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Frederick Stoutland

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  •  Publications
    50
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    31

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  • All publications (50)
  •  71
    Reasons and Decisions (review)
    with Margaret Gilbert, Jan Narveson, John Horton, and Diane Jeske
    Jurisprudence 4 (2): 273-321. 2013.
  •  16
    Summary of Anscombe’s Intention
    In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 23-32. 2011.
  •  6
    Introduction: Anscombe’s Intention in Context
    In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 1-22. 2011.
  •  11
    Essays on Anscombe's "Intention" (edited book)
    with Anton Ford and Jennifer Hornsby
    Harvard University Press. 2011.
  •  3
    Wittgenstein: On Certainty and Truth
    Philosophical Investigations 21 (3): 203-221. 2002.
  •  39
    Searle's consciousness
    Philosophical Books 35 (4): 245-254. 2010.
  •  7
    Index
    with Anton Ford and Jennifer Hornsby
    In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 309-313. 2011.
  •  17
    Index to Anscombe’s Intention
    with Anton Ford and Jennifer Hornsby
    In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 299-308. 2011.
  •  7
    Contents
    with Anton Ford and Jennifer Hornsby
    In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. 2011.
  •  4
    Preface
    with Anton Ford and Jennifer Hornsby
    In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. 2011.
  •  2
    Contributors
    with Anton Ford and Jennifer Hornsby
    In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 297-298. 2011.
  •  19
    Reasons for Action and Psychological States
    In Anton Leist (ed.), Action in Context, De Gruyter. pp. 75-94. 2007.
  •  13
    Intentionalists and Davidson on Rational Explanation
    In Georg Meggle (ed.), Actions, Norms, Values: Discussions with Georg Henrik von Wright, De Gruyter. pp. 191-208. 1999.
  •  49
    Von Wright
    In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-blackwell. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Von Wright on Causality Actions, Events, and Intentionality; Results and Consequences Practical Inference and the Logical Connection Argument Two Kinds of Explanation and Their Compatibility and Congruence The Determinants of Action References Further reading.
  •  30
    G. H. von Wright (1916–)
    In A. P. Martinich & E. David Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. 2001.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Induction and probability Philosophical logic Ethics, norms, and values Philosophy of action Philosophy of mind Wittgenstein Humanism.
  •  68
    Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 711-715. 1994.
  •  59
    Action, Intention, and Reason
    Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185): 537-541. 1996.
  •  78
    What Philosophers Should Know About Truth
    De Gruyter. 2019.
    Fred Stoutland was a major figure in the philosophy of action and philosophy of language. This collection brings together essays on truth, language, action and mind and thus provides an important summary of many key themes in Stoutland’s own work, as well as offering valuable perspectives on key issues in contemporary philosophy.
    Correspondence Theory of TruthTarskian Theories of TruthPrimitivism about TruthTheories of Truth, Mi…Read more
    Correspondence Theory of TruthTarskian Theories of TruthPrimitivism about TruthTheories of Truth, Misc
  •  316
    The Logical Connection Argument
    American Philosophical Quarterly. 1970.
    This is a critical discussion of the argument that since intentions are "logically connected" with their objects, Intentional actions cannot include intentions as their causes. Various versions of the argument are discussed, And it is argued that none of them shows the causal theory of intention to be inconsistent. It is argued that the causal theory is nevertheless wrong since intentions must be understood teleologically and as being, Therefore, Non-Contingently linked with actions
    Causal Theory of Action
  •  346
    Ontological simplicity and the identity hypothesis
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June): 491-509. 1971.
    Mind-Brain Identity Theory
  •  105
    Searle's consciousness: A review of John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind (review)
    Philosophical Books 35 (4): 245-254. 1994.
    Searle's Biological Naturalism
  •  166
    Oblique causation and reasons for action
    Synthese 43 (3). 1980.
    Reasons and CausesCausal Theory of ActionAction Theory, MiscellaneousIntentional Action
  •  91
    Causality, Interpretation and the Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 711-714. 1998.
    PerceptionPhilosophy of Action, MiscFree Will, MiscExplanation of Action
  •  182
    The Ontology of Social Agency
    Analyse & Kritik 30 (2): 533-551. 2008.
    The main claim of the paper is that there are irreducibly social agents that intentionally perform social actions. It argues, first, that there are social attitudes ascribable to social agents and not to the individuals involved. Second, that social agents, not only individual agents, are capable of what Weber called “subjectively understandable action.” And, third, that although action (if not merely mental) presumes an agent’s moving her body in various ways, actions do not consist of such mov…Read more
    The main claim of the paper is that there are irreducibly social agents that intentionally perform social actions. It argues, first, that there are social attitudes ascribable to social agents and not to the individuals involved. Second, that social agents, not only individual agents, are capable of what Weber called “subjectively understandable action.” And, third, that although action (if not merely mental) presumes an agent’s moving her body in various ways, actions do not consist of such movements, and hence not only individual persons but social groups are genuine agents. We should be pluralists about individuation, rejecting both individualism and collectivism by granting that social agency is neither more nor less ultimate, well-founded, or basic than non-social agency.
    Social GroupsSocial Ontology, Misc
  •  76
    Realism and Anti-Realism in Davidson's Philosophy of Language I
    Critica 14 (41): 13-53. 1982.
    Realism and Anti-Realism
  •  29
    Introduction : Anscombe's Intention in context
    In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. pp. 1-22. 2011.
    Intentional ActionNoncausal Theories of ActionIntentions, MiscExplanation of Action
  •  20
    Analytic Philosophy and Metaphysics
    Acta Philosophica Fennica 80 67. 2006.
    European PhilosophyGerman Philosophy
  •  41
    Zur Verteidigung einer Nichtpsychologishchen Theorie der Handlunsgrunde
    E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 1. 2005.
    Zur Verteidigung einer Nichtpsychologishchen Theorie der Handlunsgrunde
  •  49
    Review of Duncan Richter, Wittgenstein at His Word (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8). 2005.
    20th Century Analytic Philosophy
  •  97
    On Not Being a Realist
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89. 1989.
    Frederick Stoutland; VII*—On Not Being a Realist, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 95–112, https://doi.org/10.109.
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