Nijaz Ibrulj

The text is a drought outlining the development of logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina through several periods of history: period of Ottoman occupation and administration of the Empire, period of Austro-Hungarian occupation and administration of the Monarchy, period of Communist regime and administration of the Socialist Republic and period from the aftermath of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to this day (the Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina) and administration of the International Community. For each of the aforementioned periods, the text treats the organization of education, the educational paradigm of the model, status of logic as a subject in the educational system of a period, as well as the central figures dealing with the issue of logic (as researchers, lecturers, authors) and the key works written in each of the periods, outlining their main ideas. Thework of aNeoplatonic philosopher Porphyry, “Introduction” (Greek: Eisagogee), Latin: Isagoge; Arabic: Īsāġūğī), can be seen, in all periods of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the main text, the principal textbook, as a motivation for logical thinking. That gave me the right to introduce the syntagm Bosnia Porphyriana.

The conceptual framework that emerged in relation to Komsic’s theory of social pulsations is composed of notions we will deem convenient in the reception of this theory: the anomalous character of social causation, implicit normative inferentialism, projective semantics of social relations, projective sociology, projective social phenomenology, inferential explication of social relations, social inferentialism, and many others. This conceptual framework is part of a “partial doctrine” itself, or a counter-factual position within sociological theory that could legitimately be called projective sociology, or connectionistic social theory, that is founded on a new projective semantics of social relations. If we are able interpret Komsic’s approach to social theory through the conceptual framework presented here, then the evidence of its sustainability lies in the constructability of this new conceptual framework, that is in the mapping of structures which the two sets of propositions, or claims, produce when and if brought into resonance.

In the article we consider the relationship of traditional provisions of basic logical concepts and confront them with new and modern approaches to the same concepts. Logic is characterized in different ways when it is associated with syllogistics (referential – semantical model of logic) or with symbolic logic (inferential – syntactical model of logic). This is not only a difference in the logical calculation of (1) concepts, (2) statements, and (3) predicates, but this difference also appears in the treatment of the calculative abilities of logical forms, the ontological-referential status of conceptual content and the inferential-categorical status of logical forms. The basic markers or basic ideas that separate ontologically oriented logic from categorically oriented logic are the (1) concept of truth, the (2) concept of meaning, the (3) concept of identity, and the (4) concept of predication. Here, this differences are explicitly demonstrated by the introduction of differential terminology. From this differential methodology follows a new set of characterizations of logic.

It is my intention in this article to present some consequences of Quine’s thesis on the dependence of ontology on ideology (Quine, 1980), seeking an argument for my own thesis on the dependence (theoretical) existence of entities on identity type or ontology dependence on logic and language.If Quine's thesis is correct, then we can expand the resolution of this conclusion and say that ontology depends on the identity or on identification of the "identity criteria for conceptual schemes" (Davidson, 2001) which is constructed in the theory. Consequently I will speak about types of identity which adapts choice of ontology and of which depends ontology of a theory. Here I want to connect the different types of use of the term identity in Aristotle's writings and the different types of predications that are based on them with the concept of identity as the equivalence of symbols in modern logic. I want to reinterpret Quine's statement: "There is no entity without identity " in the form of imlication "What (kind of) identity such (kind of ) entity."

The main thesis of this paper is directed against the traditional (cognitivetheoretical) definition of the concept which claims that the concept is the '' thought about the essence of the object being thought'', i.e. that it is “a set of essential features or essential characteristics of an object''. But the '' set of essential features or essential characteristics of an object of thought'' is a '' content’’ of the thought. The thought about the essence of an object is definition and the concept is not definition but the part of definition! Besides as the part of formal structure of thought, the concept possesses calculative logical properties that in formal logic (be it syllogistics, or the logic of propositions, or the logic of predicates) come to the front place of formal logical computation. Without the calculative properties of the concept, there would be no calculative properties of propositions which express the thought (thought structures). The calculative properties of a concept include the (1) degree of its logical generality (degree of variability), the (2) logical relations it can establish within the whole of the conceptual content, the (3) operability of the concept in structure of affirmation and negation, the (4) deducibility of either axiomatic or probabilistic systems. Therefore, I believe that, from the logical point of view, the definition of a concept should be applied in favor of its calculative properties that it possesses.

Anyway, whether it's comments, reviews or critical reviews, texts of this kind they need to show how they are in some work, in someone else's opinion, in one's utterances, hold together meaning, significance and reference, and in what way they construct some kind of record, whether it is about consistency, coherence or correspondence, for some type of true value. Vincent van Gogh wrote “I exaggerate, sometimes I make changes to the subject, but still I do not invent the whole picture; on the contrary, I found a subject already prepared - but undeveloped - in the real world. ” In doing so, in the interpretation of meaning words spoken, expressed or uttered by others, in a practical or theoretical context, are always needed satisfy the principle of benevolence or the principle of affection (Davidson's Charity principle) which reduces it the number of misunderstandings in the interpretation of semantic dispositions of communication and thus the incommensurability of the beliefs of the subjects of communication is removed.

