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Adam Pautz

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  •  10
    Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?
    In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234. 2013.
    The chapter criticizes the thesis that “cognitive phenomenology” might help ground mental content. Criticisms concern what the chapter calls “altered cognitive qualia cases”, “absent cognitive qualia cases”, and “disembodied cognitive qualia cases”. But the chapter defends a thesis in the same vicinity. In the chapter's view, it is sensory phenomenology, not “cognitive phenomenology”, that is the source of all determinate intentionality. To explain how, a modified version of David Lewis’s theory…Read more
  • Consciousness: A Simple Approach
    In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  • Poise, Dispositions, and Access Consciousness: Reply to Daniel Stoljar (edited book)
    with Daniel Stoljar
    MIT Press. 2019.
  •  48
    What are the Contents of Experiences?
    In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Admissible Contents of Experience, Wiley-blackwell. 2011.
    I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
  •  119
    The Perceptual Representation of Objects and Natural Kinds: Comments on Speaks
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2): 470-477. 2017.
  •  102
    Sensory awareness as irreducible: From internalist intentionalism to primitivism
    I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual _a priori_ considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly _a posteriori_ premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis
    Internalism and Externalism about ExperienceConsciousness and Materialism
  •  56
    Can color structure be explained in terms of color experience?
    Hardin argues that Reflectance Physicalism about color fails because it cannot accommodate color structure. David Lewis and others have replied that the Reflectance Physicalist may explain color structure in terms of color experience. I argue that this reply fails
    ColorColor Experience