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4DenkenIn Johann S. Ach & Dagmar Borchers (eds.), Handbuch Tierethik: Grundlagen – Kontexte – Perspektiven, J.b. Metzler. pp. 52-56. 2018.Seit Descartes gilt Denken nicht nur als das Vermögen, welches Menschen vor Tieren auszeichnet, sondern auch, als das Merkmal, welches den Bereich des Psychischen bzw. Mentalen von dem des bloß Materiellen unterscheidet. Die Cartesianische Auffassung des Denkens ist allerdings sehr umfassend, da sie außer intellektuellen Fähigkeiten auch Empfindung, Wahrnehmung, Einbildungskraft und Wünsche einschließt. Der etablierte Begriff – sowohl in der Umgangssprache als auch in den Wissenschaften – ist je…Read more
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44What Is Meaning? A Wittgensteinian Answer to an Un-Wittgensteinian QuestionIn James Conant & Sebastian Sunday (eds.), Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning, Cambridge University Press. pp. 185-210. 2019.Wittgenstein has often been ascribed a ‘use-theory of meaning’. However, he explicitly renounced theory construction. Furthermore, his slogan ‘Don’t ask for the meaning, ask for the use!’ invites circumventing the question ‘What is meaning?’ altogether. This chapter argues that, Wittgenstein’s ambivalence notwithstanding, there is no merit in avoiding the title question (‘What is meaning?’). Moreover, it is argued that, while Wittgenstein’s reflections are incompatible with a formal theory of me…Read more
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40Objectivism and Causalism About Reasons for ActionIn Gunnar Schumann (ed.), Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography: Causal and Teleological Approaches, Routledge. pp. 124-145. 2019.This chapter explores whether a version of causalism about reasons for action can be saved by giving up Davidsonian psychologism and endorsing objectivism, so that the reasons for which we act are the normative reasons that cause our corresponding actions. We address two problems for ‘objecto-causalism’, actions for merely apparent normative reasons and actions performed in response to future normative reasons—in neither of these cases can the reason for which the agent acts cause her action. To…Read more
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138Agency, Intelligence and Reasons in AnimalsPhilosophy 94 (4): 645-671. 2019.What kind of activity are non-human animals capable of? A venerable tradition insists that lack of language confines them to ‘mere behaviour’. This article engages with this ‘lingualism’ by developing a positive, bottom-up case for the possibility of animal agency. Higher animals cannot just act, they can act intelligently, rationally, intentionally and for reasons. In developing this case I draw on the interplay of behaviour, cognition and conation, the unduly neglected notion of intelligence a…Read more
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101Philosophy Rehinged?International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3): 274-308. 2016.This paper is devoted to the role hinge propositions play or should play in epistemology and meta-philosophy. It starts by distinguishing different ways in which propositions can be basic or fundamental and by arguing that the foundational status of hinge propositions cannot be reduced to any of the others. The second part maintains that hinges have anti-sceptical potential, provided that one combines Wittgenstein’s critique of sense with Moore’s method of differential certainty. The final part …Read more
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11Thought, Language, and AnimalsGrazer Philosophische Studien 71 (1): 139-160. 2006.This paper discusses Wittgenstein's ideas about the relation between thought, neurophysiology and language, and about the mental capacities of non-linguistic animals. It deals with his initial espousal and later rejection of a 'language of thought', his arguments against the idea that thought requires a medium of images or words, his reasons for resisting the encephalocentric conception of the mind which dominates contemporary philosophy of mind, his mature views about the connection between tho…Read more
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24A Companion to Wittgenstein (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2017.The most comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein’s thought yet compiled, this volume of fifty newly commissioned essays by leading interpreters of his philosophy is a keynote addition to the Blackwell series on the world’s great philosophers, covering everything from Wittgenstein’s intellectual development to the latest interpretations of his hugely influential ideas. The lucid, engaging commentary also reviews Wittgenstein’s historical legacy and his continued impact on contemporary philosophical …Read more
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30IntroductionIn Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 1-4. 2017.
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143The Awful English LanguagePhilosophical Papers 47 (1): 123-154. 2018.The ever-increasing dominance of English within analytic philosophy is an aspect of linguistic globalisation. To assess it, I first address fundamental issues in the philosophy of language. Steering a middle course between linguistic universalism and linguistic relativism, I deny that some languages might be philosophically superior to others, notably by capturing the essential categories of reality. On this background I next consider both the pros and cons of the Anglicisation of philosophy. I …Read more
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205Can Animals Judge?Dialectica 64 (1): 11-33. 2010.This article discusses the problems which concepts pose for the attribution of thoughts to animals. It locates these problems within a range of other issues concerning animal minds (section 1), and presents a ‘lingualist master argument’ according to which one cannot entertain a thought without possessing its constituent concepts and cannot possess concepts without possessing language (section 2). The first premise is compelling if one accepts the building-block model of concepts as parts of who…Read more
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33Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes WrongPhilosophy 84 (1): 5-29. 2009.The debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism, which treats them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism, which insists that they exist independently of individual minds. The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor's RTM. The Fregean charge against subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different individuals cansharethe same concepts. Proponents of RTM have accepted shareability as a ‘non-nego…Read more
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38Vorprung durch Logik: The German Analytic TraditionRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44 137-166. 1999.Although at present analytic philosophy is practiced mainly in the English-speaking world, it is to a considerable part the invention of German speakers. Its emergence owes much to Russell, Moore, and American Pragmatism, but even more to Frege, Wittgenstein, and the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. No one would think of analytic philosophy as a specifically Anglophone phenomenon, if the Nazis had not driven many of its pioneers out of central Europe.
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36Animals, Thoughts And ConceptsSynthese 123 (1): 35-64. 2000.There are three main positions on animalthought: lingualism denies that non-linguistic animalshave any thoughts; mentalism maintains that theirthoughts differ from ours only in degree, due totheir different perceptual inputs; an intermediateposition, occupied by common sense and Wittgenstein,maintains that animals can have thoughts of a simplekind. This paper argues in favor of an intermediateposition. It considers the most important arguments infavor of lingualism, namely those inspired byDavid…Read more
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30The object of philosophy: Tugendhat’s semantical transformation of ontologyCogito 8 (3): 234-241. 1994.
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16Externalism and First-Person AuthorityThe Monist 78 (4): 515-533. 1995.If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of.
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64Wittgenstein on truthIn W. Loffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief: Wissen Und Glauben, . pp. 13-31. 2004.
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11Wittgenstein and reasonIn Glock, Hans Johann (2001). Wittgenstein and reason. In: Klagge, J. Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220, . pp. 195-220. 2001.
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60All kinds of nonsenseIn E. Ammereller & E. Fischer (eds.), Glock, Hans Johann (2004). All kinds of nonsense. In: Amareller, E; Fischer, E. Wittgenstein at work: Method in the Philosophical Investigations. London: Routledge, 221-245, . pp. 221-245. 2004.