In this article I present some characteristics of logics and semantics of an uncertain world. I confront two-valued and fuzzy logic. I use Kafka’s novel Process as an example, which is designed as an uncertain context with words which are rigid designators without rigid meaning. That produces an uncertain world of logical and semantical relations. In presentation of problems I introduce basic concepts of Frege’s, Wittgenstein’s, Tarsky’s, Searle’s, Quine’s and Davidson’s philosophy of language. I differ the logical and semantical identification of identity. I differ reference and inference, or representation and identification as two components which are fundamental for the identification of identity. I found this difference on the role of logical unification and granulation of predicates in the structure of thought and semantical unification and granulation of attributes in the structure of statements and their relation to ontology of context. Through the confrontation of the logical and semantical unification and granulation I find that the limits of logic are not also the limits of language. The semantical unification goes over the highest genre and below the lowest species. That enables the extra-logical, non-scientifical, con-fessional, pro-phetical, artistic, and ordinary use of language.

In this article I present some characteristics of logics and semantics of an uncertain world. I confront two-valued and fuzzy logic. I use Kafka’s novel Process as an example, which is designed as an uncertain context with words which are rigid designators without rigid meaning. That produces an uncertain world of logical and semantical relations. In presentation of problems I introduce basic concepts of Frege’s, Wittgenstein’s, Tarsky’s, Searle’s, Quine’s and Davidson’s philosophy of language. I differ the logical and semantical identification of identity. I differ reference and inference, or representation and identification as two components which are fundamental for the identification of identity. I found this difference on the role of logical unification and granulation of predicates in the structure of thought and semantical unification and granulation of attributes in the structure of statements and their relation to ontology of context. Through the confrontation of the logical and semantical unification and granulation I find that the limits of logic are not also the limits of language. The semantical unification goes over the highest genre and below the lowest species. That enables the extra-logical, non-scientifical, con-fessional, pro-phetical, artistic, and ordinary use of language.

U tekstu se bavim logikom i semantikom nepreciznog svijeta. Konfrontiram dvovrijednosnu i fuzzy logiku. Kao primjer uzimam Kafkin roman Proces u kojemu je dizajniran neprecizni kontekst s riječima koje su rigidni označitelji bez rigidnih značenja, što proizvodi neprecizni svijet logičkih i semantičkih relacija. U predstavljanje problema uvodim temeljne koncepte filozofije jezika Fregea, Wittgensteina, Tarskog, Searlea, Quinea i Davidsona. U tekstu razlikujem logičku i semantičku identifikaciju identičnosti identiteta. Razlikujem referenciju i inferenciju, odnosno reprezentaciju i identifikaciju kao temeljne komponente kroz koje se realizira identičnost identiteta u jezičnom i logičkom smislu. Ovu razliku zasnivam na djelovanju logičke unifikacije i granulacije predikata u strukturi misli i semantičke unifikacije i granulacije atributa u strukturi iskaza i njihovu odnosu prema ontologiji konteksta.Kroz konfrontaciju logičke i semantičke unifikacije i granulacije nalazim da granice logike nisu granice jezika. Jezična unifikacija ide iznad ili preko najviše postavljenog roda i ispod najniže postavljene vrste. To omogućuje vanlogičku, neznanstvenu, konfesionalnu,umjetničku, pjesničku, profetsku i svakodnevnu upotrebu jezika.In this article I present some characteristics of logics and semantics of an uncertain world. I confront two-valued and fuzzy logic. I use Kafka’s novel Process as an example, which is designed as an uncertain context with words which are rigid designators without rigid meaning. That produces an uncertain world of logical and semantical relations. In presentation of problems I introduce basic concepts of Frege’s, Wittgenstein’s, Tarsky’s, Searle’s, Quine’s and Davidson’s philosophy of language. I differ the logical and semantical identification of identity. I differ reference and inference, or representation and identification as two components which are fundamental for the identification of identity. I found this difference on the role of logical unification and granulation of predicates in the structure of thought and semantical unification and granulation of attributes in the structure of statements and their relation to ontology of context. Through the confrontation of the logical and semanticalunification and granulation I find that the limits of logic are not also the limits of language. The semantical unification goes over the highest genre and below the lowest species. That enables the extra-logical, non-scientifical, con-fessional, pro-phetical, artistic, and ordinary use of language