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150Identity, individuality, and unityPhilosophy 78 (3): 321-336. 2003.Locke notoriously included number amongst the primary qualities of bodies and was roundly criticized for doing so by Berkeley. Frege echoed some of Berkeley's criticisms in attacking the idea that ‘Number is a property of external things’, while defending his own view that number is a property of concepts. In the present paper, Locke's view is defended against the objections of Berkeley and Frege, and Frege's alternative view of number is criticized. More precisely, it is argued that numbers are…Read more
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180Review. Interpreting bodies: Classical and quantum objects in modern physics. E Castellani [ed] (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2): 353-355. 2000.
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110Serious endurantism and the strong unity of human personsIn Benedikt Schick, Edmund Runggaldier & Ludger Honnefelder (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 67. 2009.
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124Two Notions of Being: Entity and EssenceRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 23-48. 2008.
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58Is conceptualist realism a stable position? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2). 2005.
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26Review of Frank Plumpton Ramsey and Maria Carla Galavotti: Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2): 300-301. 1997.
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226Mereological Extensionality, Supplementation, and Material ConstitutionThe Monist 96 (1): 131-148. 2013.
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98The mind in natureInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4). 2009.This Article does not have an abstract
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50Physical causal closure and the invisibility of mental causationIn Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation, Imprint Academic. pp. 137-154. 2003.
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503What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?Mind 121 (484): 919-950. 2012.There is currently intense interest in the question of the source of our presumed knowledge of truths concerning what is, or is not, metaphysically possible or necessary. Some philosophers locate this source in our capacities to conceive or imagine various actual or non-actual states of affairs, but this approach is open to certain familiar and seemingly powerful objections. A different and ostensibly more promising approach has been developed by Timothy Williamson, according to which our capaci…Read more
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22Origins of Analytical Philosophy By Michael Dummett London:Duckworth, 1993, xi+199pp., £25.00 (review)Philosophy 69 (268): 246-. 1994.
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22The Determinists Have Run Out of Luck—For a Good ReasonPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 745-748. 2008.
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61One-Level versus Two-Level Identity CriteriaAnalysis 51 (4). 1991.E. J. Lowe; One-level versus two-level identity criteria, Analysis, Volume 51, Issue 4, 1 October 1991, Pages 192–194, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/51.4.192.
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262Reply to le poidevin and MellorMind 96 (384): 539-542. 1987.In ‘Time, Change and the “Indexical Fallacy”’,1 Robin Le Poidevin and D. H. Mellor criticize an earlier paper of mine2 both for failing to rebut an argument of McTaggart's and for failing to explain why time is the dimension of change. I consider that their criticisms miss the mark on both scores, partly through misrepresentation of my views and partly through defective argumentation
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91Some varieties of metaphysical dependenceIn Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (eds.), Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence, Philosophia. pp. 193-210. 2013.In this paper, I first of all define various kinds of ontological dependence, motivating these definitions by appeal to examples. My contention is that whenever we need, in metaphysics, to appeal to some notion of existential or identity-dependence, one or other of these definitions will serve our needs adequately, which one depending on the case in hand. Then I respond to some objections to one of these proposed definitions in particular, namely, my definition of (what I call) essential identit…Read more
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105Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of ConceptualismPhilosophia Scientiae 12 (1): 9-33. 2008.Le réalisme métaphysique est la conception suivant laquelle la plupart des objets qui peuplent le monde existent indépendamment de notre pensée et possèdent une nature indépendante de la manière dont nous pouvons éventuellement la concevoir. A mon sens cette position engage à admettre une forme robuste d'essentialisme. Beaucoup des formes modernes de l'anti-réalisme tirent leurs origines d'une forme de conceptualisme, suivant laquelle toutes les vérités que nous puissions connaître au sujet des …Read more
Areas of Specialization
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Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Physical Science |