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1Analysis 52.4 october 1992In Delia Graff & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Vagueness, Ashgate. pp. 27--207. 1994.
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291Mellor on chance and causation (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3): 411-433. 1997.Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also that any notion of chance which conforms to…Read more
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226
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351Vagueness by DegreesIn Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader, Mit Press. 1996.Book synopsis: Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms-such as "tall", "red", "bald", and "tadpole"—have borderline cases ; and they lack well-defined extensions. The phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate. Another striking problem to which vagueness gives rise is the sorites paradox. If yo…Read more
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5Conditionals, truth and assertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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56Ramsey's Legacies on Conditionals and TruthIn Hallvard Lillehammer & David Hugh Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford University Press. 2005.Book synopsis: The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors o…Read more
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248X*—Meaning, Bivalence and RealismProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 153-174. 1981.Dorothy Edgington; X*—Meaning, Bivalence and Realism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 153–174, https://doi.org/1.
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The pragmatics of the logicalIn Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 768. 2005.
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61Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some PuzzlesIn Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--73. 1992.
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15And AssertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. pp. 283. 2009.
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116The Presidential Address: CounterfactualsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3). 2008.
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140Verificationism and the Manifestations of MeaningAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1): 17-52. 1985.
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166
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157The Philosophical Problem of VaguenessLegal Theory 7 (4): 371-378. 2001.Think of the color spectrum, spread out before you. You can identify the different colors with ease. But if you are asked to indicate the point at which one color ends and the next begins, you are at a loss. “There is no such point,” is a natural thought: One color just shades gradually into the next.
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ADAMS, E. W. "The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic" (review)Mind 87 (n/a): 619. 1978.
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Probability |