Aidarkhan Kussainov

Across the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities, an inherited habit of mind is being dismantled: thing-thinking, the presupposition that reality is composed of separable things. This article advances the first sustained processual rereading of Nietzsche’s corpus and argues for a paradigm shift in Nietzsche scholarship that brings the discipline into the broader interdisciplinary process turn. From the earliest lectures to the final notes of 1889, Nietzsche’s thought moves through four mutually implicating operators: process as forces, will to power, eternal return and chance. Together they make apparent things, subjects, causes and values legible as temporary stabilisations within becoming, while familiar contradictions emerge where commentary stills what Nietzsche keeps in motion. The argument is tested against Bergson, Whitehead and Deleuze, then subjected to its hardest independent test at the seam where Nietzsche’s ontology and quantum theory converge structurally, without prophecy, reduction or anachronism. Nietzsche’s singular contribution is diagnostic. He reveals why thought needs things, how language fabricates them and what kind of life can endure their disappearance. Processual rereading becomes a condition of adequate interpretation and a discipline for thinking, inhabiting and creating after the world of things.

Across physics, biology and the social sciences, explanation increasingly begins with relation, recurrence and temporary stabilisation rather than with self-sufficient things. This article advances the first sustained corpus-wide processual rereading of Nietzsche and argues for a paradigm shift in Nietzsche scholarship that brings the field into synch with that broader interdisciplinary process turn. From the earliest writings to the late Nachlass, Nietzsche's thought operates through four mutually implicating dynamic operators — process as forces, will to power, eternal return, and chance — that together articulate a thoroughgoing ontology of becoming. Familiar interpretive contradictions, we show, arise where commentary first stabilises what Nietzsche keeps in motion. The reading is tested against the modern process canon — Bergson, Whitehead and Deleuze each retain a final reserve Nietzsche removes — and exposed to its hardest independent test through a disciplined account of structural convergence with twentieth-century physics, conducted at strict distance from prophecy, reduction and anachronism. The methodological consequence is exact: processual rereading becomes a condition of adequate interpretation, and the paradigm shift it proposes reaches beyond Nietzsche scholarship to the cognition and existence of a species learning to think without the shelters things provided.