-
7Von WrightIn Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Von Wright on Causality Actions, Events, and Intentionality; Results and Consequences Practical Inference and the Logical Connection Argument Two Kinds of Explanation and Their Compatibility and Congruence The Determinants of Action References Further reading.
-
3G. H. von Wright (1916–)In A. P. Martinich & David Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.This chapter contains sections titled: Induction and probability Philosophical logic Ethics, norms, and values Philosophy of action Philosophy of mind Wittgenstein Humanism.
-
18Causality, Interpretation, and the MindPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 711-715. 1994.
-
13What Philosophers Should Know About TruthDe Gruyter. 2019.Fred Stoutland was a major figure in the philosophy of action and philosophy of language. This collection brings together essays on truth, language, action and mind and thus provides an important summary of many key themes in Stoutland’s own work, as well as offering valuable perspectives on key issues in contemporary philosophy.
-
252The Logical Connection ArgumentAmerican Philosophical Quarterly. 1970.This is a critical discussion of the argument that since intentions are "logically connected" with their objects, Intentional actions cannot include intentions as their causes. Various versions of the argument are discussed, And it is argued that none of them shows the causal theory of intention to be inconsistent. It is argued that the causal theory is nevertheless wrong since intentions must be understood teleologically and as being, Therefore, Non-Contingently linked with actions
-
247Ontological simplicity and the identity hypothesisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June): 491-509. 1971.
-
54Searle's consciousness: A review of John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind (review)Philosophical Books 35 (4): 245-254. 1994.
-
2On not being a behaviouristIn G. H. von Wright, Lars Hertzberg & Juhani Pietarinen (eds.), Perspectives on Human Conduct, E.j. Brill. pp. 48--60. 1988.
-
37Another View of G. H. von WrightPhilosophical Investigations 29 (3): 275-286. 2006.This Note is a response to Thomas Wallgren’s “Georg Henrik von Wright: a Memorial Notice” (Philosophical Investigations, January, 2005). I contend that Wallgren gave an account of von Wright’s work that is sometimes erroneous and generally off‐key. I offer a more accurate account and defend it against those who view his work with suspicion: analytical philosophers, Wittgensteinians and intellectuals who hoped for a more engaged participation in public life. Wallgren also wrote that von Wright pr…Read more
-
20VII*—On Not Being a RealistProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 95-112. 1989.Frederick Stoutland; VII*—On Not Being a Realist, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 95–112, https://doi.org/10.109.
-
13Summary of Anscombe's IntentionIn Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. 2011.
-
38Responsive action and the belief-desire modelGrazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1): 83-106. 2001.Whereas the belief-desire model maintains that reasons for action either are or depend on reasons which consist in the agent's own beliefs and desires, I contend that reasons for action, whether taken normatively or explanatorily, are states of affairs. I defend this view by reference to non-deliberative responses to states of affairs agents encounter directly – stopping for a stop sign or answering a knock at the door, for instance–actions which I take to be common, to presuppose no specific at…Read more
-
64Faces of Intention (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 238-241. 2002.Michael Bratman’s new book is a very good piece of work. Clearly written, philosophically sophisticated, and admirably fair to contrary points of view, it is worthy of both attentive study and careful critique. Its first sentence, “We are planning agents”, states its theme, which is developed in thirteen previously published papers plus an introduction. The first paper examines the difference between believing a claim and merely accepting it for some reason, while the next two discuss the stabil…Read more
-
54Critical NoticeInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (4): 579-596. 2006.This Article does not have an abstract
-
59Radical misinterpretation indeed: Response to Lepore and LudwigInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (4). 2007.This Article does not have an abstract
-
42Causality, Interpretation and the Mind (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 711-715. 1998.
-
112The Ontology of Social AgencyAnalyse & Kritik 30 (2): 533-551. 2008.The main claim of the paper is that there are irreducibly social agents that intentionally perform social actions. It argues, first, that there are social attitudes ascribable to social agents and not to the individuals involved. Second, that social agents, not only individual agents, are capable of what Weber called “subjectively understandable action.” And, third, that although action (if not merely mental) presumes an agent’s moving her body in various ways, actions do not consist of such mov…Read more
-
4Introduction : Anscombe's Intention in contextIn Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. 2011.
-
17Zur Verteidigung einer Nichtpsychologishchen Theorie der HandlunsgrundeE-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 1. 2005.Zur Verteidigung einer Nichtpsychologishchen Theorie der Handlunsgrunde
-
14Review of Duncan Richter, Wittgenstein at His Word (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8). 2005.