•  42
    Hume Studies Referees, 2006–2007
    with Margaret Atherton, Tom Beauchamp, Deborah Boyle, Emily Carson, Dorothy Coleman, Angela Coventry, Shelagh Crooks, Remy Debes, and Paul Draper
    Hume Studies 33 (2): 385-387. 2007.
  •  3
    European and American Philosophers
    with John Marenbon, Douglas Kellner, Richard D. Parry, Gregory Schufreider, Ralph McInerny, Andrea Nye, R. M. Dancy, Vernon J. Bourke, A. A. Long, James F. Harris, Thomas Oberdan, Paul S. MacDonald, Véronique M. Fóti, F. Rosen, James Dye, Pete A. Y. Gunter, Lisa J. Downing, W. J. Mander, Peter Simons, Maurice Friedman, Robert C. Solomon, Nigel Love, Mary Pickering, Andrew Reck, Simon J. Evnine, Iakovos Vasiliou, John C. Coker, James Gouinlock, Paul J. Welty, Gianluigi Oliveri, Jack Zupko, Tom Rockmore, Wayne M. Martin, Ladelle McWhorter, Hans-Johann Glock, Georgia Warnke, John Haldane, Joseph S. Ullian, Steven Rieber, David Ingram, Nick Fotion, George Rainbolt, Thomas Sheehan, Gerald J. Massey, Barbara D. Massey, David E. Cooper, David Gauthier, James M. Humber, J. N. Mohanty, Michael H. Dearmey, Oswald O. Schrag, Ralf Meerbote, George J. Stack, John P. Burgess, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Nicholas Jolley, Adriaan T. Peperzak, E. J. Lowe, William D. Richardson, Stephen Mulhall, and C.
    In Robert L. Arrington (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophers, Blackwell. 2017.
    Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categ…Read more
  •  3
    In this chapter, the author shows how certain deep points about temporal experience drive both versions of Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories – a transcendental argument that he called a “Deduction” not because of its deductive structure but because in German the term “Deduktion” had a legal meaning signifying establishment of the right or title to something, in this case the right to apply Kant's categorical concepts – and their sequel in the Analogies of Experience. The author a…Read more
  •  7
  •  9
    Hume and Induction: Merely Cognitive Psychology?
    Hume Studies 48 (1): 79-116. 2023.
    Abstract:The purpose of Hume’s argument about induction, contra “literalist” interpretations that see it merely as psychology, is to show that induction cannot be justified. Hume maintains that the only way to justify induction would be to demonstrate or to produce a good inductive argument for the uniformity principle (UP). His most famous point is that any attempt to justify UP inductively would be circular. One may retort that no inductive argument can be circular, for a circular argument mus…Read more
  •  35
    “Cogito, Ergo Sum”: Proof or Petitio?
    The European Legacy 27 (3-4): 269-282. 2022.
    ABSTRACT E. M. Curley has said that Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum “is as obscure on examination as it is compelling at first glance.” Why should that be? Maybe because the cogito raises so many textual and interpretive questions. Is it an argument or an intuition? If it is an argument, does it require an additional premise? Is it best interpreted as a “performance?” Is it best seen as the discovery that any reason proposed for doubting its success entails the meditator’s existence? And so on. But …Read more
  •  14
    Georges Dicker here provides a commentary on John Locke's masterwork, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding-the foundational work of classical Empiricism. Dicker's commentary is an accessible guide for students who are reading Locke for the first time; a useful research tool for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students; and a contribution to Locke scholarship for professional scholars. It is designed to be read alongside the Essay, but does not presuppose familiarity with it.
  • Dewey's Theory of Knowing
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 14 (1): 77-79. 1978.
  • Perceptual Knowledge
    Mind 92 (366): 279-281. 1983.
  •  4
    The Problem of Perception, by A. D. Smith (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3): 423-430. 2006.
  •  87
    I argue that philonous gives two versions of the argument from perceptual relativity--One for the secondary qualities and another for the primary. Further, Both versions ultimately turn on the epistemological assumption that every case of perceiving, Regardless of the conditions of observation, Is a case of "knowing" the character of some "object". This assumption is made in order to avoid a vicious regress that arises when one tries to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible
  •  19
    The Analysis of Knowing (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 18 (3): 94-95. 1986.
