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Georges Dicker

State University of New York (SUNY)
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    69
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 More details
  • State University of New York (SUNY)
    Department of Philosophy
    Other faculty (Postdoc, Visiting, etc)
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
17th/18th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (69)
  • The Annual Proceedings of the Center for Philosophic Exchange, SUNY Brockport (edited book)
    . forthcoming.
  •  171
    Anti-Berkeley
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (2). 2008.
    Berkeley: ImmaterialismBerkeley: Sensory Perception
  •  104
    Perceptual Knowledge
    Reidel. 1980.
    INTRODUCTION This book is a systematic study of the problem of perception and knowledge. I intend to analyze the problem, to expound and criticize the most...
    Perception and Knowledge, MiscEpistemic and Non-epistemic Perception
  •  362
    Kant's refutation of idealism
    Noûs 42 (1). 2008.
    Kant: Transcendental IdealismKant: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Misc
  • Horace M. Kallen, Liberty, Laughter, and Tears: Reflections on the Relations of Comedy and Tragedy to Human Freedom (review)
    Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (4): 315. 1971.
    Value TheoryPhilosophy of Specific Arts
  •  287
    Descartes and the Meditations
    Philosophical Review 114 (1): 122-125. 2005.
    René Descartes
  •  191
    Three Questions about Treatise 1.4.2
    Hume Studies 33 (1): 115-153. 2007.
    Why does Hume think that the “distinct existence” of sensible objects implies their “continu’d existence”? Does Hume have any reason for thinking that objects have an intermittent existence, other than that they lack a “distinct” existence? Why does Hume think that the inference from the “coherence” of our impressions to the continued existence of objects is “at bottom” considerably different from causal reasoning? The answers proposed are, respectively, that perceptually delimited objects would…Read more
    Why does Hume think that the “distinct existence” of sensible objects implies their “continu’d existence”? Does Hume have any reason for thinking that objects have an intermittent existence, other than that they lack a “distinct” existence? Why does Hume think that the inference from the “coherence” of our impressions to the continued existence of objects is “at bottom” considerably different from causal reasoning? The answers proposed are, respectively, that perceptually delimited objects would for Hume be causally dependent on being perceived; that Hume’s collapse of the object/perception distinction leads him to the view that objects have as “gappy” an existence as our perceptions of them, and that cases of coherence falsify the generalizations that would need to hold for inferences from coherence to qualify as causal reasoning.
    Hume: MetaphysicsHume: EpistemologyHume: Perception
  •  279
    Berkeley's idealism: a critical examination
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    Berkeley's Idealism both advances Berkeley scholarship and serves as a useful guide for teachers and students.
    Berkeley: General WorksBerkeley: ImmaterialismIdealism
  • Review of P.M.S. Hacker: Appearance and reality (review)
    Theoria 54 (3): 231. 1988.
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