context on which causal claims depend has, as I have considered it, a basic feature: It is an epistemic rather than a metaphysical context.

The probabilistic account of causation is presented in this chapter. Roughly, this account states that causes increase the probability of their effects. As a notorious problem for such a simple characterisation of causation, the case of spurious causation will be explained. This permits introducing the notion of screening off, which is crucial to the discussion of overdetermination cases. In general, redundant causes screen other causes off from their effects. Again, a notion of causation with regard to some context will be illuminating with respect to overdetermination scenarios.

Following an account of signaling games, one can show how meaning emerges and is preserved on the basis of the interactions between individuals and their environments. It is here argued that, as all concepts, a concept of consciousness is formed from a set of signaling games and is assigned a sense, from which its extensional reference can be postulated. It will be helpful to understand the contrast between what we may call a representationalist account of consciousness and an enactivist account. As argued, a consciousness state can be assumed and fixed by intensional reference. Thus, although the notion of consciousness may be explanatorily excluded, in principle, from a neurobiological language, it remains relevant in a semantic way. This is a consequence of what we may call the semantic gap between the mental and the physical. Keywords: concept, sense, reference, enaction, mind, neurophenomenology.

This work explains how different theories of causation confront causal overdetermination. Chapters clarify the problem of overdetermination and explore its fundamental aspects. It is argued that a theory of causation can account for our intuitions in overdetermination cases only by accepting that the adequacy of our claims about causation depends on the context in which they are evaluated.The author proposes arguments for causal contextualism and provides insight which is valuable for resolution of the problem. These chapters enable readers to quickly absorb different perspectives on overdetermination and important theories of causation, therefore it is a work that will have a broad appeal.

One of the principal presuppositions in the extended mind account of Clark and Chalmers establishes that extended and non-extended cognitive systems have somehow the same structure and that the distinctions between them can only be superficial. In contrast, this work presents some arguments for the idea that it is possible to find fundamental differences between both, mainly on the basis that a criterion that does not include the notion of knowledge is not strong enough to define cognitive processes. A brief analysis on the non-transitivity of trust and the notion of causal dependence between information and cognitive systems might be helpful to support this position. It will be argued that the counterfactual block which supports the extended mind building does not seem to be firm.

En el presente trabajo se realiza una exposición breve del punto de vista filosófico de la teoría de la decisión, profundizando específicamente en el trabajo que propone David Lewis al respecto. Este autor sustenta que la teoría de la decisión puede sostenerse sobre bases causales o no causales, siendo la Teoría Causal de la Decisión un modelo necesario para el análisis de este tipo de problemas. En casos particulares como en la Paradoja de Newcomb, las teorías no causales de la decisión serían insuficientes. A continuación se presentarán brevemente las nociones básicas del análisis de decisiones, para en segundo lugar explicar en detalle algunos aspectos de la Paradoja deNewcomb. Finalmente se presentan las tesis principales de la teoría de Lewis y algunas posibles objeciones de la misma. In this work a brief account of the philosophical point of view on decision theory is shown by studying David Lewis’s work in particular. This author states that a theory of decision can have either causal or non causal grounds and that causal decision theory is a necessary model for the analysis of this kind ofproblems. In particular cases like Newcomb’s Paradox, non causal decision theories would be insufficient. I will show some basic notions of decision analysis, in order to explain in detail some aspects of Newcomb’s Paradox. Finally, the fundamental theses of Lewis’s Theory and some possible objections are presented.

Causal decision theory defines a rational action as the one that tends to cause the best outcomes. If we adopt counterfactual or probabilistic theories of causation, then we may face problems in overdetermination cases. Do such problems affect Causal decision theory? The aim of this work is to show that the concept of causation that has been fundamental in all versions of causal decision theory is not the most intuitive one. Since overdetermination poses problems for a counterfactual theory of causation, one can think that a version of causal decision theory based on counterfactual dependence may also be vulnerable to such scenarios. However, only when an intuitive, not analyzed notion of causation is presupposed as a ground for a more plausible version of causal decision theory, overdetermination turns problematic. The first interesting consequence of this is that there are more reasons to dismiss traditional theories of causation (and to accept others). The second is to confirm that traditional causal decision theory is not based on our intuitive concept of the causal relation.