Esteban Céspedes

As a non-representationalist form of integrating methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism, this work proposes a distinction between phenomenic and rational intuitions. Since this is not a static distinction, it offers a way of observing in which sense the apparent circularity between mental and theoretical representations is not a vicious one. The argument’s plausibility will have to be reinforced through considerations about the unstability of ontologies and about how to conceive conflicting intuitions.

One of the problems that are often indicated as a criticism of different forms of representationalism is the difficulty to find definitions that are neither semantic nor realist in a simple sense. The present work tackles this class of critiques from a contextualist point of view, assuming those semantic aspects that are necessary for a concept of representation, but showing that semantic relations of representation should neither be static, nor referential in a classical and strictly realist sense. Two distinctions are crucial for our proposal: On the one hand, we have the distinction between closed and open systems; on the other, a tripartite distinction between structural, informational and semantic representations. On this basis, we understand representations in terms of asymmetric variations between contextual models

: The notion of growth is one of the most studied notions within economic theory and, traditionally, it is accounted for based on a positivist thesis according to which assumptions are not relevant, if economic models have acceptable predictive power. Following this view, it does not matter whether assumptions are realistic or not. Arguments against this principle may involve a defence of the realistic assumptions over highly idealized or false ones. This article aims in a different direction. Instead of demanding more realism, we can accept the spirit of the mentioned thesis, but, instead, criticize the circularity that may arise by combining different assumptions that are necessary for the explanation of economic growth in mainstream economics. Such a circularity is a key aspect of the well-known problem of providing microfoundations for macroeconomic properties. It is here suggested that the notion of emergence could be appropriate to arrive at a better understanding of growth, clarifying the issues related to circularity, but without totally rejecting the usefulness of unrealistic assumptions.

Although the interest about emergence has grown during the last years, there does not seem to be consensus on whether it is a non-trivial and interesting notion and whether the concept of reduction is relevant to its characterization. Another key issue is whether emergence should be understood as an epistemic notion or if there is a plausible ontological concept of emergence. The aim of this work is to propose an epistemic notion of contextual emergence on the basis of which one may tackle those issues. Resumen Aunque el interés en torno a la emergencia ha crecido durante los últimos años, no parece haber un consenso sobre si es una noción no trivial e interesante ni sobre si el concepto de reducción es relevante para su caracterización. Otra cuestión clave es si la emergencia debería ser entendida como una noción epistémica o si hay un concepto ontológico plausible de emergencia. El objetivo de este trabajo es proponer una noción epistémica de emergencia contextual sobre cuya base uno podría abordar estos problemas.

This work responds to a criticism of effective complexity made by James McAllister, according to which such a notion is not an appropriate measure for information content. Roughly, effective complexity is focused on the regularities of the data rather than on the whole data, as opposed to algorithmic complexity. McAllister’s argument shows that, because the set of relevant regularities for a given object is not unique, one cannot assign unique values of effective complexity to considered expressions and, therefore, that algorithmic complexity better serves as a measure of information than effective complexity. We accept that problem regarding uniqueness as McAllister presents it, but would not deny that if contexts could be defined appropriately, one could in principle find unique values of effective complexity. Considering this, effective complexity is informative not only regarding the entity being investigated but also regarding the context of investigation itself. Furthermore, we argue that effective complexity is an interesting epistemological concept that may be applied to better understand crucial issues related to context dependence such as theory choice and emergence. These applications are not available merely on the basis of algorithmic complexity.

: This is the final part of a three-part paper. In the first part, it was proposed that a notion of phenomenon type could be relevant to tackle some crucial issues about incommensurability. Then, part II had a focus on some remaining problems associated with scientific realism and the possibility of scientific progress. In this part, some ways to solve them are offered, without abandoning the classical features of incommensurability. This can be done by showing that two rival theories may refer to the same phenomenon type even if their ontologies are incompatible and assuming at the same time a non-naïve, moderate scientific realism.

: This is the second part of a three-part paper. In part I, some of the main issues regarding theoretical incommensurability and meaning invariance were considered, introducing the notion of a phenomenon type. Phenomenon types can be treated as subject matters in order to tackle the mentioned issues. Here, I show how a subject matter can be conceived as a common ground of two conflicting theories. However, crucial problems about realism and scientific progress remain. These are introduced in this part of the paper and will be tackled in part III.

Resumen: This is the first part of a three-part paper on incommensurability. Although incommensurability between theories has been object of study during many years, there does not seem to be a clear consensus regarding the notion of meaning according to which it should be characterised. Based on the notion of incommensurability proposed here, the common ground between incommensurable theories is neither determined by the sense nor by the reference of the relevant terms, but by a given phenomenon type, which fixes the subject matter of inquiry. Phenomenon types are understood as expressions that are associated with some phenomenon and describable or understandable in some language. In this proposal, two theories can refer to a same phenomenon type even if they are mutually incommensurable about the concepts used in them to grasp it. This possibility may serve as a way of fixing the subject matter of an investigation and, thus, to characterise the common ground between incommensurable paths of inquiry.: This is the first part of a three-part paper on incommensurability. Although incommensurability between theories has been object of study during many years, there does not seem to be a clear consensus regarding the notion of meaning according to which it should be characterised. Based on the notion of incommensurability proposed here, the common ground between incommensurable theories is neither determined by the sense nor by the reference of the relevant terms, but by a given phenomenon type, which fixes the subject matter of inquiry. Phenomenon types are understood as expressions that are associated with some phenomenon and describable or understandable in some language. In this proposal, two theories can refer to a same phenomenon type even if they are mutually incommensurable about the concepts used in them to grasp it. This possibility may serve as a way of fixing the subject matter of an investigation and, thus, to characterise the common ground between incommensurable paths of inquiry.

