Hans-Johann Glock

  There are three main positions on animalthought: lingualism denies that non-linguistic animalshave any thoughts; mentalism maintains that theirthoughts differ from ours only in degree, due totheir different perceptual inputs; an intermediateposition, occupied by common sense and Wittgenstein,maintains that animals can have thoughts of a simplekind. This paper argues in favor of an intermediateposition. It considers the most important arguments infavor of lingualism, namely those inspired byDavidson: the argument from the intensional nature ofthought (Section 1); the idea that thoughts involveconcepts (Sections 2–3); the argument from the holisticnature of thought (Section 4); and the claim that beliefrequires the concept of belief (Sections 5–6). The lastargument (which Davidson favors) is uncompelling, butthe first three shed valuable light on the extent towhich thought requires language. However, none of themprecludes animals from having simple thoughts. Even ifone adopts the kind of third-person perspective onthought Davidson shares with Wittgenstein, the resultis a version of the intermediate position, albeit oneenriched by Davidson''s insights concerningintensionality, concepts and holism (Section 7). We canonly ascribe simple thoughts to animals, and even thatascription is incongruous in that the rich idiom weemploy has conceptual connections that go beyond thephenomena to which it is applied

At present, there is an almost universal consensus that the linguistic doctrine of logical necessity is grotesque. This paper explores avenues for rehabilitating a limited version of the doctrine, according to which the special status of analytic statements like 'All vixens are female' is to be explained by reference to language. Far from being grotesque, this appeal to language has a respectable philosophical pedigree and chimes with common sense, as Quine came to realize. The problem lies in developing it in a way that avoids the powerful objections facing previous versions of the linguistic doctrine. I argue tentatively that this can be done by reconciling Wittgenstein's claim that such statements have a normative role with Carnap's concession that they are true.

This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement.

In der zeitgenössischen analytischen Philosophe wird oft behauptet, die Erkenntnistheorie sei weniger fundamental als die Ontologie, da sich aus Aussagen über unser Erkenntnisvermögen keine Aussagen über die Wirklichkeit ableiten lassen und die Frage nach der Beschaffenheit der Wirklichkeit der Frage nach ihrer Erkennbarkeit vorausgeht. Dagegen verteidige ich folgende Thesen: eine Form der Erkenntnistheorie—die Auseinandersetzung mit der Skepsis —ist nicht fundamental; eine andere Form—die Auseinandersetzung mit methodologischen Fragen--ist in bestimmter Hinsicht fundamentaler als die Ontologie; man kann sehr wohl ontologische Folgerungen aus überwiegend erkenntnistheoretischen Überlegungen ziehen; was ein Ding ist, läßt sich oft am besten dadurch klären, daß man sich darauf besinnt, daß wir es erkennen und wie wir es erkennen. Dabei stütze ich mich auf das Mooresche Prinzip der vernünftigen Abwägung: auch ohne eine Widerlegung des Skeptikers ist es vernünftig anzunehmen, daß wir Wissen über bestimmte Gegenstandsbereiche besitzen, und aus dieser Annahme lassen sich Schlußfolgerungen über die Beschaffenheit dieser Gegenstandsbereiche ziehen

This article investigates whether the concept of a concept can be given a fairly uniform explanation through a 'cognitivist' account, one that accepts that concepts exist independently of individual subjects, yet nonetheless invokes mental achievements and capacities. I consider various variants of such an account, which identify a concept, respectively, with a certain kind of abilitiy, rule and way of thinking. All of them are confronted with what I call the 'proposition problem', namely that unlike these explananda concepts are standardly regarded as components of propositions. The paper ends by suggesting that this problem can be resolved by recognizing the different ways in which concepts can be involved in judgements or propositions, and by undermining the building-block model of concepts as abstract parts of abstract wholes

There is a venerable tradition according to which the concept of truth is totally independent of human beings, their actions and beliefs, because truth consists in the correspondence of mind-independentpropositions to a mind-independent reality. For want of arespect. One way of doing so is relativism, the idea that whether a belief is true or false depends on the point of view of individuals or communities. A closely related position is a consensus theory of truth, according to which a belief is true if it is held by a group of people. In a similar vein, the pragmatist theory maintains that a true belief is one which it is expedient for us to accept

In recent years, even some of its own practitioners have accused analytic philosophy of lacking historical awareness. My aim is to show that analytic philosophy and history are not such a mismatch after all. Against the objection that analytic philosophers have unduly ignored the past I argue that for the most part they only resist strong versions of historicism, and for good reasons. The history of philosophy is not the whole of philosophy, as extreme historicists maintain, nor is it indispensable to substantive philosophizing, as mainline historicists have it, it is merely advantageous (pragmatic historicism). Against the objection that analytic histories of philosophy are inevitably anachronistic I argue that it is possible to approach past texts with a view to substantive issues and in a critical spirit (contrary to historicist relativism and to misguided interpretations of the principle of charity). Indeed, such an analytic approach makes not just for better philosophy but also for better history

This paper discusses conceptual relativism. The main focus is on the contrasting ideas of Wittgenstein and Davidson, with Quine, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Hacker in supporting roles. I distinguish conceptual from alethic and ontological relativism, defend a distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content, and reject the Davidsonian argument against the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes: there can be conceptual diversity without failure of translation, and failure of translation is not necessarily incompatible with recognizing a practice as linguistic. Conceptual relativism may be untenable, but not for the hermeneutic reasons espoused by Davidson.

