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75Another View of G. H. von WrightPhilosophical Investigations 29 (3): 275-286. 2006.This Note is a response to Thomas Wallgren’s “Georg Henrik von Wright: a Memorial Notice” (Philosophical Investigations, January, 2005). I contend that Wallgren gave an account of von Wright’s work that is sometimes erroneous and generally off‐key. I offer a more accurate account and defend it against those who view his work with suspicion: analytical philosophers, Wittgensteinians and intellectuals who hoped for a more engaged participation in public life. Wallgren also wrote that von Wright pr…Read more
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115VII*—On Not Being a RealistProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 95-112. 1989.Frederick Stoutland; VII*—On Not Being a Realist, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 95–112, https://doi.org/10.109.
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1Reaktives Handeln und das Überzeugung/Wunsch-ModellE-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 4. 2006.
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28Summary of Anscombe's IntentionIn Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 23-32. 2011.
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94Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelGrazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1): 83-106. 2001.Whereas the belief-desire model maintains that reasons for action either are or depend on reasons which consist in the agent's own beliefs and desires, I contend that reasons for action, whether taken normatively (as reasons to do something) or explanatorily, (as reasons for which agents act) are states of affairs. I defend this view by reference to non-deliberative responses to states of affairs agents encounter directly – stopping for a stop sign or answering a knock at the door, for instance–…Read more
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92Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and AgencyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 238-240. 2002.Michael Bratman’s new book is a very good piece of work. Clearly written, philosophically sophisticated, and admirably fair to contrary points of view, it is worthy of both attentive study and careful critique. Its first sentence, “We are planning agents”, states its theme, which is developed in thirteen previously published papers plus an introduction. The first paper examines the difference between believing a claim and merely accepting it for some reason, while the next two discuss the stabil…Read more
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166Critical NoticeInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (4): 579-596. 2006.This Article does not have an abstract
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125Radical misinterpretation indeed: Response to Lepore and LudwigInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (4). 2007.This Article does not have an abstract
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91Causality, Interpretation and the MindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 711-714. 1998.
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182The Ontology of Social AgencyAnalyse & Kritik 30 (2): 533-551. 2008.The main claim of the paper is that there are irreducibly social agents that intentionally perform social actions. It argues, first, that there are social attitudes ascribable to social agents and not to the individuals involved. Second, that social agents, not only individual agents, are capable of what Weber called “subjectively understandable action.” And, third, that although action (if not merely mental) presumes an agent’s moving her body in various ways, actions do not consist of such mov…Read more
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29Introduction : Anscombe's Intention in contextIn Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 1-22. 2011.
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41Zur Verteidigung einer Nichtpsychologishchen Theorie der HandlunsgrundeE-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 1. 2005.Zur Verteidigung einer Nichtpsychologishchen Theorie der Handlunsgrunde
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49Review of Duncan Richter, Wittgenstein at His Word (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8). 2005.
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97On Not Being a RealistProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89. 1989.Frederick Stoutland; VII*—On Not Being a Realist, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 95–112, https://doi.org/10.109.