This work explains how different theories of causation confront causal overdetermination. Chapters clarify the problem of overdetermination and explore its fundamental aspects. It is argued that a theory of causation can account for our intuitions in overdetermination cases only by accepting that the adequacy of our claims about causation depends on the context in which they are evaluated.The author proposes arguments for causal contextualism and provides insight which is valuable for resolution of the problem. These chapters enable readers to quickly absorb different perspectives on overdetermination and important theories of causation, therefore it is a work that will have a broad appeal.

One of the principal presuppositions in the extended mind account of Clark and Chalmers establishes that extended and non-extended cognitive systems have somehow the same structure and that the distinctions between them can only be superficial. In contrast, this work presents some arguments for the idea that it is possible to find fundamental differences between both, mainly on the basis that a criterion that does not include the notion of knowledge is not strong enough to define cognitive processes. A brief analysis on the non-transitivity of trust and the notion of causal dependence between information and cognitive systems might be helpful to support this position. It will be argued that the counterfactual block which supports the extended mind building does not seem to be firm.

En el presente trabajo se realiza una exposición breve del punto de vista filosófico de la teoría de la decisión, profundizando específicamente en el trabajo que propone David Lewis al respecto. Este autor sustenta que la teoría de la decisión puede sostenerse sobre bases causales o no causales, siendo la Teoría Causal de la Decisión un modelo necesario para el análisis de este tipo de problemas. En casos particulares como en la Paradoja de Newcomb, las teorías no causales de la decisión serían insuficientes. A continuación se presentarán brevemente las nociones básicas del análisis de decisiones, para en segundo lugar explicar en detalle algunos aspectos de la Paradoja deNewcomb. Finalmente se presentan las tesis principales de la teoría de Lewis y algunas posibles objeciones de la misma. In this work a brief account of the philosophical point of view on decision theory is shown by studying David Lewis’s work in particular. This author states that a theory of decision can have either causal or non causal grounds and that causal decision theory is a necessary model for the analysis of this kind ofproblems. In particular cases like Newcomb’s Paradox, non causal decision theories would be insufficient. I will show some basic notions of decision analysis, in order to explain in detail some aspects of Newcomb’s Paradox. Finally, the fundamental theses of Lewis’s Theory and some possible objections are presented.

Causal decision theory defines a rational action as the one that tends to cause the best outcomes. If we adopt counterfactual or probabilistic theories of causation, then we may face problems in overdetermination cases. Do such problems affect Causal decision theory? The aim of this work is to show that the concept of causation that has been fundamental in all versions of causal decision theory is not the most intuitive one. Since overdetermination poses problems for a counterfactual theory of causation, one can think that a version of causal decision theory based on counterfactual dependence may also be vulnerable to such scenarios. However, only when an intuitive, not analyzed notion of causation is presupposed as a ground for a more plausible version of causal decision theory, overdetermination turns problematic. The first interesting consequence of this is that there are more reasons to dismiss traditional theories of causation (and to accept others). The second is to confirm that traditional causal decision theory is not based on our intuitive concept of the causal relation.

The events of nature are, at first glance, related to each other in a necessary way, as if they were subject to certain rules, a fact that is closely linked with the ontology of natural laws. However, there are several conflicting theories about their existence, such as the Humean view as well as realism. Mumford proposes a third way: to accept natural regularity, but deny that this is due to the real existence of natural laws. Finally, some ideas about a possible combination between nomological realism and Lewis’s counterpart theory will be considered in order to improve the first. I will defend realism about regularities as well as about laws and show that such a point of view is not only compatible with counterparts, but that it could be supported by them

Part of Varela’s work focused on the study of visual perception, particularly on the grounds of an enactivist theory of vision. Problem: Varela held that the problem of misrepresentation and the comparability of visual experience were crucial. We live with other creatures in sensory worlds that are not tractable, so could we share color-similar experiences? We are still missing an integrative enactive framework to tackle the problems of misrepresentation and comparability related to animal color experience. Method: We carried out a literature survey to draw attention to the status of the enactivist theory of vision and to explore how the problems of misrepresentation and comparability may be tackled. Results: As shown, philosophy and computational science have recently incorporated concepts from neurobiology that close gaps between disciplines and support aspects of the enactivist approach of vision. Implications: Epistemological problems related to perception are here tackled, considering some controversial assumptions related to vision. We argue that an enactivist theory of visual perception may not only clarify the problematic consequences of those assumptions, but also fruitfully guide future philosophical and empirical research on this topic. Constructivist content: The presence of singular “visual channels”, as well as physical, sensorimotor and evolutionary factors, constrains our own perceptual experience as proposed by enactivism.