My topic is the relation between nonsense and intelligibility, and the contrast between nonsense and falsehood which played a pivotal role in the rise of analytic philosophy . I shall pursue three lines of inquiry. First I shall briefly consider the positive case, namely linguistic understanding . Secondly, I shall consider the negative case—different breakdowns of understanding and connected forms of failure to make sense . Third, I shall criticize three important misconceptions of nonsense and unintelligibility: the austere conception of nonsense propounded by the New Wittgensteinians ; the “no nonsense position” which roundly denies that there are cases of nonsense—Chomsky’s semantic anomalies or Ryle’s category mistakes–that are grammatically well-formed, without even having the potential for being used to make a truth-apt statement ; the individualistic conception of language and of semantic mistakes championed by Davidson . All three positions, I shall argue, ignore or deny combinatorial nonsense, the fact that perfectly meaningful sentence-components can be combined in a way that may be grammatical, yet without resulting in a sentence that is itself “meaningful”, i.e. endowed with linguistic sense. At a more strategic level, the first and the third position deny or ignore that natural languages are communal historical practices that go beyond idiolects and the employments of expressions in specific contexts and that are guided by semantic rules—standards for the meaningful use of words

Analytic philosophy is roughly a hundred years old, and it is now the dominant force within Western philosophy. Interest in its historical development is increasing, but there has hitherto been no sustained attempt to elucidate what it currently amounts to, and how it differs from so-called 'continental' philosophy. In this rich and wide-ranging book, Hans Johann Glock argues that analytic philosophy is a loose movement held together both by ties of influence and by various 'family resemblances'. He considers the pros and cons of various definitions of analytic philosophy, and tackles the methodological, historiographical and philosophical issues raised by such definitions. Finally, he explores the wider intellectual and cultural implications of the notorious divide between analytic and continental philosophy. His book is an invaluable guide for anyone seeking to understand analytic philosophy and how it is practised.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;Even among Wittgenstein's admirers, his conception of philosophy as a therapy for conceptual confusion is generally considered to be the weakest part of his later work. It seems to consist of slogans, which are unsupported by argument and belied by his own 'theory construction'. It may even be self-refuting--a philosophical theory that denies the possibility of philosophical theory. ;Unless these objections can be met, current attempts to apply Wittgenstein's philosophical methods remain problematic. I have therefore sought to provide a systematic account and defense of Wittgenstein's position. I have identified the common ground between Wittgenstein and the philosophical tradition, distinguished five basic features of his position and shown how they are linked. ;I go on to argue that his conception of philosophy is consistent and appears untenable only because of a failure to appreciate its connection with other aspects of his work, notably his understanding of logical necessity and of language. I have not examined Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy in isolation, for only by pitting it against its major rivals can its cogency be properly assessed. Throughout, I have examined the links between methodological issues and problems in philosophical logic, epistemology and metaphysics. ;The principle threat to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is Quine's assimilation of philosophy and science. His rejection of the distinctions between the a priori and the empirical and between analytic and synthetic propositions represent a profoundly important challenge to Wittgenstein's normative conception of language. However, I argue the challenge can be met by reducing Quine's behaviorist model of language to absurdity

v. Savigny's commentary is a remarkable achievement and essential reading for all scholars of the Investigations. It brings to the exegetical enterprise something new and important — the challenge of an immanent approach and the tool of German philology. However, some of the potential gains may be lost by his leitmotiv of a tight master-scheme. In my view this ‘central theses’ scheme presses Wittgenstein's multifaceted masterpiece into an unsuitable Procrustean bed and tends to impoverish v. Savigny's account. Nevertheless there remains the palatable pattern-recipe (for me partly spoiled by an overdose of community-views). Most importantly, v. Savigny approaches most of the material in an innovative and illuminating way. He provides good reasons for questioning, although not necessarily overturning, many key claims of recent scholarship

This paper considers the question of whether there is a human-animal or ‘anthropological difference'. It starts with a historical introduction to the project of philosophical anthropology. Section 2 explains the philosophical quest for an anthropological difference. Sections 3-4 are methodological and explain how philosophical anthropology should be pursued in my view, namely as impure conceptual analysis. The following two sections discuss two fundamental objections to the very idea of such a difference, biological continuity and Darwinist anti-essentialism. Section 7 discusses various possible responses to this second objection - potentiality, normality and typicality. It ends by abandoning the idea of an essence possessed by all and only individual human beings. Instead, anthropological differences are to be sought in the realm of capacities underlying specifically human societies. The final section argues that if there is such a thing as the anthropological difference, it is connected to language. But it favours a more modest line according to which there are several anthropological differences which jointly underlie the gap separating us from our animal cousins.

This lucid and accessible dictionary presents technical terms that Wittgenstein introduced into philosophical debate or transformed substantially, and also topics to which he made a substantial contribution. Hans-Johann Glock places Wittgenstein's ideas in their relevance to current debates. The entries delineate Wittgenstein's lines of argument on particular issues, assessing their strengths and weaknesses, and shed light on fundamental exegetical controversies. The dictionary entries are prefaced by a 'Sketch of a Intellectual Biography', which links the basic themes of the early and later philosophy and describes the general development of Wittgenstein's thinking. Extensive textual references, a detailed index and an annotated bibliography will facilitate further study. Authoritative, comprehensive and clear, the volume will be welcomed by anyone with an interest in Wittgenstein - his life, work or influence. Each Blackwell Philosopher Dictionary presents the life and work of an individual philosopher in a scholarly but accessible manner. Entries cover key ideas and thoughts, as well as the main themes of the philosopher's works. A comprehensive biographical sketch is also included