David Magnus

In 2011, Ingmar Riedel‐Kruse's bioengineering laboratory at Stanford University publicized an application that uses paramecia for what the researchers termed “biotic games.” These games make use of living organisms, computer programs, and lab equipment to implement games like Pong, Pac‐man, and soccer. Gamesand related activities are often considered nonserious or trivial, whereas life, biological systems, and science are treated very seriously in moral analysis and public perception. The manipulation of living matter frequently engenders at least some controversy in the marketplace of ideas, and using living things in games is no exception. Some of the objections lodged against biotic games have appeared in the ethics literature on similar topics; however, the addition of an entertainment element introduces some objections distinct from those about similar cases, as the online comments vividly illustrate. We aim to explore and address the objections in this paper, using the comments to organize and launch the discussion. In scientific work, there is typically a presumption of some prospect of translation and application of generated knowledge for public benefit. In the case of biotic games, these applications are not self‐evident. Because of this, a serious analysis of the justifications, limitations, and features of biotic games is warranted. To this end, we outline key ethical limits that ought to be placed on these activities as well as the obligations that these activities generate for researchers, other professionals, and lay people who design, implement, use, and play them.

Institutional ethics consultation services for biomedical scientists have begun to proliferate, especially for clinical researchers. We discuss several models of ethics consultation and describe a team-based approach used at Stanford University in the context of these models. As research ethics consultation services expand, there are many unresolved questions that need to be addressed, including what the scope, composition, and purpose of such services should be, whether core competencies for consultants can and should be defined, and how conflicts of interest should be mitigated. We make preliminary recommendations for the structure and process of research ethics consultation, based on our initial experiences in a pilot program.

Approaching science by considering the epistemological virtues which scientists see as constitutive of good science, and the way these virtues trade-off against one another, makes it possible to capture action that may be lost by approaches which focus on either the theoretical or institutional level. Following Wimsatt (1984) I use the notion of heuristics and biases to help explore a case study from the history of biology. Early in the 20th century, mutation theorists and natural historians fought over the role that isolation plays in evolution. This debate was principally about whether replication was the central scientific virtue (and hence the ultimate goal of science to replace non-experimental evidence with experimental evidence) or whether consilience of inductions was the central virtue (and hence, as many kinds of evidence as possible should be pursued).

Biologists often define evolution as a change in allele frequencies. Consideration of the evolution of the pocket mouse will show that it is possible to have evolution without any change in the allele frequencies in a population (through change in the genotype frequencies). The implications of this for genic selectionism are then discussed. Sober and Lewontin (1982) have constructed an example to demonstrate the blindness of genic selectionism in certain cases. Sterelny and Kitcher (1988) offer a defense against these arguments which assumes a conventionalist approach to populations. The example considered here will be shown to offer a more plausible and far-reaching argument against the view that alleles can always be seen as the units of selection.