  •  195
    Berkeley's idealism: a critical examination
    Oxford University Press. 2011.
    Berkeley's Idealism both advances Berkeley scholarship and serves as a useful guide for teachers and students.
  •  82
    Kant's Refutation of Idealism: Once More Unto the Breach
    Kantian Review 17 (2): 191-195. 2012.
    In ‘Kant's Refutation of Idealism’ (Noûs, 47), I defend a version of the Refutation, pioneered by Paul Guyer inKant and the Claims of Knowledge, whose core idea is that the only way that one can know the order of one's own past experiences, except in certain rare cases, is by correlating them with the successive states of perceived external objects that caused the experiences. Andrew Chignell has offered a probing critique of my reconstruction of Kant's argument (Philosophical Quarterly, 60), an…Read more
  •  15
    John Dewey on the Object of Knowledge
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 8 (3). 1972.
  •  34
    The problem of perception, by A. D. Smith
    European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3). 2006.
  •  3
    Book reviews (review)
    with ManfredS Frings, WilliamT Blackstone, and LawrenceS Stepelevich
    Journal of Value Inquiry 7 (4): 540. 1973.
  •  23
    A Refutation of Rowe’s Critique of Anselm’s Ontological Argument
    Faith and Philosophy 5 (2): 193-202. 1988.
    In William L. Rowe’s “The Ontological Argument,” an essay that appears in the most recent editions of Feinberg’s Reason and Responsibility and as a chapter in Rowe’s Philosophy of Religion, Rowe reconstructs Anselm’s Proslogium II argument for the existence of God, surveys critically several standard objections to it, and presents an original critique. Although Rowe’s reconstruction is perspicuous and his criticisms of the standard objections are judicious, his own critique, I argue, leaves Anse…Read more
  • Leibniz on Necessary and Contingent Propositions
    Studia Leibnitiana 14 (n/a): 221. 1982.
    Dans son Discours de Métaphysique‚ Leibniz maintient que le concept individuel d'une substance comprend et permet la déduction de tous ses prédicats, et certains prédicats d'une substance lui appartiennent néanmoins d'une manière contingente. Arnauld objecta contre Leibniz que implique la fausseté de — ce qui démontre, selon Arnauld, l'absurdité de . En puisant les réponses de Leibniz à Arnauld dans leur Correspondence, l'auteur soutient que la position de Leibniz, pourvu qu'elle soit interprété…Read more
  •  6
    Kant and Skepticism, by Michael N. Forster (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 18 (4): 609-615. 2010.
  •  189
    Descartes and the Meditations
    Philosophical Review 114 (1): 122-125. 2005.
  •  61
    Perceptual Knowledge
    Reidel. 1980.
    INTRODUCTION This book is a systematic study of the problem of perception and knowledge. I intend to analyze the problem, to expound and criticize the most ...
  •  76
    Berkeley on immediate perception: Once more unto the breach
    Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225). 2006.
    I have previously argued that within an argument to show that we cannot perceive the causes of our sensations, Berkeley's Philonous conflates a psychological and an epistemic sense of 'immediately perceive', and uses the principle of perceptual immediacy (PPI), that whatever is perceived by the senses is immediately perceived. George Pappas has objected that Berkeley does not operate with either of these concepts of immediate perception, and does not subscribe to (PPI). But I show that Berkeley'…Read more
  •  51
    Kant's masterpiece, Critique of Pure Reason, is universally recognized to be among the most difficult of all philosophical writing, and yet it is required reading in almost every course that covers modern philosophy. Most students find Critique of Pure Reason impenetrable without the help of secondary sources. While there are numerous advanced scholarly works on the topic, Dicker's is the first treatment explicitly designed for undergraduates to read alongside the primary text, rendering Kant's …Read more
  • Knowing and 'Coming-to-Know' in Dewey's Theory of Knowledge
    Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison. 1969.