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15And AssertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. pp. 283. 2009.
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26Ramsey's Legacies on Conditionals and TruthIn Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford University Press. 2005.Book synopsis: The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors o…Read more
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241Vagueness by DegreesIn Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader, Mit Press. 1997.Book synopsis: Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms-such as "tall", "red", "bald", and "tadpole"—have borderline cases ; and they lack well-defined extensions. The phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate. Another striking problem to which vagueness gives rise is the sorites paradox. If yo…Read more
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25Graeme Forbes, "The Metaphysics of Modality" (review)Philosophical Quarterly 38 (52): 365. 1988.
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36The Presidential Address: CounterfactualsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3). 2008.
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42The Inaugural Address: Two Kinds of PossibilityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 1-22. 2004.I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
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Verificationism and the Manifestations of MeaningAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 17-52. 1985.
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34X*—Meaning, Bivalence and RealismProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 153-174. 1981.Dorothy Edgington; X*—Meaning, Bivalence and Realism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 153–174, https://doi.org/1.
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23Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to CounterfactualsIn Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation, Oxford University Press. pp. 230. 2011.
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The pragmatics of the logicalIn Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 768. 2006.
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37The mystery of the missing boundary (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3). 2005.
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Probability |